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INTRODUcrION
Controversy surrounding Roe v. Wade 1 has grown steadily in the nearly
two decades since the case was decided. Supreme Court appointments by
two administrations openly hostile to Roe may finally have presented Roe's
original dissenting Justices with the votes needed to overrule or substantially
revise the decision. With the prospect of Roe's demise at hand, it is no
longer clear what protections, if any, will be afforded the right to abortion,
as a matter of federal constitutional law.
The abortion right has been so closely identified with the opinion which
first recognized it that their fates now seem inseparable. The most vigorous
constitutional objections to protecting the abortion right have been articu-
lated as criticisms of Roe. Constitutional critics of the abortion right have
argued that the privacy analysis Roe employed to protect the abortion deci-
sion lacks textual support in the Constitution, have questioned whether the
abortion decision deserves the same protection as other rights of privacy,
and have attacked Roe's trimester framework as imposing unreasonable re-
straints on the state's interest in protecting potential life.2 The apparent
premise of such criticism is that ifRoe's reasoning is infirm, then so too are
the constitutional underpinnings of the abortion right itself.3
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518-20 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,221-23 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Roe. 410 U.S. at 171-78
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLmCAL SE-
DUCTION OF THE LAW 111-16 (1990); John Hart Ely, The Wages a/Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REv. 159.
3. Justice O'Connor stands alone among prominent critics of Roe in suggesting an alternate,
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Yet, there are serious constitutional concerns presented by abortion-
restrictive regulation that Roe does not address. Restricting women's access
to abortion implicates constitutional values of equality as well as privacy, as
the Court itself suggested in Thornburgh v. American College ofObstetricians
and Gynecologists.4 A growing number of commentators have begun to ad-
dress abortion regulation as an issue of sexual equality,s articulating con-
cerns scarcely recognized in prevailing accounts of abortion as a right of
privacy. Properly understood, constitutional limitations on antiabortion
laws, like constitutional limitations on antimiscegenation laws, have moor-
ings in both privacy and equal protection.6
although narrower, constitutional framework for the decision. See Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828-33 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452-75 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). But cf. Webster, 492 U.S. at 527-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (declining to join a plurality opinion that adopts some of her criticisms of the trimester
framework).
4. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). Concluding its opinion in Thornburgh, the Court observed:
The Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will
be kept largely beyond the reach of government. . . . That promise extends to women as
well as men. . . • A woman's right to make [the abortion] choice freely is fundamental.
Any other result ••• would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere ofliberty that
our law guarantees equally to all.
Id. at 772 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun discusses both liberty and equality concerns
presented by abortion-restrictive regulation in Webster, 492 U.S. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see text accompanying notes 359-360 infra.
5. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATIITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW
PERSPECIlVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 101-06 (1985); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93-102 (1987); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1353-59 (2d ed. 1988); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 (1985);
Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1,53-59 (1977) [hereinafter Karst, Foreword]; Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984
DUKE L.J. 447, 472-75 [hereinafter Karst, Woman's Constitution]; Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1308-24 (1991); Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise,
103 HARV. L. REv. 105, 117-35 (1989); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L.
REv. 1569, 1621-45 (1979); Ellen Relkin & Sudi Solomon, Using State Constitutions to Expand
Public Fundingfor Abortions: Throwing away the Carrot with the Stick, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 27
(1986) (privacy and equal protection); Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special
Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 1992). For
other arguments with deep affinities to the equal protection approach, see Andrew Koppelman,
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense ofAbortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480 (1990); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 788-91 (1989).
For briefs employing an equal protection framework to analyze abortion-restrictive regulation,
see, e.g., Brief for the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), reprinted in 11
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 281 (1989); Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to Women's
Equality as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (privacy and equal protection), reprinted in 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 249,
265-67; Brief Amici Curiae on Behalfof the New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women, et al., Right
to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982) (challenging abortion funding restrictions on
state constitutional grounds of privacy and equality), reprinted in 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 285
(1982).
6. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) (striking down antimiscegenation statute on
equal protection and due process grounds); cf. Karst, Foreword, supra note 5, at 57 (Supreme Court
"decisions protecting 'fundamental' interests related to procreation, marriage, and particularly non-
marriage .... can be seen as 'woman's role' cases. So viewed, they implicate the principle of equal
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There are, however, substantial impediments to analyzing abortion-
restrictive regulation in an equal protection framework, which few propo-
nents of the claim have confronted. The Court has yet to characterize laws
governing pregnancy as sex-based state action for purposes of equal protec-
tion review;7 but, even if it did so, a deeper jurisprudential problem remains.
The Court typically reasons about reproductive regulation in physiological
paradigms, as a form of state action that concerns physical facts of sex rather
than social questions of gender. It has often observed that the reality of
reproductive differences between the sexes justifies their differential regula-
tory treatment.8 This mode of reasoning about reproductive regulation ob-
scures the possibility that such regulation may be animated by
constitutionally illicit judgments about women. Thus, while sex-based state
action is generally scrutinized to ensure it is free of "old notions of role
typing" or other vestiges of the separate spheres tradition9-such as the as-
sumption that women are "child-rearers"lo or the assumption that "the fe-
male [is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family"ll-
regulation which directly concerns women's role in reproduction has yet to
receive similar scrutiny.
Like any other form of sex-based state action, regulation directed at
women's role in reproduction demands exacting scrutiny to ensure it does
not reflect or enforce traditional gender role assumptions. Equal protection
jurisprudence has repeatedly articulated principles that would support such
an inquiry. But current doctrine lacks the critical capacity to discern gender
bias in reproductive regulation, a grasp of how regulation respecting preg-
nancy-a "real" physical difference between the sexes--can nevertheless be
citizenship, for they involve some of the most important aspects of a woman's independence, her
control over her own destiny.") (footnotes omitted).
Employing an equal protection framework could prove important in understanding the limita-
tions imposed on abortion regulation, not only by the United States Constitution, but by state consti-
tutions as well. See, e.g.• Relkin & Solomon, supra note 5 (challenging abortion funding restrictions
on state constitutional grounds of privacy and equality). It would also affect how courts evaluate
fetal.prqtective regulation outside the abortion context. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Crea-
tion of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy. and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regula-
tion ofPregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 197-204 (1989) [hereinafter
Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs] (analyzing fetal-protective regulation of women on privacy and sex
equality grounds).
7. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); text accompanying notes 17-28 infra. But cf.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (distinctions on the basis of pregnancy are distinctions on the basis of
sex under federal civil rights law governing employment discrimination). See generally Law, supra
note 5 (arguing that regulation governing pregnancy should be analyzed as sex-based state action for
purposes of equal protection review).
8. See. e.g.• text accompanying note 37 infra.
9. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); id. at 198-99 (rejecting statutory schemes
premised on "increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home
rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas' ") (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15
(1975»; cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) ("Although the test
for determining the validity of a gender based classification is straightforward, it must be applied free
of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.").
10. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
11. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14.
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 265 1991-1992
January 1992] REASONING FROM THE BODY 265
sexually discriminatory. Without this understanding, analysis of abortion-
restrictive regulation cannot be fully assimilated into an equal protection
framework.
Abortion-restrictive regulation can be analyzed as an expression of sex
discrimination: as legislation that reflects traditional sex-role assumptions
about women and presents problems of gender bias discernible in other
forms of sex-based state action. But to perform this analysis, it is necessary
to break out of the physiological paradigms in which the Court reasons
about reproductive regulation in both privacy and equal protection law.
More than any doctrinal factor, it is the physiological framework in which
the Court reasons about reproductive regulation that obscures the gender-
based judgments that may animate such regulations and the gender-based
injuries they can inflict on women. When abortion-restrictive regulation is
analyzed in physiological paradigms, as past cases have shown, the inquiry
focuses on questions concerning gestation. By contrast, if restrictions on
abortion are analyzed in a social framework, they present questions concern-
ing the regulation of motherhood, and, thus, value judgments concerning
women's roles.
This article employs historical analysis to situate abortion-restrictive reg-
ulation in a social framework, building its argument from an account of the
original campaign to criminalize abortion during the nineteenth century.
Those who advocated restricting women's access to abortion in the nine-
teenth century were interested in enforcing women's roles, an objective they
justified with arguments concerning women's bodies. 12 Analyzing the his-
torical record reveals how social discourses concerning women's roles have
converged with physiological discourses concerning women's bodies, as two
distinct but compatible ways of reasoning about women's obligations as
mothers. When issues which we habitually conceptualize in terms of
women's bodies are reconsidered in light of this history, it is possible to see
that they in fact involve questions concerning women's roles. Considered
from this perspective, abortion-restrictive regulation presents many of the
concerns that have traditionally triggered heightened equal protection
scrutiny.
The article is organized in four parts. Part I identifies a central analytic
deficiency in constitutional doctrines governing reproductive regulation:
The Court addresses reproduction as if it were primarily a physiological pro-
cess and evaluates its regulation in terms focused on the female body. This
tendency, which I call "physiological naturalism," informs both equal pro-
tection law and the analysis of abortion-restrictive regulation offered in Roe.
Consequently, abortion-restrictive regulation has been evaluated in ways
that obscure the social norms that shape women's interests in abortion, as
well as public interest in its regulation.
To illustrate the critical limitations and historical lineage of this natural-
istic framework, Part II offers a detailed account of the nineteenth century
12. See. e.g., text accompanying notes 121-133 infra.
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campaign to criminalize abortion. The doctors who led the nineteenth cen-
tury campaign attacked abortion in the physiological discourse of their pro-
fession, depicting the practice as inimical to diverse aspects of social life.
They emphasized that restricting women's access to abortion was necessary,
not only to protect the unborn, but also to ensure that women performed
their obligations as wives and mothers and to preserve the ethnic character
of the nation. Analysis of the criminalization campaign demonstrates that
abortion-restrictive regulation may be driven in significant part by constitu-
tionally illicit concerns, reflecting normative judgments about women, not
simply concern for the unborn. At the same time, this inquiry reveals that
physiological modes of reasoning about women's reproductive role have a
social history: From the criminalization of abortion to the protective legisla-
tion upheld in Muller v. Oregon,13 physiological argument has played an
important role in justifying regulation that enforces relations of gender
status.
Part III considers contemporary interest in protecting unborn life in light
of the nineteenth century campaign. Claims about women's roles openly
voiced in the nineteenth century do not appear in arguments for protecting
unborn life today. Upon closer examination, however, it can be seen that
gender-based judgments do continue to inform arguments for regulation of
women's reproductive conduct; today these judgments can be articulated in
the physiological modes of argument the campaign inaugurated. Ifone ana-
lyzes the incidence and structure of fetal-protective regulation, it is possible
to see that such regulation reflects social judgments about women's roles,
and not simply solicitude for the welfare of the unborn. The diverse means a
society employs to promote the welfare of unborn generations reflect varying
normative judgments about women and have dramatically different effects
on women's lives.
Part IV employs the historical and critical perspectives developed
throughout the article to analyze abortion-restrictive regulation in an equal
protection framework. Legislation restricting women's access to abortion
forces women to bear children. Today, as in the past, a legislature's decision
to save fetal life by compelling pregnancy is one that both reflects and en-
forces social judgments concerning women's roles. This can be seen by ana-
lyzing the incidence and structure of abortion-restrictive regulation, a
process which illuminates the types of gender bias that may animate such
regulation and the types of injuries it can inflict on women. So analyzed, it is
clear that abortion-restrictive regulation can violate the antidiscrimination
and antisubordination principles which give the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection its meaning.
13. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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I. PHYSIOLOGICAL NATURALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Clearly, reproduction has been regarded as quite different from other natu-
ral functions which, on the surface, seem to be equally imbued with neces-
sity; eating, sexuality and dying, for example, share with birth the status of
biological necessities. Yet it has never been suggested that these topics can
be understood only in terms of natural science.14
Mary O'Brien (1981)
Social forces playa powerful part in shaping the process of reproduction.
Social forces define the circumstances under which a woman conceives a
child, including how voluntary her participation in intercourse may be. So-
cial forces determine whether a woman has access to methods of preventing
and terminating a pregnancy, and whether it is acceptable for her to use
them. Social forces determine the quality of health care available to a
woman during pregnancy, and they determine whether a pregnant woman
will be able to support herself throughout the term of gestation, or instead
will be forced to depend on others for support. Social relations determine
who cares for a child once it is born, and what resources, rewards, and pen-
alties attend the work of gestating and nurturing human life.
Thus, human reproduction is not simply a physiological process; like eat-
ing and dying, it is a social process, occurring in and governed by culture. In
each culture, norms and practices of the community, including those offam-
ily, market, medicine, church, and state, combine to shape the social rela-
tions of reproduction. If physiological forces seem to define the process of
reproduction, it is because most cultures reason about the social relations of
reproduction as part of the physical relations of reproduction, that is, as
unalterable aspects of nature; ideologies of gender sustain these habits of
thought. Ideological norms and institutional practices pertaining to repro-
duction playa central part in defining women's status, the dignity they are
accorded, the degradations to which they are subjected, and the degree of
autonomy they are allowed or dependency they must suffer. These norms
and practices affect women who are mothers most intensely, but in one way
or another they affect all women.
These observations, tenets of anthropological and. feminist critical
thought,I5 do not inform the reasoning of those charged with interpreting
the Constitution. In crafting equal protection and due process doctrine con-
cerning reproductive regulation, the Court has typically reasoned from the
premise that women's reproductive role is dictated by nature, and that regu-
lation of women's reproductive conduct can be evaluated by consulting facts
of nature. The result is that social relations enforced by the body politic
14. MARY O'BRIEN, THE POLmcs OF REPRODUCTION 20 (1981).
15. See, e.g., ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1990); WOMAN, CULTURE, AND SOCI-
ETY (Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds., 1974); Joan Kelly-Gadol, The Social
Relations of the Sexes: Methodological Implications of Women's History, in THE SIGNS READER II
(Elizabeth Abel & Emily K. Abel eds., 1983).
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often find constitutional justification in the organization of the female body
itself. The interpretive assumptions of physiological naturalism inform both
equal protection and due process doctrine, inhibiting judicial scrutiny of the
social norms and practices that shape reproduction and its regulation. Con-
sequently, both privacy and equal protection precedents governing regula-
tion of women's reproductive lives are inordinately preoccupied with the
physiological character of women's reproductive role and correspondingly
inattentive to the social logic of its regulation.
A. Physiological Naturalism in Equal Protection Doctrine
The Court's equal protection rulings on reproductive regulation have
drawn abundant criticism. They were announced early in the development
of constitutional sex discrimination doctrine, but, to date, the Court has not
seen fit to elaborate upon or to amend them. In Cleveland Board ofEduca-
tion v. LaFleur 16 and Geduldig v. Aiello,17 cases decided in the years imme-
diately following Roe, the Court was faced with two classic instances of
pregnancy discrimination in employment. LaFleur involved a mandatory
maternity leave policy that forbade school teachers to work after their fourth
or fifth month of pregnancy. Geduldig involved a state disability insurance
plan that provided unemployment benefits for virtually all work-disabling
physical conditions except pregnancy. The two policies exemplified the so-
cial judgment that pregnancy is incommensurate with employment, graphi-
cally illustrating the use of public power to transform the physiological act
of gestation into a gendered condition of economic dependency. IS In both
LaFleur and Geduldig, the lower courts struck down the sex-based regula-
tion on equal protection groundS.19 In neither case did the Supreme Court
follow their analysis. It invalidated the mandatory maternity leave policy in
LaFleur because it embodied an irrebuttable presumption that violated re-
quirements of due process, and it upheld the disability insurance exclusion in
Geduldig as consistent with requirements of equal protection.20
The Court's equal protection analysis in Geduldig is by now infamous.21
The Court refused to recognize a classification based on pregnancy as sex-
16. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
17. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
18. The same is true of the policy in Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44
(1975) (per curiam), which the Court decided following its holding in LaFleur. Turner concerned a
Utah law making pregnant women ineligible for unemployment compensation for 12 weeks preced-
ing and six weeks following the expected date of childbirth.
19. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1973) ("[Much] of our society's views
concerning the debilitating effects of pregnancy are more ofa response to cultural sex-role condition-
ing than a response to medical fact and necessity."), rev'd sub nom., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974); LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1972) (''This record indi-
cates clearly that pregnant women teachers have been singled out for unconstitutionally unequal
restrictions upon their employment."), ajf'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
20. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494; LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 648.
21. See, e.g., Law, supra note 5, at 983-84 ("Criticizing Geduldig has since become a cottage
industry.... Even the principal scholarly defense of Geduldig admits that the Court was wrong in
refusing to recognize that the classification was sex-based...•").
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 269 1991-1992
January 1992] REASONING FROM THE BODY 269
based, insisting the disability exclusion did not "involv[e] discrimination
based upon gender as such,"22 because "[t]he program divides potential re-
cipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes."23 Although this approach to characterizing regulatory classifi-
cations was by no means compelled by precedent,24 the Court employed it
without attempting to reconcile its holding with the concerns of equal pro-
tection doctrine.2s Instead the Court justified its refusal to recognize preg-
nancy regulations as sex-based state action for purposes of equal protection
review with the observation that
[n]onnal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving preg-
nancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally
free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as
this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition.26
At the simplest level, Geduldig's holding that pregnancy classifications
are not sex-based can be criticized on physiological grounds. The Court ig-
nored the fact that the capacity to gestate distinguishes the sexes physi-
cally.27 But,just as importantly, the Court ignored the fact that the capacity
to gestate distinguishes the sexes socially: Judgments about women's capac-
ity to bear children playa key role in social definitions of gender roles and
thus in the social logic of "discrimination based on gender as such."
This critical perception is lacking in Geduldig. Because the Court viewed
22. Gedu/dig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
23. Id.
24. Many regulatory classifications struck down on equal protection grounds do not pertain to
an entire suspect class. For example, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court invalidated a
statute that designated persons entitled to administer an intestate's estate because it gave a prefer-
ence to men where several persons were otherwise equally entitled. As the Court itself pointed out,
"Idaho does not ..• deny letters of administration to women altogether. Indeed, under § 15-312, a
woman whose spouse dies intestate has a preference over a son, father, brother, or any other male
relative of the decedent." Ill. at 75. The statute in Reed operated like the disability insurance pro-
gram in Gedu/dig. The policy challenged in Reed denied administrator status to a particular class of
women; the statute conferred administrator status on men and women both. Cf. Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (treating an employer's refusal to hire women with preschool-
age children as a sex-based policy for purposes of employment discrimination law).
The Court might easily have characterized the disability insurance program challenged in
Gedu/dig as sex-based on the grounds that it discriminates between male and female employees who
procreate, or that it discriminates between those employees who have the capacity to gestate and
those who do not. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
25. It is hard to see why concerns about bias that inform the proscription against sex-based
state action would not be as urgent in the case oflegislation that affects most women and no men as
they are in the case of legislation that affects all women and no men.
26. Gedu/dig. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
27. Cf. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(pregnancy exclusion is sex-based because "the capacity to become pregnant ... primarily differenti-
ates the female from the male"); Gedu/dig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[D]issimilar
treatment of men and women on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex,
inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.").
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pregnancy as "an objectively identifiable physical condition," about which
"reasonable," as distinct from "invidious," discriminations could be made, it
required plaintiffs to prove that any pregnancy regulations they challenged
were "mere pretexts" designed to accomplish some other discriminatory
end. To be actionable as sex discrimination in this framework, a state's deci-
sion to provide employment insurance for all work-disabling conditions ex-
cept pregnancy would have to reflect an abstract animus toward women as
such-rather than, for example, a belief that a pregnant employee would
not, or should not, remain in the work force, or that she would, or should,
have someone to support her. Beliefs of this sort and the practices they
make "reasonable" (such as denying pregnant women unempioyment insur-
ance benefits) are part of the social relations of reproduction which define
motherhood as a condition of economic dependency. Because the Court
evaluated the exclusionary pregnancy policy in a framework that focused on
the physical rather than social relations of reproduction, it could see that
"[n]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition vlith
unique characteristics," but could not see that the state's pregnancy policy
reflected and enforced social judgments about women's roles.
Despite changes affecting the treatment ofpregnancy in employment dis-
crimination law, the Court has continued to analyze reproductive regulation
in physiological paradigms, interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in ways
that suggest that regulation concerning pregnancy presents little possibility
of sex discrimination.28
The physiological naturalism informing the Court's reasoning in
Geduldig emerged again to shape the Court's analysis in Michael M. v. Supe-
rior Court. 29 In this case, the Court upheld a statutory rape law against
equal protection challenge, even though the statute criminalized only men's
participation in an otherWise consensual act of sexual intercourse. Although
ample historical evidence indicated that the law had been enacted to protect
female chastity, the Court chose to evaluate it as if it had been enacted to
prevent teenage pregnancy.3D Once the statutory rape law was analyzed as a
28. Two years after Gedu/dig, the Court applied the same reasoning to Gilbert, an employment
discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oo0e to 20ooe-17
(1988), again refusing to recognize regulation respecting pregnancy as sex-based. See Gilbert, 429
U.S. at 136 ("Gedu/dig is precisely in point in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy from a
disability benefits plan •.. is not a gender-based discrimination at all.''). This decision set off a
controversy that prompted Congress to amend Title VII to make clear that distinctions on the basis
of pregnancy are sex-based. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92
Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988» ("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the
basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions •..•").
Despite these developments, the Court continued to construe the Equal Protection Clause in
ways that suggested that regulation concerning pregnancy was not sex-based and presented little
possibility of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (the Hyde
Amendment restricting abortion funding "is not predicated on a constitutionaIly suspect classifica-
tion"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977) (statute restricting abortion funding "involves no
discrimination against a suspect class").
29. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
30. ld. at 470 ("We are satisfied ... that·the prevention of illegitimate pregnancy is at least one
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form of reproductive regulation, the sex distinctions in the statute found
their legal justification in physical distinctions between the sexes. As Justice
Rehnquist explained, "[w]e need not be medical doctors to discern that
young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the
problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become
pregnant and they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emo-
tional, and psychological consequences of sexual activity."31 A legislature
was entitled "to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of
the consequences of his conduct" because "the risk of pregnancy itself con-
stitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanc-
tions deter males."32 By this reasoning, pregnancy imposes "natural
sanctions" on women, to which men "by nature" are immune. Men are
therefore properly subject to the state's criminal law, which will " 'equalize'
the deterrents" to sexual relations imposed on women by nature.33
The equal protection analysis offered in Michael M. takes the complex
questions posed by a sex-based statutory rape law and reduces them to a
problem that concerns women's reproductive physiology. A frank account
of the normative concerns that might support the constitutionality of such a
law would focus on the social conditions in which women conceive, bear,
and rear children, not the physical fact that "[o]nly women may become
pregnant."34 Ifa sex-based statutory rape law can be reconciled with values
of equal protection, it is because the social relations of reproduction affect
young women differently than they affect young men: Young women are
vulnerable to types of coercion, stigma, and disadvantage in matters of sex
and parenthood that young men do not face.35 Michael M. discusses these
troubling aspects of gender relations as "natural sanctions" "suffer[ed]" by
women, to which men, "by nature," are not subject-reasoning about gender
inequalities as if they were immediate "consequences" of the physical facts
of sex.
Because the Court does not discriminate between the physical and social
relations of reproduction, it evaluates regulatory decisions about reproduc-
tion as if they were merely responses to the physical realities of reproduc-
tion, and thus can "realistically refiect[] the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances."36 The naturalistic framework
of the 'purposes' of the statute .•.."). But cf. id. at 494-96 & nn.9-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the
history of statutory rape laws reveals that legislators were concerned with protecting teenage chas-
tity, not preventing teenage pregnancy; the terms of the challenged statute suggest that it "was
initially designed to further these outmoded sexual stereotypes"); see also Rita Eidson, Co=ent,
The Constitutionality ofStatutory Rape LaWs, 27 UCLA L. REv. 757, 762-68 (1980).
31. Michael M.. 450 U.S. at 471 (plurality opinion).
32. Id. at 473.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 471.
35. Social analysis ofa sex-based statutory rape law may support arguments for and against its
constitutionality. Compare Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture.
Courts. and Feminism. 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 175, 179-90 (1982) with Frances Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique ofRights Analysis. 63 TEX. L. REv. 387. 422-24 (1984).
36. Michael M.. 450 U.S. at 469 (plurality opinion).
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in which the Court reasons about reproductive regulation obscures questions
concerning its normative content that would be the central focus of doctrinal
inquiry if the Court recognized that reproductive regulation concerned mat-
ters of gender, and not merely physiological sex. The remarks of Justice
Stewart illustrate this dynamic:
[W]hile detrimental gender classifications by government often violate the
Constitution, they do not always do so, for the reason that there are differ-
ences between males and females that the Constitution necessarily recog-
nizes. In this case we deal with the most basic of these differences: females
can become pregnant as a result of sexual intercourse; males cannot.
. . . Gender-based classifications may not be based . . . upon archaic
assumptions about the proper roles of the sexes. But we have recognized
that in certain narrow circumstances men and women are not similarly situ-
ated; ... and a legislative classification realistically based upon those differ-
ences is not unconstitutional.37
No meaningful review of reproductive regulation is possible within this
equal protection framework. Because the Court rarely acknowledges that
reproduction is social as well as physiological, it systematically ignores what
is evident as a matter of common sense: When a legislature adopts regula-
tion governing the conditions in which women conceive, gestate, and nurture
children, its actions are "realistically based upon" and thus "realistically re-
flect[]" social judgments about women's roles-and only secondarily, if at
all, facts about their bodies. Regulations governing the conditions in which
women conceive, gestate, and nurture children express social attitudes about
sexuality and motherhood and, in tum, shape women's experience of sexual-
ity and motherhood. Yet, to date, the Court has not scrutinized reproduc-
tive regulation to ascertain what gender-based judgments it might reflect or
enforce. Analyzed within paradigms attentive to the physical rather than
the social organization of reproduction, reproductive regulation is effectively
immunized from critical constitutional review.
B. Physiological Naturalism and Due Process: Roe v. Wade38
Though the Court has assumed a more aggressive role in reviewing re-
productive regulation under constitutional doctrines of privacy, naturalistic
assumptions about reproduction inform its due process jurisprudence as
well. Roe v. Wade, decided a year prior to Geduldig, shares many of the
analytic tendencies of Geduldig, although these tendencies have drawn less
critical comment. This section identifies some of the ways in which physio-
logical naturalism informed the Court's reasoning in Roe, affecting Roe's
account of a woman's interests in abortion and the state's interests in its
37. Id. at 478 (Stewart, I., concurring) (citations omitted); cf. id. at 498 n.4 (Stevens, I., dis-
senting) ("In cases involving discrimination between men and women, the natural differences be-
tween the sexes are sometimes relevant ...• [I]f, as in this case, there is an apparent connection
between the discrimination and the fact that only women can become pregnant, it may be appropri-
ate to presume that the classification is lawful.").
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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regulation, as well as the account Roe provided of the history of abortion's
criminalization.
1. Roe~ account ofwomen's interests in abortion.
Given the time and circumstances of authorship, Roe describes a
woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy in an attentive and empathetic
fashion. The opinion notes many factors that may cause women to seek an
abortion. It recognizes that "[s]pecific and direct harm medically
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved" and that
"[P]sychological harm may be imminent"; it further observes that
"[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distress-
fullife and future," that a woman's "[m]ental and physical health may be
taxed by child care," and that pregnancy may result in a child a family is
"unable, psychologically or otherwise, to care for" or "the additional diffi-
culties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood."39 The opinion sug-
gests that, in making the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy, "[a]ll
these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will
consider in consultation."40
Roe describes a woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy in terms
consonant with the logic of the therapeutic exception, which was expanding
at the time of the Court's decision.41 Consequently, the opinion presents
decisions about motherhood as a private dilemma to be resolved by a woman
and her doctor: a "woman's problem," in which the social organization of
motherhood plays little part.42 In Roe, the Court repeatedly suggests that
states should defer to private decisions respecting abortion because they re-
flect the expertise of a medical professional,43 not because the community
39. Id. at 153.
40. Id.
41. Therapeutic exceptions to criminal abortion statutes allowed physicians to perform legal
abortions for specified medical reasons, most commonly to save a woman's life or health. See
MODEL PENAL CoDE § 230.3 (1962), cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 140, reprinted in Doe v. Bolton, App.
B, 410 U.S. 179,205 (1973) (allowing a physician to terminate a pregnancy when "he believes there
is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother"). Similar statutes were adopted in a third of the states at the time of the
decision. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140. For an account of the expansion of the therapeutic exception in the
years preceding the Roe decision, see Herbert L. Packer & Ralph J. Gampell, Therapeutic Abortion:
A Problem in Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 417 (1959).
42. The Court's account scarcely mentions the social norms and practices that make maternity
"distressful" for a woman. Only in noting "the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of un-
wed motherhood" does the Court acknowledge that the conditions of motherhood are socially de-
fined, but it does so without giving any critical significance to that fact. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
43. After deciding (in two paragraphs) that the right of privacy protects a pregnant woman's
decision whether or not to bear a child, id. at 152, the Court refers throughout the remainder of the
opinion to the right of privacy as a right shared by the physician and his patient, or as belonging to
the physician alone, even though it dismissed the physician-plaintiff in the case for want of standing
to sue. See id. at 123-29. Indeed, Roe consistently suggests that the decisions it protects and the
judgment it empowers belong to doctors, not women, emphasizing that "the abortion decision in all
its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision," and insisting that the opinion "vindi-
cates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judg-
ment." Id. at 165-66; see also id. at 163 ("[Flor the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling'
point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regula-
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owes any particular deference to women's decisions about whether to as-
sume the obligations of motherhood. Because Roe and its progeny treat
pregnancy as a physiological problem, they obscure the extent to which the
community that would regulate a woman's reproductive choices is in fact
implicated in them, responsible for defining motherhood in ways that impose
material deprivations and dignitary injuries on those who perform its work.
Analyzed within a medical framework, exclusion from employment,44 denial
of unemployment and health insurance benefits,45 the stigma of unwed
motherhood,46 and other of pregnancy's "natural sanctions"47 appear as
consequences of a woman's body-not practices of the community that
would regulate her conduct. Roe's account of the abortion decision invites
criticism of the abortion right as an instrument of feminine expedience (i.e.
abortion "for convenience" or "on demand")48 because it presents the bur-
dens of motherhood as woman's destiny and dilemma-a condition for
which no other social actor bears responsibility.49
tion by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated.");
Susan F. Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis ofthe Physician's
Role in "Private" Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 197-207 (1985) (analyzing por-
trayal of physician as decisionmaker in Roe). The Court's repeated description of the abortion right
as protecting a physician's decisions plainly bespeaks a distrust in women's competence to make
reproductive decisions, whether that distrust of women was the Court's own or one it imputed to the
public. See Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt, 22
NEW ENG. L. REv. 521, 541-42 (1988) (privacy right recognized in abortion cases is located, not in
pregnant woman alone, but in the relationship between the pregnant woman and the physician;
doctrine defers to medical expertise rather than woman's judgment).
44. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
45. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Turner v. Department of Employ-
ment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
47. Michael M. v. Superior.Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (plurality opinion).
48. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting in Roe and Doe)
(referring disparagingly to abortions of "convenience" three times in four paragraphs, and observing
that under the majority's holding the "Constitution of the United States values the convenience,
whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus").
49. Stripped of its therapeutic trappings, the Court's account presents abortion as the resort of
women whose "woes, ... emotions, ... frailty, so-called 'error,' and needs," drive them to terminate
unborn life. Doe, 410 U.S. at 196-97. So long as accounts of the abortion decision exempt men and
society at large from their responsibility for shaping the conditions under which women conceive,
bear, and rear children, it is only the woman seeking an abortion who appears to attach negative
value to pregnancy. In these circumstances, her decision to seek an abortion will appear to reflect
traits of the feminine character-be it frail, overwrought, selfish, or capricious.
Roe's account of the abortion decision is reinforced by the constitutional underpinnings of the
opinion, which protect the right as a right of "personal privacy," applying to "activities relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education." Roe, 410
U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted). Because the concept of privacy grows out of traditions that as-
sume the structure of family life as natural and accept the ideological division of social life into
separate spheres for men and women, see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983), it can be employed in ways that rein-
force notions of pregnancy as a "woman's problem." Traditional assumptions about the structure of
private life tend to inhibit critical examination of the social relations in which women conceive, bear,
and rear children-an inquiry which would illuminate many of the practical reasons why women
seek abortions, and provide additional constitutional reasons for protecting exercise of that choice.
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2. Roe's account ofstate regulatory interests in abortion.
The same medical paradigms that govern Roe's analysis of a woman's
interest in terminating a pregnancy dominate its analysis of the state's inter-
est in regulating her decision. Because Roe relies so heavily upon medical
science to define the state's interest in regulating abortion, medical analysis
displaces social analysis of the exercise of state power entailed in restricting
women's access to abortion. For this reason, the interest in potential life
recognized in Roe can be employed to justify fetal-protective regulation of
women in a fashion that is inattentive to the gender-based impact of that
regulation as well as to the possibility that it may be gender biased.
Roe justifies the state's interest in regulating abortion by adopting, quite
explicitly, a purely medical definition of pregnancy:
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an
embryo and, later, a fetus, ifone accepts the medical definitions of the devel-
oping young in the human uterus. See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dic-
tionary 478-479, 547 (24th ed. 1965). The situation therefore is inherently
different from [all other privacy precedents] ....50
When the Court considers the pregnant woman from what it conceives to be
a strictly physiological standpoint, in Roe, just as in equal protection cases
like Geduldig, it sees her "situation [as] inherently different" from that of
other citizens.51 The Court asserts that the pregnant woman's privacy rights
are defeasible, without devoting a single sentence to explaining why this is so.
The Court simply assumes that the existence of the embryo/fetus is sufficient
to explain and justify the state's interest in regulating abortion; the opinion
nowhere addresses the possibility that public interest in restricting abortion
might be shaped by social judgments about the pregnant woman herself. As
in its equal protection jurisprudence, the Court reasons from the premise
that the physical reality ofpregnancy can objectively substantiate public reg-
ulatory judgments concerning the pregnant woman.52
Consistent with the manner in which it justifies the state's interest in
regulating abortion, Roe defines the circumstances in which the state may
regulate abortion in terms of medical facts concerning gestation. The opin-
ion's "trimester framework" allows the state to regulate abortion in the in-
terests of maternal health in the second trimester of pregnancy, when
mortality in abortion exceeds mortality in childbirth,53 and allows regulation
50. 410 U.S. at 159.
51. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) ("Normal pregnancy is an objec-
tively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics."); see also Michael M.. 450 U.S. at
471 (plurality opinion).
52. Cf text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. Indeed, these objectivist assumptions are so pro-
nounced that the Court subsequently describes the state's regulatory interest in maternal health and
potential life as embodied in the progress of gestation itself, observing that these regulatory interests
"grow[] in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each
becomes 'compelling.''' Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. By this account, a pregnant woman nurtures more
than fetal life. She nurtures within her body an interest of the community whose "growth" progres-
sively consumes her claim on privacy and bodily autonomy.
53. "[B]ecause of the now-established medical fact ... that until the end of the first trimester
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in the interests of potential life in the third trimester of pregnancy, at the
point of fetal viability. According to Roe, the concept of viability supplies
"logical and biological justifications" for "[s]tate regulation protective of fe-
tal life" because "the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb."s4
Roe thus holds that the state has an interest in potential life which be-
comes compelling at the point of viability. It defines this regulatory interest
in potential life physiologically, without reference to the sorts of constitu-
tional considerations that normally attend the use of state power against a
citizen. In the Court's reasoning, facts concerning the physiological devel-
opment of the unborn provide "logical and biological justifications" both
limiting and legitimating state action directed against the pregnant woman.
Because Roe analyzes an exercise of state power from a medical, rather than
a social, point of view, it authorizes state action against the pregnant woman
on the basis of physiological criteria, requiring no inquiry into the state's
reasons for acting against the pregnant woman, or the impact of its actions
on her. Indeed, Roe analyzes the state's interest in potential life as a benign
exercise of state power for the protection of the unborn, and not as a coer-
cive exercise of state power against pregnant women, often reasoning as if
the state's interest in protecting potential life scarcely pertained to the preg-
nant woman herself.ss Thus, in the course of justifying its decision to pro-
tect the abortion decision as a right of privacy, the Court recognized an
antagonistic state interest in restricting women's access to abortion on which
it imposed temporal, but few principled, restraints.S6
To the extent that Roe relied upon physiological reasoning to define the
state's interest in potential life, it unleashed a legal discourse of indetermi-
nate content and scope-one legitimating boundless regulation of women's
reproductive lives should the Court abandon the trimester framework that
presently constrains it.S7 In recognizing the state's interest in potential life,
mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth, [ilt follows that, from and
after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reason-
ably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." ld. at 163.
54. ld.
55. The Court discusses the state's interest in protecting a viable fetus as if the fetus were
located in some hypothetical space outside the body of the woman in which it SUbsists. When the
fetus is characterized as "presumably" capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb," id..
even as it remains within it, it appears as an autonomous object of public concern, justifying the
Court's insistence that a state's regulatory interests in the pregnant woman and in potential life are
"separate and distinct," id. at 162.
56. The restraints Roe imposes on the state's interest in potential life are temporal, pertaining
to the physical development of the fetus, not the state's regulatory relation with the pregnant woman
herself. Consequently, judgments about the fetus seem to determine the strength of a woman's pri-
vacy interests. (This is why medical advances affecting the point of fetal viability appeared to
threaten the privacy right Roe recogniZed. See note 57 infra.) If one removes the trimester frame-
work from Roe. much of the opinion's reasoning seems to support, rather than constrain, abortion-
restrictive regulation.
57. Initially, the manner in which the Court justified the state's interest in regulating abortion
was of little practical significance to those exercising or defending the right Roe established because
of the infrequency of third-trimester abortions. The nature of the state's regulatory interests in abor-
tion was first called into question by now-discredited reports predicting the advance of viability into
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the Court ignored a simple social fact that should be of critical constitutional
significance: When a state invokes an interest in potential life to justify fetal-
protective regulation, the proposed use of public power concerns not merely
the unborn, but women as well. Abortion-restrictive regulation is sex-based
regulation, the use of public power to force women to bear children. Yet,
the Court has never described the state's interest in protecting potential life
as an interest in forcing women to bear children. Roe's physiological reason-
ing obscures that simple social fact. "[I]f one accepts the medical definitions
of the developing young in the human uterus"58 as a sufficient, objective, and
authoritative framework for evaluating the state's regulatory interest in
abortion-as Roe did-state action compelling women to perform the work
of motherhood can be justified without ever acknowledging that the state is
enforcing a gender status role. In part, this is because analyzing abortion-
restrictive regulation within physiological paradigms obscures its social
logic, but also, and as importantly, it is because physiological reasons for
regulating women's conduct are already laden with socio-political import:
Facts about women's bodies have long served to justify regulation enforcing
judgments about women's roles.
3. Roe~ account of the history ofabortion regulation.
When the Court examined the history underlying the adoption of crimi-
nal abortion laws in nineteenth century America, it identified three reasons
that might account for their enactment. The first was the notion that "these
laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sex-
ual conduct."59 Observing that "no court or commentator has taken the
early gestation. Compare Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456-58 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting):
Just as improvements in medical technology inevitably will move forward the point at
which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health, different technological im-
provements will move backward the point of viability at which the State may proscribe
abortions .... The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself.
with Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 554 n.9 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("This ['collision course'] critique has no medical foundation.").
Today, it is crucial to understand the nature of the state's regulatory interests in abortion be-
cause an increasing number of sitting Justices have declared their dissatisfaction with the restraints
the trimester framework imposes on the state regulation protective of potential life, see note 2 supra,
and because lower courts are increasingly applying the trimester framework to fetal-protective regu-
lation outside the abortion context. See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) (court
orders the removal of a potentially viable fetus from a cancer patient by surgery that may have
hastened her death), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) (en bane); In re Madyun Fetus,
114 Daily Washington L. Rep. 2233, 2240 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986) (court orders a caesarean
delivery over pregnant woman's objections, reasoning that "all that stood between the ... fetus and
its independent existence was, put simply, a doctor's scalpel").
If the Court abandons Roe's trimester framework or qualifies a pregnant woman's privacy rights
without imposing meaningful restraints on the interest in potential life Roe recognized, Roe will have
spawned a constitutionally "compelling" interest in regulating the conduct of pregnant women that
is elaborated in terms wholly inattentive to the social judgments prompting state action against the
pregnant woman or the impact of state action on her.
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (passage quoted in full in text accompanying note
50 supra).
59. Roe, 410 U.S. at 148.
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argument seriously,"60 the Court dismissed it without more, never again
considering the possibility that sexual mores had anything to do with the
statutes' enactment. A second rationale, to which it gave greater credence,
was the theory that antiabortion statutes were adopted in order to restrict
access to a procedure that at the time posed considerable dangers to a
woman's health.61 Finally, the Court considered the contention that "a pur-
pose of these laws, when enacted, was to protect prenatal life,"62 a view
sharply contested by the litigants and one difficult to substantiate in light of
the dearth of state legislative history from the nineteenth century. The
Court left the question unresolved, but allowed "that as long as at least po-
tential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection
of the pregnant woman alone."63 From its analysis of the historical record,
the Court derived an account of the state interests that might legitimately be
asserted in the regulation of abortion-all of which it assessed from the
standpoint of medical science. In the course of this analysis, the Court never
seriously considered the possibility that the state might have constitutionally
illegitimate interests in regulating abortion.
It is important to examine the history of the nineteenth century cam-
paign afresh, in order to understand how the abortion right is protected by
constitutional guarantees of equal protection, as well as of privacy.64 The
work of James Mohr, Linda Gordon, Kristin Luker, and Carroll Smith-Ro-
senberg provides a much more detailed account of the nineteenth century
criminalization campaign than was available to the Court at the time of its
decision.65 As importantly, historiographical and jurisprudential perspec-
tives have changed in the years since Roe. Because we are now attentive to
questions of gender in matters of historical and constitutional interpretation
both, it is possible to reexamine the historical record and observe constitu-
60. Id.
61. ld. at 149-51.
62. ld. at 151 (footnote omitted).
63. ld. at 150.
64. Aspects of the historical record which are relevant to a due process analysis of the abortion
right may not necessarily be those of relevance to the equal protection claim. While due process
jurisprudence derives its moral authority from the rich traditions defining this nation's history, equal
protection jurisprudence derives its moral authority from an aspiration to transcend certain aspects
of that history so that the realities of American political life accord more fully with the ideals of
American political life. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection. 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1171-76 (1988).
Roe is written as a substantive due process opinion, and draws its authority from the nation's
history and traditions. The privacy right Roe recognized protects a liberty available to women at
common law, and the state regulatory interests Roe recognized are those embodied in nineteenth
century criminal abortion statutes, as the Court understood them. Because the Court crafted Roe as
a due process opinion that would give synthetic expression to the nation's history and traditions, it
never subjected the history of the criminalization campaign to critical scrutiny to determine whether
in facti it deserved constitutional sanction.
65. See LINDA GoRDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIR1H
CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976); KRISrIN LUKER, ABORTION AND 1HE POLmcs OF M01HERHOOD
(1984); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); CARROLL SMI1H-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CoNDUCT: VISIONS OF
GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 217-44 (1985).
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tionally significant aspects of the campaign which the Court's naturalist as-
sumptions caused it to overlook.
As the work of James Mohr and others makes clear, it was the medical
profession that led the nineteenth century campaign to criminalize abortion.
The doctors who advocated criminalizing abortion quite openly argued that
regulating women's reproductive conduct was necessary, not merely to pro-
tect potential life, but also to ensure women's performance of marital and
maternal obligations and to preserve the ethnic character of the nation. At
the simplest level, then, the history of the criminaIization campaign illus-
trates the wide-ranging social preoccupations that may inform public inter-
est in regulating reproduction, among them, concerns rooted in relations of
gender, ethnicity, race, and class. The history of the criminaIization cam-
paign demonstrates that reproductive regulation may indeed be driven by
constitutionally illegitimate concerns, a possibility now obscured by the nat-
uralist premises of equal protection and due process doctrines. Given the
significant role that constitutionally offensive attitudes played in the nine-
teenth century campaign to criminalize abortion, it is important for courts
reviewing fetal-protective regulation to determine whether it is animated by
similar forms of bias today.
But the history of abortion's criminalization has other, more elusive, ju-
risprudential significance. The doctors who led the criminaIization cam-
paign advanced their arguments for regulating abortion in the distinctive
discourse of their profession. They employed physiological arguments to
demonstrate the impact of abortion, not only on the unborn, but also on the
reproductive health and conduct ofAmerican wives and on the reproductive
rates of various ethnic groups-thereby demonstrating that abortion
threatened the allocation of power between men and women and among the
various groups that might direct the future of the state. Physicians did not
merely invoke the body as an analogical figure for the state.66 They used
scientific arguments about the body to argue that controlling the physical
relations of reproduction was necessary to ensure reproduction of the social
order.67 Proponents of abortion reform thus corporealized the preoccupa-
66. Cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 81 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968) (1651):
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or
STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though ofgreater stature and
strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which
the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Sou/' as giving life and motion to the whole body; The
Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts •...
See also JOHN LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIvIL GOVERNMENT 11 96, at 55 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952) (1764) ("For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one
body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority .•. and it being necessary to that
which is one body to move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the
greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority .••.").
67. The campaign's use of reproductive paradigms to analyze social relations does bear certain
striking resemblances to the work of Malthus (whom the doctors denounced, see note 135 infra) and
his intellectual descendants, Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. Cf. RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 38-39 (The Beacon Press 1955) (1944) (tracing the
legacy of Malthus's arguments through social and biological evolutionary theory); CHARLES E. Ro-
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tions of civic governance, imbuing the physiology of human reproduction
with far-reaching social import. Because the mode of argument they em-
ployed grounds social relations in the physical process of reproduction, it
imbues the raw facts of reproductive physiology with intrinsic sociality,
transforming the female body itself into a "reason" for its regulation. In the
wake of the campaign, it seems natural to reason about social relations in
physiological terms; more particularly, it seems natural to reason about reg-
ulating women's roles in rhetorical paradigms concerned with women's
bodies.
Thus, the criminalization campaign precipitated an important historical
transformation, one affecting the practical means of regulating gender status
and the rhetorical modes of its justification. This dimension of abortion's
criminalization is invisible in Roe's account because, in important respects,
Roe reasons within the premises of the legal regime it repudiated. Conse-
quently, correcting the historical record on which Roe rests is a necessary
first step in reconsidering the jurisprudence of abortion-restrictive
regulation.
II. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CAMPAIGN AGAINST ABORTION
Woman's rights and woman's sphere are, as understood by the American
public, quite different from that understood by us as Physicians, or as Anat-
omists, or as Physiologists.68
-Montrose H. Pallen, M.D. (1868)
The problem of woman's sphere, to use the modern phrase, is not to be
solved by applying to it abstract principles of right and wrong. Its solution
must be obtained from physiology, not from ethics or metaphysics ....69
-Edward H. Clarke, M.D. (1873)
[S]ociety haunts the body's sexuality.70
-Maurice Godelier (1981)
Unlike the social historians who have explored the nineteenth century
campaign to criminalize abortion in the years since Roe,71 I approach the
historical record with specific jurisprudential concerns. To demonstrate the
inadequacies of doctrines that now govern reproductive regulation, I will
SENBERG, No OTHER GODS: ON SCIENCE AND AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 33-34 (1961) (interest
in the social significance of human heredity was growing in America prior to the spread ofDarwinist
thought). In these new nineteenth century traditions of political analysis, diverse aspects of the
reproductive process begin to playa prominent role in explaining reproduction of the social order,
displacing the role played by concepts of social contract in Enlightenment political theory. See notes
239-240 infra and accompanying text (examining the convergent concerns of the antiabortion cam-
paign and evolutionary and eugenical thought in the post-Civil War period).
68. Montrose A. Pallen, Foeticide, or Criminal Abortion. 3 MED. ARCHIVES 193, 205 (1869)
(paper read before the Missouri State Medical Association, April, 1868).
69. EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION, OR A FAIR CHANCE FOR GIRLS 12 (Boston,
Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1873).
70. Maurice Godelier, The Origins ofMale Domination. 127 NEW LEfT REv. 3, 17 (1981).
71. See, for example, the authors listed in note 65 supra.
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examine the concerns that have animated reproductive regulation in the
past, and trace the lineage of physiological arguments for regulation of
women's reproductive conduct. This analysis reveals that the conceptual
paradigms we use to justify the regulation of reproduction have a history:
They are aspects of the social relations of reproduction which enable us to
reason about concerns of gender in physiological discourses of sex. As his-
tory amply demonstrates, claims about women's bodies can in fact express
judgments about women's roles.
To illustrate this, I explore the antiabortion campaign from the stand-
point of a practical historical question: Why were the arguments advanced
by the nineteenth century medical profession successful in persuading the
American public to criminalize one of the more effective methods of birth
control of the era? After situating the criminalization campaign in social
context, I consider two general strategies the campaign employed to per-
suade the public of the importance of regulating abortion.
Part II B examines the physiological arguments physicians used to
demonstrate the practical threat abortion posed-to the unborn, to women,
to the form and function of the marriage relation, and to the ethnic composi-
tion of the state. These physiological arguments focused wide-ranging con-
cerns on the act of reproduction itself, so that protecting unborn life became
a way of preserving the social structure as a whole. Part II C considers the
more overtly gendered aspects of antiabortion advocacy, examining the cam-
paign's arguments for regulating abortion as arguments for controlling
women's conduct. Physicians regularly depicted abortion as an act of femi-
nine role resistance, encouraged by feminist advocacy. In so doing, they
invested abortion with symbolic meaning, urging Americans to oppose abor-
tion in order to defend gender roles in diverse spheres of social life.
After surveying the wide-ranging concerns raised by the American Medi-
cal Association's antiabortion advocacy, I assess its immediate impact and
long term legacy. Part II D discusses criminal abortion statutes adopted in
the post-Civil War era, illustrating the influence of the doctors' arguments
on legislative reform in Ohio. Part II E analyzes the criminalization cam-
paign in wider legal perspective, as it offered a way to regulate gender roles
that complemented the common law of marital status, providing the state
with physiological justifications for enforcing wives' marital obligations.
Examining arguments for regulating abortion in times past provides no
simple framework for scrutinizing its regulation today. But It does provide a
foundation for undertaking that task, illuminating social concerns that are
often obscured by the physiological habits of reasoning that the campaign
engendered-and thus identifying new constitutional questions to which re-
view of reproductive regulation must respond.
A. Historical Context
At the opening of the nineteenth century, abortion was governed by com-
mon law, and was not a criminal offense if performed before quickening-
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the point at which a pregnant woman perceived fetal movement, typically
late in the fourth month or early in the fifth month of gestation.72 During
the ensuing decades, especially in the years following the Civil War, states
began to enact legislative restrictions on abortion. Although statutes varied
in form and severity, the cumulative effect of the new legislation was to pro-
hibit abortion from conception. The statutes proscribed abortion-without
reference to quickening-unless necessary to save a mother's life, subjected
women seeking abortions to criminal sanctions, and increased criminal pen-
alties generally. States also adopted legislation barring the distribution of
abortifacients and contraceptives, as well as the circulation ofadvertisements
or information about them.73
This transformation in the law of abortion occurred at the behest of the
nation's physicians-at once the architects and exponents of legal reform.
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, when America's politicians,
clergy, and press were silent on the question of abortion, the doctors began a
concerted campaign, directed at fellow practitioners, legislators, religious
leaders, and the public at large, to put abortion on the national political
agenda.74
As James Mohr has characterized it, the doctors' "opposition to abortion
was partly ideological, partly scientific, partly moral, and partly practical."75
Doctors premised their campaign on a scientific understanding of human
development as continuous from the point of conception, a scheme in which
"quickening" had no special significance. With this understanding of
human development and certain judgments about the nature of family life,
doctors began to articulate strong moral objections to the practice of abor-
tion,76 contending, as a matter of professional ethics,77 that abortion at any
stage of pregnancy was an unwarranted destruction of human life.
72. The moment of quickening is variable. It is fair to say, however, that it is late enough in
pregnancy such that the common law provided women a reasonable opportunity to secure a legal
abortion. After quickening, persons who assisted in the expulsion and destruction of the fetus with-
out due cause were considered to have committed a crime--one, however, distinct from the destruc-
tion of a human being, and punished less harshly. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-36 (1973); J.
MOHR, supra note 65, at 3-6; see also id. at 5-6 nn.4 & 5 (discussing American case law).
73. See J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 200-25.
74. Abortion reform between 1820 and 1840 was typically undertaken in the course of code
revisions, rather than by enactment of separate statutes. It was the product of medical advocacy,
initiated without public, journalistic, or religious advocacy. ld. at 42-43. Religious leaders did not
become involved in the crusade against abortion until after the Civil War, and then only hesitantly.
See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLU-
TION TO THE PRESENT 239 (1980); J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 182-88; John Paull Harper, "Be
Fruitful and Multiply": The Reaction to Family LiInitation in Nineteenth-Century America 154
(1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, on file with the Stanford Law Review);
see also note 141 infra.
75. J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 34-35.
76. Over the course of the campaign, doctors raised three types of moral objections to the
practice of abortion. They vehemently insisted that the embryo was a form of human life whose
destruction was tantamount to murder, see text accompanying notes 93-115 infra. that marital sexu-
ality not devoted to procreating was a form of "physiological sin," see text accompanying notes 116-
136 infra. and that wives who shirked their duty to bear and rear children were self-indulgent ego-
ists, see text accompanying notes 158-164 infra.
77. Mohr suggests that the physicians' allegiance to the Hippocratic Oath moved them to op-
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But, as Mohr points out, the doctors had practical, as well as moral and
scientific, reasons for opposing abortion. The doctors inaugurated the cam-
paign against abortion at a time when the medical profession was attempting
to establish itself as a profession, and graduates of elite medical schools
("regulars") were attempting to drive competing popular practitioners ("ir-
regulars") from the field. As the regulars saw it, their opposition to abortion
distinguished them in method and commitment from all other health care
providers of the era. By campaigning for legislative restrictions on abortion,
the doctors were simultaneously entering the political arena on high moral
ground, and seeking public power to close their ranks to professional
competition.7s
The competitive dynamic Mohr identifies underlying the campaign can
in fact be described in sexual terms. The obstetricians and gynecologists
who led the mid-century campaign against abortion were attempting to build
a professional practice in a field traditionally dominated by women. At
prominent institutions, doctors teaching obstetrics were still called "profes-
pose abortion. See J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 35. Before the inception of the campaign, however, it
was not entirely clear that the ethical precepts of the physicians prohibited abortion.
At the outset, it should be noted that some versions of the Hippocratic Oath prohibit abor-
tifacients (pessaries) only, while others prohibit the practice of abortion entirely, just as some ver-
sions of the Oath prohibit surgery, while others do not. See W.H.S. JONES, THE DOCTOR'S OATH
11, 23, 52 (1924) (comparing Greek and Christian variants of Oath on question of abortion and
surgery); see also LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND IN-
TERPRETATION 6-18, 24-32 (1943) (tracing Pythagorean sources of Oath's condemnation of abor-
tifacients and surgery). More research is required to determine which versions of the Oath regulars
employed during the antebellum period, or, indeed, whether, during this period, regulars systemati-
cally relied upon the Oath at all. American medical schools, then in their infancy, may well have
administered the Oath, but the code ofethics the regulars most commonly relied upon was Percival's
Medical Ethics, which the AMA explicitly cited as the source for the Code of Ethics adopted at its
foundation in 1847. See DONALD E. KONOLD, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS, 1847-
1912, at 9-10 (1962); PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 218 (Chauncey Leake ed., 1927). Percival's
code condemns some but not all uses of abortifacients; in some passages it seems to accept the
quickening distinction, and in others not to accept it. See id. at 134-36. The Code of Ethics the
AMA adopted at its inception in 1847 and retained throughout the century does not address the
question of abortion. See id. at 218-38.
Thus, in the years preceding the campaign, when abortions prior to quickening were still legal,
the regulars' ethical stance toward the practice seems to have been less than uniform. Cf. HENRY
SHAFER, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION, 1783 TO 1850, at 222 (1968) (1st ed. 1936) (re-
porting that in the 18305 "[a]t least one [county medical] society considered [abortion] a violation of
medical ethics"). If doctors did not openly endorse abortion, many among their ranks may well
have practiced it. As James Mohr reports, campaign leadership had to quell resistance in the ranks
of the profession before it took its case to the American public. See J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 149-
53, 156; see also The Report Upon Criminal Abortions, 56 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 346, 346
(1857) ("Argue as forcibly as they may ... the Committee will fail to convince the public that
abortion in the early months is a crime, and a large proportion of the medical profession will tacitly
support the popular view of the sUbject.").
78. See J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 30-39; see also K. LUKER, supra note 65, at 27-35; PAUL
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 92 (1982) (explaining that the
nineteenth century medical profession was competitive rather than corporate); id. at 79-144 (tracing
consolidation of professional authority from 1850 to 1930); BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIDRE
ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 48-68 (1978)
(chronicling competition faced by elite medical practitioners during nineteenth century); RICHARD
SHRYOCK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MEDICINE: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL
AND SCIENTIFIC FACTORS INVOLVED 248-72 (1947) (same).
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sor ofmidwifery,"79 and practitioners often encountered skepticism and ridi-
cule.80 As late as 1881, a professional manual warned doctors to be on
guard against "jealous midwives, ignorant doctor-women and busy neigh-
bors" who spread malicious rumors about physicians.8! By opposing abor-
tion, gynecologists and obstetricians hoped to establish their authority in
matters of birthing,82 and so improve their status in the eyes of the profes-
sion and the public at large. At a time when medical practitioners could do
little to prolong life, the doctors' efforts to assert scientific authority over the
inception of life enhanced the stature of the profession as a whole.83
79. For example, Horatio Storer, leader of the criminalization campaign, refers to his father as
"the Professor of Midwifery in Harvard University." HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NoT? A
BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 17 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1866). Similarly, Dr. Augustus Gardner, a
prominent activist in the campaign, was titled "Professor of Diseases of Females and Clinical Mid-
wifery" at New York Medical College. See AUGUSTUS K. GARDNER, CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST
THE LAWS OF LIFE AND HEALTH 3 (photo. reprint 1974) (New York, J.S. Redfield 1870); Harper,
supra note 74, at 100.
A nineteenth century biographical sketch of the campaign's leader notes that Horatio Storer
"was the first in this country to teach gynecology proper, as contra-distinguished from obstetrics or
midwifery, his separate course upon the diseases of women, unconnected with gestation, childbed, or
the puerperal state, comprising not less than sixty lectures." IRVING A. WATSON, PHYSICIANS AND
SURGEONS OF AMERICA: A COLLECTION OF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE REGULAR MEDI-
CAL PROFESSION 25 (Concord, N.H., Republican Press Ass'n 1896).
80. The task of assisting a birth was traditionally handled by women. See JUDITH WALZER
LEAVITT, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA 1750-1950, at 89-113 (1986) (role of
gender in the birthing room). In the mid-nineteenth century when male doctors began to practice as
birth assistants, they encountered both professional and popular objections, and often ridicule. See
B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, supra note 78, at 61-63 ("[b]y mid-century the private horrors of
mixed-sex medical encounters had become a public issue"); JUDY BARRETT LITOFF, AMERICAN
MIDWIVES 1860 TO THE PRESENT 3-14 (1978); C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 65, at 231;
SARAH STAGE, FEMALE COMPLAINTS: LYDIA PINKHAM AND THE BUSINESS OF WOMEN'S
MEDICINE 77-82 (1979) (public and professional criticism of clinical and surgical gynecologists); see
also J.W. LEAVITT, supra, at 40-43, 108-10 (doctors style their procedures to accommodate patient
modesty).
81. See P. STARR, supra note 78, at 87 (quoting professional manual by D.W. Cathell entitled
The Physician Himself, published in 1881).
82. During the period of the criminalization campaign and after, the medical profession sought
to establish its authority in matters of birthing by subordinating women's role in it. Doctors sought
to eliminate midwives or redefine their work as physicians' assistants in all cases save those of the
poorest clientele. They also sought to prevent women from joining their professional ranks. See
notes 149 & 153 infra. Notwithstanding these efforts, midwife-attended births exceeded physician-
attended births until the beginning of the twentieth century, when they were about equal in numbers.
See B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, supra note 78, at 93; J.W. LEAVITT, supra note 80, at 12;
Frances E. Kobrin, The American Midwife Controversy: A Crisis ofProfessionalization, in SICKNESS
AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 217,
219 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers 005., 1978).
83. By opposing abortion, the profession could save unborn life, even if obstetricians and other
regular practitioners were not markedly more adept than their competitors in saving the life ofborn
persons. See K. LUKER, supra note 65, at 30-31; cf. J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 31-34 (discussing the
inability of the practice to cope with common diseases of the era; professional physicians "really
could not do what they claimed they could do"); id. at 34 ("[T]he regulars bitterly opposed what
they regarded as quack theories, though in truth many of the irregulars advocated courses of treat-
ment less detrimental to health than the regulars' own.").
During the nineteenth century the safety record of male obstetricians as measured by mortality
statistics was no better, if not worse, than that of midwives. Physician intervention in birthing may
actually have increased its dangers, given the doctors' proclivity for "heroic interventions": blood-
letting, administering opiates, and using forceps during parturition. See B. EHRENREICH & D. ENG-
LISH, supra note 78, at 97; J.W. LEAVITT, supra note 80, at 43-57,62-63. In 1912, a medical study
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The doctors began their campaign quietly, working with legislators en-
gaged in reforming state codes.84 It was not until the middle of the century
that they took their campaign to the public. Until then, abortion had been
considered the last resort of the desperate single woman.8S By mid-century,
however, abortion was commonly perceived as a practice of married women
seeking to avoid dangerous pregnancies and to control family size-a matter
of special concern to middle-class families in the new industrial order. As
middle-class families began to adopt increasingly elaborate methods for rais-
ing and educating children, parents began to consider children as work
rather than workers, expense rather than wealth.86 With this transformation
in child-rearing practices, the birthrate in America steadily declined.87
Abortion now appeared to play an increasingly significant role in efforts to
control family size, more so among the middle class than among the immi-
grant working class.88
Doctors advocating criminalization of abortion thus seized an issue of
reported doctors lost more patients than midwives. See Kobrin, supra note 82, at 218. These statis-
tics are especially noteworthy in that, by the tum of the century, midwives were primarily serving
only the poorer sectors of society. B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, supra note 78, at 93-98; J.B.
LrroFF, supra note 80, at 27-30. Whether women were served by doctors or midwives, they faced
significant physical dangers in childbirth. Maternal mortality in childbirth apparently remained
constant from 1890 to 1917. In 1917, it still caused more deaths among women than any disease
except tuberculosis. Id. at 53.
84. See J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 42-43; id. at 43 (surveying statutory reform of the period
and concluding that U[t]he United States remained in 1841, notwithstanding an initial wave ofabor-
tion legislation, a nation still committed to the basic tenets of the common law tradition").
85. See id. at 86. In fact, special laws which made it a crime to conceal the birth or death of
bastard children governed acts ofabortion and infanticide practiced by unmarried women. Penalties
for concealment were of moderate severity (typically 1 to 2 years of hard labor); they applied to
abortion (without regard to quickening) and to infanticide. In this way, the statutes both con-
demned and condoned abortion and infanticide of illegitimate children. While some of the statutes
dated from the colonial era, New York only adopted such a statute in 1845, along with general
criminal abortion legislation. Act of May 13, 1845, ch. 260, §§ 4-5, 1845 N.Y. Laws 285, 286. See
also 1 THEODORE ROMEYN BECK & JOHN B. BECK, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 586-
89 (philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 12th ed. 1863) (discussing state statutes); Eugene Quay,
Justifiable Abortion, 49 GEO. L.J. 447, app. (1961) (reproducing state statutes governing conceal-
ment of bastard issue and abortion).
Consistent with this tradition, the leader of the criminalization campaign characterized infanti-
cide, abandonment, or other similarly covert acts as the practice of the single woman, and abortion
as the practice of the married woman. See H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 67-68.
86. On the changing character of the parent-child relation in mid-century middle-class fami-
lies, see MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW
YORK, 1790-1865, at 155·85 (1981); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 5-6 (1985) (comparing shifting valuation of children in
middle- and working-class families during the period of industrialization). See also C. DEGLER,
supra note 74, at 72-85; C. ROSENBERG, supra note 67 at 59; Nancy Schrom Dye & Daniel Blake
Smith, Mother Lore and Infant Death 1750-1920, 73 J. AM. HIST. 329, 337-46 (1986).
87. See ANSLEY COALE & MELVIN ZELNIK, NEW EsTIMATES OF FERTILITY AND POPULA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF ANNUAL WHITE BIRTHS FROM 1855 TO 1960 AND OF
CoMPLETENESS OF ENUMERATION IN THE CENSUSES FROM 1880 TO 1960, at 36 (1963) (the rate at
which white women in U.S. gave birth fell 50% between 1800 and 1900); id. at 38 (graph indicating
birthrate declines throughout the century, with rate of decline accelerating in the 18408 and again
during the Civil War).
88. Mohr suggests that
abortion rates in the United States may have risen from an order of magnitude approximat-
ing one abortion for every twenty-five or thirty live births during the first three decades of
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intersecting professional, familial, and societal significance and made it a text
of America's future. By 1859, medical opponents of abortion had secured a
resolution from the American Medical Association (the "AMA") condemn-
ing abortion as an "unwarranted destruction of human life," and, under the
leadership of Horatio Storer,89 elite physicians launched an aggressive public
campaign dedicated to saving the nation from the evils of abortion.9o
These sociological observations explain the public visibility of abortion in
mid-century America, as well as the medical profession's interest in curbing
its practice. Yet, they do not illuminate how the AMA persuaded a public
interested in limiting family size and inclined to defer to women's authority
in matters of reproduction to criminalize one of the most reliable methods of
birth control of the era.91 Indeed, at the advent of the campaign, one skepti-
the nineteenth century to an order of magnitude possibly as high as one abortion for every
five or six live births by the 18505 and 18605.
J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 50; see also C. DEGLER, supra note 74, at 228-32 (discussing contempo-
rary reports of abortion); J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 82 (same); id. at 98-99 (after 1840, abortion
used as means of family limitation nationwide); R. Sauer, Attitudes to Abortion in America, 1800-
1973, 28 POPULATION STUD. 53, 54-56 (1974).
Dr. Horatio Gibbons, a contemporary observer, linked the increasing incidence of abortion to
changing middle-class family norms:
As the children of the poor grow up, they become sources of revenue to the parents, who
find their interest in an unrestricted increase. Whereas, the children of the better classes
•.• are a source of increased expenditure. Hence one of the strongest inducements to
feticide in married women, is wanting in the humblest walks of life.
H. Gibbons, Sr., On Foeticide, 21 PAC. MED. & SURGICAL J. 97, 101 (1878); see also J. MOHR, supra
note 65, at 94-95, 100-02 (discussing evidence that in mid-nineteenth century abortion was most
prevalent amongst the ranks of married, Protestant, economically privileged women).
89. Horatio Storer was the son of Dr. David Humphreys Storer, a professor of obstetrics and
medical jurisprudence at Harvard University and a president of the AMA. Horatio Storer served as
secretary of the AMA in 1865, and as its vice-president in 1868. During this period, he led the
department of obstetrics and medical jurisprudence at Berkshire Medical College, where he distin-
guished himself as "the first in this country to teach gynecology proper, as contra-distinguished from
obstetrics or midwifery" and, along with two other physicians, "came to monopolize the ovarioto-
mies of the United States and Canada." I. WATSON, supra note 79, at 25. For Storer's role in
leading the antiabortion campaign, in the AMA and in the nation at large, see J. MOHR, supra note
65, at 78, 89, 148-49, 152-59, 187, 190, 206-07.
90. See Horatio R. Storer, Thomas W. Blatchford, Hugh L. Hodge, Edward H. Barton, A.
Lopez, Charles A. Pope, William Henry Brisbane & A.J. Semmes, Report on Criminal Abortion, 12
TRANSACTIONS AM. MED. Ass'N 75 (1859). On the lobbying campaign leading to adoption of the
1859 resolution, see J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 148-57 (transformation of physicians' crusade
against abortion from an ad hoc movement to an organized national campaign); C. SMITH-ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 65, at 221-22.
91. According to James Mohr, contraceptive information was widely disseminated in the U.S.
from the 18305 onward, and some of the techniques advocated were "partially effective even by
modem standards." J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 83. Potional and surgical abortion practices ante-
dated this era, see id. at 6-15, 50-70, and, Mohr suggests, their use was increased by growing reliance
on contraceptive methods, as families turned to abortion to "erase" mistakes produced by contracep-
tive failure. See id. at 84; see also 1 T.R. BECK & J. BECK, supra note 85, at 477-95 (discussing
potional and surgical abortion methods of the era). In this era, "natural" methods of contraception
were especially likely to have failed because the medical profession identified the period half-way
between the onset of menses as the so-called "safe period" for couples interested in avoiding concep-
tion. Thus, medical guidance in family planning would seem to have unintentionally increased the
number of undesired pregnancies. See C. DEGLER, supra note 74, at 213-15; Thomas Laqueur,
Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics ofReproductive Biology, 14 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 25-31 (1986)
(medical profession analyzed ovulation in women with reference to dogs, analogizing menstruation
to heat and thus identifying this period as the period of ovulation).
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cal physician observed that abortion was commonly relied upon as a method
of family limitation, and confidently predicted that doctors would "fail to
convince the public that abortion in the early months is a crime."92 To un-
derstand the campaign's success in cultivating popular opposition to abor-
tion, it is necessary to examine the wide-ranging arguments doctors
marshalled against the practice.
B. The Doctors' Arguments: The Order ofLife
The arguments doctors brought to bear against the practice of abortion
defined life from the perspective of medical science. The role of scientific
argument is obvious in the profession's attack on the concept ofquickening,
which doctors criticized on the grounds that gestational development begins
at conception. But other scientific arguments were offered as well. Doctors
employed reproductive physiology to show how <3.bortion affected the un-
born, the institution of marriage, and affairs of state. These physiological
arguments worked in complementary fashion, enabling physicians to portray
abortion as a threat to the life of society as a whole.
1. Maternal/fetal relation.
When Dr. Montrose Pallen presented the argument for criminalizing
abortion to fellow practitioners at the Missouri State Medical Association in
1868, he stated the physicians' case in succinct terms: "Many persons
scarcely recognize the fact that foeticide is murder of an unborn being,
whether the conception have quickened, or at any period anterior to the
quickening. Physiology teaches us that life is manifest as soon as the ovum
is impregnated ...."93 The doctors employed a scientific account of concep-
tion to attack the idea of quickening; they sought to discredit the common
law's understanding of gestational life, which deferred to the testimony of a
pregnant woman,94 and to replace it with a definition of life that deferred to
the authority and perspectives of medical science.95 Their defense of the
92. The Report Upon Criminal Abortions, supra note 77, at 346.
93. Pallen, supra note 68, at 195.
94. The common law of abortion deferred to the woman as the responsible agent in reproduc-
tion in two notable respects. First, the doctrine of quickening defined life on the basis of the sensa-
tions and testimony of the pregnant woman. Second, despite the fact that common law rules of
marital status made the wife a dependent of her husband, requiring his consent for her to engage in
many transactions ofconsequence, it did not condition the legality ofan abortion on his consent. See
note 242 infra.
95. Horatio Storer impugned the common law doctrine of quickening with a three-fold obser-
vation: "quickening.. . is often absent, even throughout pregnancy; and foetal movements are
sometimes appreciable to the attendant when not to the mother, or, indeed, they may be to the
mother alone." HORATIO R. STORER & FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, CRIMINAL ABORTION: ITS NA-
TURE, ITS EVIDENCE, AND ITS LAW 12-13 (Bostdn, Little, Brown & Co. 1868). Quickening was
unreliable evidence, which at times was undetectable and at other times better discerned by the
doctor than his patient. Furthermore, it was evidence a woman could conceal. In deriding the
concept of quickening, doctors thus attacked the sensations, judgments, and testimony of the preg-
nant woman. The conception standard doctors advocated vested the medical profession with au-
thority to determine the beginning oflife, depriving women of control over public determinations of
that fact.
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conception standard advanced both objectives, offering a new way of reason-
ing about reproduction dramatically at odds with traditional
understandings.
In arguing that life begins at conception, physicians proudly rejected the-
ories of ensoulment as "metaphysical speculation."96 They sought to define
life from the standpoint of medical science, in purely biological terms. Their
arguments against abortion emphasized that the fertilized egg had a physio-
logical capacity for growth, and derived from this capacity for growth the
embryo's status as an autonomous life form. Thus, in defending the claim
that life begins at conception, physicians redefined the maternal/fetal rela-
tion, offering a physiological account of human development that treated
women's role in reproduction as a matter of minor consequence-from the
point of conception onwards.
The distinctive persp~ctive from which the profession attacked abortion
is evident in arguments Jesse Boring offered colleagues at the Atlanta Medi-
cal Society in 1857. Denouncing the doctrine of quickening, Boring invited
his colleagues to consider the embryo from a physiological standpoint:
[F]rom the moment of the fecundation of an ovum, it is, in every essential
sense, a living, self-sustaining, and self-developing being, entitled to protec-
tion in its possessions, and that whatever it may become, physically, men-
tally, and spiritually, in utero, or extra-utero, is, by growth and development
of the original, and not by addition of new materials, or attributes, and,
therefore its destruction ... is alike murder, at any and every stage of its
existence . . . .97
Analyzed from a physiological standpoint, Boring contended, intrauterine
life was its potential, already everything it might become in its extrauterine
existence because it was capable of physical development. Boring gave this
capacity for development particular moral weight. The fecundated ovum
was "entitled to protection in its possessions"98 against the woman bearing
it, not because it was vulnerable to or dependent upon her, but instead be-
cause its capacity for growth demonstrated it possessed the essential attri-
bute of human life: autonomy. Boring saw evidence of the embryo's
96. Consider this legislative appeal by the Medico-Legal Society of New York:
The foetus is alive from conception, and all intentional killing ofit is murder. The world is
free to discuss the transcendental problem concerning the stage of development at which
the foetus becomes endowed with a soul. Some may believe, with Plato, that this event is
deferred till birth. Others may hold, with Aristotle, that is occurs at the fortieth day for
boys and the eightieth for girls! Only, let such opinions have their due place and weight.
Whatever may be their value as evidences of intellectual activity, they have no bearing
whatever on the great practical question of child murder.
REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL ABORTION OF THE MEDICo-LEGAL SOCIETY OF NEW
YORK (Dec., 1871), quoted in Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law 0/New York Concerning Abortion and
the Status o/the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case o/Cessation o/Constitutionality, 14 N.Y. L.F. 411, 476-
77 (1968) (emphasis omitted); see also H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 14 ("We set
aside all the speculations of the metaphysicians regarding moral accountability of the foetus, the
'potential man,' ... as useless as they are bewildering.").
97. J. Boring, Foeticide. 2 ATLANTA MED. & SURGICAL J. 257, 259 (1857).
98. ld.
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autonomy not only in its physical capacity for development but also in its
physical relation to the pregnant woman:
[T]he fecundated ovum is not only the embryonic man, already vital, but it
is, in an important sense, an independent, self-existent being, that is having
in itself the materials for development, being actually separated from the
mother, as well as from the father, though maintaining a connexion in utero
by the vascular arrangement repeatedly referred to; there is, really, as has
been fully demonstrated, no actual attachment of the placenta to the
uterus.99
Physiologically considered, the "embryonic man" had the capacity to de-
velop without the mother, a capacity for "self-sustaining" existence, proof of
which lay in its lack of "actual attachment" to her. Boring thus defended
the claim that life begins at conception with an argument that life developed
by autogenesis.
When Horatio Storer addressed the nation's women in Why Not?,IOO an
antiabortion tract written for the AMA, he defended the conception stan-
dard in terms calculated to command the sympathies of his female audience.
Instead of presenting the fertilized egg as an "embryonic man," he invited
women to consider the...embryo as a suckling infant. But this concession to
maternal sympathy was merely superficial. Like Boring, Storer made no
claims about the dependency of the unborn; instead, he rested his argument
for protecting unborn life on the grounds of its physiological autonomy. The
. unimpregnated egg "may perhaps be considered as a part and parcel of [a
woman]," Storer explained, "but not afterwards."
When it has reached the womb, that nest provided for the little one by
kindly nature, it has assumed a separate and independent existence, though
still dependent upon the mother for subsistence. For this end the embryo is
again attached to its parent's person, temporarily only, although so inti-
mately that it may become nourished from her blood, just as months after-
wards it is from the milk her breasts afford. lOI
In this curious image of embryo-as-suckling infant, Storer discerned
proof of the embryo's "separate and independent existence."102 The analogy
transported the embryo in time and space so that it appeared to be outside of
the mother, thus illustrating the embryo's autonomy. Storer defended the
"truth" of this analogical argument by offering another, based on the repro-
ductive physiology of kangaroos. Like the embryo-as-infant argument, the
kangaroo analogy situated the unborn outside the woman bearing it:
This is no fanciful analogy; its truth is proved by countless facts. In the
kangaroo, for instance, the offspring is born into the world at an extremely
early stage of development ... and then is placed by the mother in an exter-
nal, abdominal, or marsupial pouch, to portions of which corresponding, so
far as function goes, at once to teats and to the uterine sinuses, these em-
99. [d. at 266.
100. H.R. STORER, supra note 79.
101. [d. at 30.
102. [d.
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bryos cling by an almost vascular connection, until they are sufficiently ad-
vanced to bear detachment, or in reality to be born.103
The polemical import of Storer's analogies was plain: "The first impregna-
tion of the egg, whether in man or in kangaroo, is the birth of the offspring
to life; its emergence into the outside world for wholly separate existence is,
for one as for the other, but an accident in time."l04
The arguments physicians employed to discredit the doctrine of quicken-
ing offered a dramatically new account of the maternal/fetal relation.
Whereas tradition and common law both viewed the unborn as "part and
parcel" of the pregnant woman, lOS the physicians worked systematically to
dismantle that view. They portrayed the unborn as an autonomous form of
life, discussing the embryo's capacity for growth as if it could be exercised
without the womb, and confusing categories of time and space so that un-
born life seemed to have scant relation to the woman bearing it. Thus, as
Storer reasoned, birth was "but an accident in time,"106 as insignificant as
distinctions between the interior and exterior of women's bodies. No impor-
tant difference existed between a gestating fetus and a suckling infant, or for
that matter between an embryo and a grown man, because unborn life pos-
sessed its essential characteristics, even its "potentiality" for intellectual and
moral reasoning, from the moment of conception.107
Yet, the doctors' most powerful strategy for demonstrating the auton-
omy of unborn life did not require confusing the facts of human develop-
ment; it worked by focusing upon them selectively. The doctors rested their
case that life begins at conception on "objective," but objectively incomplete,
facts about human development, depicting the developmental process in
ways that obscured the physical and social work of reproduction women
perform. Thus, Hugh Hodge traced the path of human maturation without
once referring to women's role in reproduction when he invited his audience
to imagine the fertilized ovum developing into the highest form of social
life-a fully matured man:
[T]he invisible product of conception is developed, grows, passes through
the embryonic and foetal stages of existence, appears as the breathing and
lovely infant, the active, the intelligent boy, the studious moral youth, the
adult man, rejoicing in the plenitude of his corporeal strength and intellec-
tual powers, capable of moral and spiritual enjoyments, and finally, in this
world, as the aged man ....108
James Whitmire depicted human genesis similarly when he contended that,
as a man of science, he could discern the present potentiality of a mature
adult in the unfertilized ovum ("germ"):
103. ld. at 30-31.
104. ld. at 31.
105. See id. at 30 (quoted in text accompanying note 101 supra).
106. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 31.
107. See note 112 infra.
108. HUGH HODGE, FOETICIDE, OR CRIMINAL ABORTION 35 (philadelphia, Lindsay &
Blakiston 1869), quoted in C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 65, at 242.
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Many, indeed, argue, that the practice [of abortion] is not, in fact, criminal,
because, they argue, that the child is not viable until the seventh month of
gestation, hence there is no destruction of life. The truly professional man's
morals, however, are not of that easy caste, because he sees in the germ the
probable embryo, in the embryo the rudimentary foetus, and in that, the
seven months viable child and the prospective living, moving, breathing man
or woman, as the case may be.109
In advancing their objections to abortion, physicians offered the American
public a scientific way of reasoning about the genesis of life that systemati-
cally discounted women's role in reproducing life. 110
The doctors' antiabortion arguments rested on a coherent account of
human genesis, reflecting the belief that women's role in reproduction was a
kind of reflexive physiological function. Just as doctors' antiabortion argu-
ments regularly employed physiological evidence to identify the unborn with
mature social actors, they employed that same discourse to identify women
with the functions of their reproductive organs. 111 Physiologically consid-
ered, unborn life was innately social, 112 having a multiplicity of developmen-
tal ends and possibilities, whereas a woman had but one social end, dictated
by her body.1l3 Women's reproductive organs were the active agents in re-
109. James S. Whitmire, Criminal Abortion. 31 CHI. MED. J. 385. 392 (1874). Whitmire, like
Hodge, depicts the path of human development without referring to the agency, work, or existence
of women. Similarly, when Horatio Storer addressed the nation's legislators in Criminal Abortion:
Its Nature, Its Evidence. and Its Law. he emphasized the "total independence" offetallife, insisting
that "its subsequent history after impregnation is one merely ofdevelopment, its attachment merely
for nutrition and shelter" and buttressed his case once again by analogy to marsupial life. H.
STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 10-11.
110. The fact that these new scientific objections to abortions focused on the fetus and ignored
women's role in reproduction was perceived by at least one medical critic of the physicians' argu-
ments. In 1857, just before the AMA inaugurated the antiabortion campaign, a doctor denounced a
report of the Suffolk District Medical Society, criticizing the arguments it offered in defense of the
conception standard:
The writer ••. seems to have thrown out of consideration the life of the mother, making
that of the unborn child appear of far more consequence, even should the mother have a
dozen dependent on her for their daily bread. It cannot be possible that either the profes-
sion or the public will be brought to this belief. Argue as forcibly as they may, .•• the
Committee will fail to convince the public that abortion in the early months is a crime, and
a large proportion of the medical profession will tacitly support the popular view of the
subject.
The Report upon Criminal Abortions. supra note 77, at 346 (criticizing committee report of the Suf-
folk District Medical Society, chaired by Storer).
111. Thus, even as Whitmire's case against abortion employed physiological reasoning to iden-
tify unborn life with developmentally mature persons, see text accompanying note 109 supra. it em-
ployed physiological reasoning to identify women with their bodily functions: "Gestation being a
physiological condition, what woman could possibly be in a healthier state than when she is perform-
ing one of the greatest and noblest physiological functions of her being? Abortion, from whatever
cause produced, is a pathological condition, and its results are pathological ..•." Report upon
Criminal Abortion. supra note 77, at 391; see also H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 80-81 (quoted in
text accompanying note 129 infra).
112. Cf. H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 14 ("If there be life, then also the exist-
ence, however undeveloped, of an intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature, the inalienable attribute
of humanity is implied.").
113. See. e.g., text accompanying note 129 infra. The profession was fascinated by a woman's
reproductive organs, to which it traced what it perceived as the defining characteristics and debilities
of the feminine nature. One doctor stated that it was as if "the Almighty, in creating the female sex,
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 292 1991-1992
292 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:261
production; women were merely the passive instruments of nature's pur-
poses, their agency appearing only as they interfered with the purposes
nature intended for. their bodies. As H.S. Pomeroy warned: "Interference
with Nature so that she may not accomplish the production of healthy
human beings is a physiological sin of the most heinous sort, for, from a
physical standpoint, reproduction is the first and foremost aim and object of
Nature ...."114
While the account of human genesis the doctors presented was internally
coherent, it was dramatically at odds with the norms and practices of child-
rearing prevailing in mid-nineteenth century America. During this era, the
parent who served as primary childrearer shifted from father to mother, and
methods of childrearing shifted from discipline to character formation, a
process which required meticulous maternal supervision of child develop-
ment. By mid-century these changes in family norms assumed the pro-
nounced forms popularly associated with the "cult of domesticity" or
"separate spheres tradition."us Thus, doctors justifying the conception
standard emphasized the developmental autonomy of the unborn at a time
when cultural authorities, including the medical profession itself, insisted
that women's conduct in gestating and nurturing a child was the single most
important determinant of its welfare. In defending the conception standard,
doctors reasoned as if mother and child were scarcely related, trivializing
acts of maternal nurturance otherwise urgently emphasized. In short, their
account of human genesis contradicted, almost point for point, the norms
and practices of reproduction prevailing during the era of the antiabortion
campaign. In retrospect, it appears that if the medical profession did per-
suade nineteenth century audiences to thinl<. of the embryo/fetus as an au-
tonomous life form, it was by encouraging Americans to take for granted the
work of gestation and nurturance women perform-work which the "cult of
domesticity" defined as a woman's duty to perform.
had taken the uterus and built up a woman around it." Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Female
Animal: Views of Woman and Her Role in Nineteenth Century America, 60 J. AM. HIST. 332, 335
(1973) (quoting M.L. HOLBROOK, PARTURmON WITHOUT PAIN: A CODE OF DIRECTIONS FOR
EsCAPING FROM THE PRIMAL CURSE (New York, Wood & Holbrook 1874»; T. GAILLARD
THOMAS, ABORTION AND ITS TREATMENT, FROM THE STAND-POINT OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
3 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1890) ("The uterus is a most extraordinary part of the female
economy. It is the organ which divides one sex from the other .. " From thirteen to fifty its career
is one of intense activity, and it has a marked influence upon the whole being of the woman."); see
also B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, supra note 78, at 120-26; JOHN S. HALLER, JR. & ROBIN M.
HALLER, THE PHYSICIAN AND SEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 58-61 (1974); C. SMITH-Ro-
SENBERG, supra note 65, at 183-96; Laqueur, supra note 91, at 2-3 (tracing emergence of scientific
paradigms premised on a view of male and female reproductive organs as incommensurable, displac-
ing traditional view of male and female reproductive organs as homologous).
114. H.S. POMEROY, THE ETHICS OF MARRIAGE 97 (New York, Funk & Wagnalls 1888).
115. For an examination of changes in parenting, and of practices and prescriptive norms per-
taining to gestation, breast-feeding, and childrearing from infancy to adolescence during this period,
see, e.g., C. DEGLER, supra note 74, at 72-85; C. ROSENBERG, supra note 67, at 26-29, 58, 68; M.
RYAN, supra note 86, at 157-63; MARY P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 98-101 (3d ed. 1983); Dye & Smith, supra note 86, at 337-46.
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2. Marriage.
In attacking the quickening doctrine, doctors described human develop-
ment in ways that obscured women's role in reproduction, but their argu-
ments against abortion by no means neglected the maternal role.
Antiabortion tracts repeatedly asserted that women had a duty to bear chil-
dren. This duty to reproduce entailed more than an obligation to protect
particular embryos and fetuses; it was a duty that derived, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, from the obligations of marriage. Doctors attacked both abortion
and contraception as violations of marital obligation, and, to prove this, em-
phasized the danger they posed to women's health. In elaborating these
physiological objections to birth control practices, the medical profession
redefined marital obligation in therapeutic terms.
As the doctors repeatedly asserted, the purpose of marriage was to per-
petuate the species. Any effort to interfere with this purpose amounted to
what Pomeroy called "physiological sin"116_a concept that fused the two
forms of cultural authority doctors used to indict birth control practices.
Thus, in 1870 Augustus Gardner published a tract entitled Conjugal Sins, I 17
which condemned, as linked and like evils, masturbation, contraception, and
abortion. Two years later, William Goodell offered his students at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania a lecture on this procreative ethic entitled On Conju-
gal Onanism and Kindred Sins,118 which sought to demonstrate the diseases
attributable to the interruption of intercourse. "It does indeed seem to be
the law of Nature that man must suffer the punishment of the onanist if he
parts with the 'seed of another life' in any other way than in that by which it
tends to become fruitful," he observed, but "[t]he wife suffers the most, be-
cause she both sins and is sinned against. She sins because she shirks those
responsibilities for which she was created. She is sinned against, because she
is defrauded of her [conjugal] rights ...."119 The terms of this ethic defined
all nonprocreative sexuality as licentious sex. It was for this reason that
when America's first laws against contraception were enacted in the years
after the Civil War, they classified information concerning contraception and
abortion as "obscene."12o
116. H.S. POMEROY, supra note 114, at 97 (quoted in full at text accompanying note 114).
117. A. GARDNER, supra note 79.
118. William Goodell, Clinical Lecture on Conjugal Onanism and Kindred Sins, PHILA. MED.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1872, at 161.
119. ld. at 162; see id. at 163 ("[I]n common with other teachers, I am old-fashioned enough to
believe that pregnancy is a necessary condition to healthful and happy marriages, and, further, that
coition is innocuous only when complete in both husband and wife and when the germinal fluid
bathes her reproductive organs."). Goodell's exposition is intriguing for its endless play on the re-
productive dimensions of "conjugal rights." See, e.g., id. at 162; see also L.F.E. BERGERET, THE
PREVENTIVE OBSTACLE, OR CoNJUGAL ONANISM (photo. reprint 1974) (p. De Marmon trans., 3d
ed., New York, Turker & Mingard 1870) (clinical case histories of women suffering diseases attrib-
uted to conjugal onanism).
120. See, e.g., Act ofApr. 28, 1868, ch. 430, 1868 N.Y. Laws 856 ("An Act for the suppression
of the trade in and circulation of obscene literature, illustrations, advertisements, and articles of
indecent or immoral use, and obscene advertisements of patent medicines"). On federal and state
legislation prohibiting the use of the mails to transmit information or articles pertaining to contra-
ception and abortion as obscenity, see C. THOMAS DIENNES, LAW, POLmcs, AND BIRTH CONTROL
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The doctors made little effort to conceal the religious sources of this
pronatalist ethic. Yet, while physicians freely invoked biblical authority to
condemn nonprocreative sexuality as sin,121 they most frequently spoke as
physiologists, emphasizing the many diseases which issued from any effort to
defeat the procreative purposes of marital sexuality. Thus, doctors elabo-
rated a norm of marital sexuality in therapeutic terms,122 and in doing so,
they defined women's health as a condition of continuous reproductive activ-
ity.123 In his popular antiabortion tract Why Not?, Storer lectured his audi-
ence: "Intentionally to prevent the occurrence of pregnancy, otherwise than
by total abstinence from coition, intentionally to bring it, when begun, to a
premature close, are alike disastrous to a woman's mental, moral, and physi-
cal well-being."124 Of course, many Americans disagreed: Women who un-
derstood that childbearing and childrearing could compromise their
physical, social, economic, and psychological "well-being" were increasingly
willing to employ birth control practices. The physicians' arguments that
contraception and abortion were "alike disastrous to a woman's mental,
moral, and physical well-being" must be read, as they were argued, against
that fact. 12S In the criminalization campaign, the profession employed the
20-48 (1972); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 175-93 (1985); J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 200-25; James C.N. Paul,
The Post Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 UCLA L. Rev. 44 (1961);
Harper, supra note 74, at 179-209.
121. See, e.g., D.A. O'Donnell & W.L. Atlee, Report on Criminal Abortion. 22 TRANSACTIONS
AM. MED. Ass'N 239, 240 (1871) (quoted in full at note 127 infra); see also J.M. Toner, Abortion in
its Medical and Moral Aspects, 5 CoMMUNICATIONS 443, 443 (1861):
No law of nature can be violated without punishment being inflicted upon the offender,
both morally and physically. IfGod punished Onan by death for spilling his seed upon the
ground, how much more fearful will be his vengeance upon the person who not only de-
stroys the fructifying seed but the life of ~ new human being?
122. See, e.g., H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 61 ("the prevention of pregnancy, by whatever
means it may be sought, by cold vaginal injections, or by incomplete or impeded sexual intercourse,
is alike destructive to sensual enjoyment and to the woman's health"); Bibliographical Notes, 53
BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 410, 411 (1856) (arguing that when "impregnation [is] prevented •••
in any way, . . . the termination of • • . naturally aroused uterine excitement, which fails of its
legitimate end, [will result] in congestion, inflammation and final disorganization").
123. Horatio Storer translated this norm into practical terms:
Every married woman, save in very exceptional cases, which should only be allowed to be
such by the decision of a competent physician, every married woman, until near the so-
called tum of life, should occasionally bear a child; not as a duty to the community merely
••. but as the best means of insuring her own permanent good health. How frequently
should this be? Usually the interval should be from two to two and a half or three years, so
as to allow a sufficient time for nursing, so important for the welfare of the child and its
mother, and an interval of subsequent rest.
HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, Is IT I?, A BOOK FOR EVERY MAN 115-16 (photo. reprint 1974)
(Boston, Lee & Shepard 1868). Similarly, Edwin Hale characterized contraception as an "offence
•.• against physiology, because it px:events the occurrence of pregnancy, which is a normal physio-
logical condition, and often absolutely necessary to the physical and moral health of woman."
EDWIN M. HALE, THE GREAT CRIME OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6n (Chicago, C.S. Halsey
1867). He makes the same argument against abortion. Id. at 5; see also note 119 supra and accom-
panying text.
124. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 76.
125. John Harper observes that when physiological arguments against contraception first ap-
peared in the mid-1850s, they were greeted with skepticism by many in the medical profession, and,
apparently, lacked any empirical substantiation. See Harper, supra note 74, at 86-89. Harper cites
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authority of medical science to define a norm of health powerful enough to
oppose and contain expressions of women's reproductive will. 126
The concept of "physiological sin" thus enfolded old authority within
new, using religion and science to define the obligations of marriage in repro-
ductive terms. The AMA's 1871 Report On Criminal Abortion claimed that
the procreative purposes of marital sex could be deduced from "certain im-
presses ... stamped on the character ofboth male and female by which they
are brought together,"127 and then denounced the woman who aborted a
sources suggesting that Storer opposed contraception because he was concerned about the falling
"native birth rate," id. at 87, and for this reason used physiological arguments to deter women from
practicing birth control, see id. at 87-88. By the 18605 claims of reproductive degenerescence, but-
tressed by anecdotal case histories, were commonplace in the literature. See text accompanying
notes 116-124 supra. There were, however, some physicians who denounced such claims as "myth."
Harper, supra note 74, at 216; see id. at 215-26 (dissenting physicians advocating contraception); cf.
J. HALLER & R. HALLER, supra note 113, at 114-15 (discussing coitus interuptus), 122-24 (discuss-
ing concerns underlying medical profession's opposition to contraception).
Harper also points out that while doctors publicly insisted on the danger abortion posed to
women's health, they privately discussed the procedure-under the rubric of "inducing premature
labor"-as relatively safe. See Harper, supra note 74, at 103-04, 139-40,213-15 (citing doctors of
the era); see also J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 30-31 (suggesting, contrary to the thesis of Cyril Means,
Means, supra note 96, that abortion during this period was no more dangerous than childbirth, and
may have been safer).
The rhetoric of certain clinical discussions makes clear that the profession analyzed the health
risks of abortion from rather pronounced normative premises. See, e.g., E.P. Christian, The Patho-
logical Consequences Incident to Induced Abortion, 2 DETROIT REv. MED. & PHARMACY 145, 146
(1867) (citing "the intimate relation between the nervous and uterine systems manifested in the
various and frequent nervous disorders arising from uterine derangements," i.e., "hysteria," and
"the liability of the female, in all her diseases, to intercurrent derangements of these functions" as
factors that "might justly lead us to expect that violence against the physiological laws of gestation
and parturition would entail upon the subject of such an unnatural procedure a severe and grievous
penalty"). The rhetoric of popular antiabortion tracts was even more pronounced. See note 126
infra.
126. In Why Not?, Storer observes, "[i]t is generally supposed, not merely that a woman can
wilfully throw olf the product ofconception without guilt or moral harm, but that she can do it with
comparative impunity as regards her own health." H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 36. Storer then
introduces his discussion of the health risks attending abortion with the observation that "any in-
fringement of [natural law] must necessarily cause derangement, disaster, or ruin." Id. at 36-37.
Other doctors were even more direct. "It is ••• women who do not pretend to guide the course
ofevents, or make the laws of nature conform to their wishes, who are in health," Augustus Gardner
warned, "while the wise in their own conceit are sulferers, invalids, and useless." Augustus Gard-
ner, Physical Decline ofAmerican Women, reprinted in A. GARDNER, supra note 79, at 199, 230.
Similarly, Edwin Hale condemned the wife who seeks an abortion for "love of fashionable life,"
warning "[s]terility comes to punish her for the heinous crime of which she has been guilty.•..
[A]bortion brings sickness and perhaps death, or numerous other evils in its train, besides remorse,
which will come sooner or later." E. HALE, supra note 123, at 10; see also id. at 9 ("In natural,
healthy parturition, there is little or no actual pain. . . . Abortion, on the contrary, is always at-
tended by a great amount of immediate or remote sulfering.").
One commentator associated abortion, infanticide, masturbation, and contraception with the
women's rights movement, and characterized all five as impulses that would result in sterility. See 3
ARTHUR W. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY FROM CoLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT 245 (1919); cf. Margarette J. Sandelowski, Failures ofVolition: Female Agency and
Infertility in Historical Context, 15 SIGNS 475,480-86 (1990) (physicians of the era advance idea that
female volition is an explanation of sterility).
127. O'Donnell & Atlee, supra note 121, at 240.
God's first commandment to Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden was, to increase and
multiply.•. : and so solicitous was he in carrying out his divine object, that certain im-
presses were stamped on the character of both male and female by which they are brought
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pregnancy: "She becomes unmindful of the course marked out for her by
Providence, she overlooks the duties imposed on her by the marriage con-
tract. She yields to the pleasures-but shrinks from the pains and responsi-
bilities of maternity ...."128 The campaign's leader, who preferred to speak
"purely" as a physiologist, made the same point when he warned the na-
tion's women:
Were woman intended as a mere plaything, or for the gratification of her
own or her husband's desires, there would have been need for her of neither
uterus nor ovaries, nor would the prevention of their being used for their
clearly legitimate purpose have been attended by such tremendous penalties
as is in reality the case.129
Because the compound concept of "physiological sin" derived a wife's
duties from facts about her body, it empowered doctors, rather than hus-
bands, with special authority in questions concerning a wife's conduct. The
physician was to serve as his patient's "confessor"130 and "physical guard-
ian." As Storer explained to the nation's legislators, "medical men are the
physical guardians of women and their offspring; from their position and
peculiar knowledge necessitated in all obstetric matters to regulate public
sentiment, and to govern tribunals of justice."131 Claiming public authority
in "all obstetric matters," the medical profession asserted that it had special
competence to mediate between a woman and the state, thereby appropriat-
ing a role the common law otherwise defined as the husband's. This claim of
expertise justified the so-called "therapeutic exception" to birth control laws,
which made the woman a ward of her physician, whQse judgments governed
her legal access to abortion and contraception.132 With this medical defini-
tion of the marriage relationship, a woman's choices regarding birth control
were made subject to a man's consent, where no such requirement existed at
common law before.133
At the same time that doctors asserted professional authority over a
wife's reproductive conduct, they insisted upon the public character of that
conduct. A wife had a duty to bear children which she owed, not to her
together, and to purify that union and to render intact and without reproach the parents
and their offspring, the institution of matrimony was established.
ld.
128. ld. at 241.
129. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 80-81.
130. See id. at 18 ("physician's consulting room proving in reality a confessional, wherein,
under the implied pledge ofsecrecy and inviolate confidence, the most weighty and at times astound-
ing revelations are daily made"); see also id. at 34, 52, 62.
131. H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 4; see also Christian, supra note 125, at 146;
Storer et al., supra note 90, at 76 ("We are the physical guardians of women; we, alone, thus far, of
their offspring in utero.").
132. See H. STORER & F.P. HEARD, supra note 95, at 104 (advocating therapeutic exception to
criminal abortion statutes); see also H.R. STORER, supra note 123, at 115-16 (suggesting that any
abatement of reproductive activity should occur only at the advice of physician); note 219 infra.
133. The common law of marital status required a husband's consent for a wife to engage in
many legal and economic transactions. By contrast, common law doctrines pertaining to abortion
and marital status imposed no requirement that a wife obtain a husband's consent in order to secure
an abortion. See note 242 infra.
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husband, but to the community: It was "a duty [she] tacitly promised the
State."134 Laws against abortion and contraception were necessary to pro-
tect the public's interest in procreation. Synthesizing religious, medical, and
common law authority in neo-Malthusianl3s terms, the doctors argued that
the institution of marriage was of the utmost public regulatory concern be-
cause it was responsible for the production of populations, and in the pro-
duction of populations lay the welfare of the state.136
3. The state.
The campaign defined intimate aspects of "private" life as matters of in-
tense public regulatory interest, not merely by expanding the concept of de-
viant sexuality to include all nonprocreative marital sex, but also by
depicting marital sex as an activity involving the production of citizens. In
the medical profession's arguments against abortion, family and state did not
stand in traditional, homologous relation to each other.137 Doctors de-
scribed family and state as interdependent institutions, arguing that regula-
tion of private conduct was necessary to preserve the character ofpublic life.
In nearly all antiabortion tracts, doctors emphasized that abortion was
most frequently practiced by married women, particularly those of the so-
called "native" middle class. Abortion did not simply threaten the unborn;
it threatened unborn populations.138 When, for example, James Whitmire
argued that "the truly professional man ... sees in the germ the probable
134. D.H., On Producing Abortion: A Physician's Reply to the Solicitations of a Married
Woman to Produce a MiscarriagejOr Her, 17 NASHVILLE J. MED. & SURGERY 200, 201 (1876):
Ifyou are not willing to accept the cares, labors, responsibilities, and duties, ofmarried life,
why did you enter into that state? You were not forced into it; but you voluntarily and
deliberately assumed that relation, and now you have no right to attempt to escape from
what you knew beforehand is one of its most natural consequences, and a duty you tacitly
promised the State, by whose authority you legally came together as husband and wife, you
would perform.
See also H.R. STORER, supra note 123, at 115-16 (describing childbearing as a "duty to the
community").
135. See H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 9 n.l, 62 (attacking Malthus).
136. D.M. Reese put the physicians' case succinctly:
[A]s marriage is a civil contract, the fruits of which vastly concern the public welfare,
bearing as they do on the present and future generation, it is the duty of the State, in every
civilized and Christian country, to surround marriage with all the sanctions of law, and to
protect the unborn fruits of such alliances from premature destruction by statutory enact-
ments. These should be such as enlightened science and philanthropy suggest, and should
be encouraged and reinforced by the united power of religion and the law.
D. Meredith Reese, Infant Mortality in Large Cities; The Sources for its Increase, And Meansfor its
Diminution, 10 TRANSAcrIONS AM. MED. Ass'N 91, 101-02 (1857).
137. Cf. WILLIAM GOUGE, OF DOMESTICALL DUTIES (1622) ("a famille is a little Church,
and a little commonwealth, at least a lively representation thereof, whereby triall may be made of
such as are fit for any place ofauthoritie, or of subjection in Church or commonwealth"), quoted in
JOHN DEMOS, THE LITTLE CoMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY I (1970);
HEMAN HUMPHREY, DOMESTIC EDUCATION 16 (1840) ("Every family is a little state, or empire
within itself, bound together by the most endearing attractions, and governed by its patriarchal head,
with whose prerogative no power on earth has a right to interfere."), quoted in ANTEBELLUM
AMERICAN CULTURE: AN INTERPRETIVE ANTHOLOGY 10 (David Brion Davis ed., 1979).
138. The first chapter of Criminal Abortion, Storer's major work of medical jurisprudence on
the subject, condemns abortion on the ground that life begins at conception, while the second chap-
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embryo [and] in the embryo ... the prospective living, moving, breathing
man or woman," the prospective man or woman he had in mind was appar-
ently of his own social class, for, without pause, Whitmire identified abortion
as
one great cause and reason for so few native-born children of American par-
ents, according to the number of young married people, and in comparison
with those of other nationalities among us.... This, too, is one of the many
reasons why we are fast losing our national characteristics, and slowly merg-
ing into those ofour foreign population, who, according to the United States
statistics of 1870, are rearing fifty per cent. more children according to their
number than Americans are doing.139
The refrain was repeated in one tract after another. l40 Augustus Gardner
dedicated Conjugal Sins "To the Reverend Clergy of the United States who
by example and instruction have the power to arrest the rapid extinction of
the Native American People."141
The physicians thus depicted reproductive conduct as public, urging
middle-class audiences to repudiate practices of abortion and contraception
in order to preserve the political power of their social class. To this end, the
doctors self-consciously translated the relations of political governance into
reproductive terms. Dr. H.S. Pomeroy observed: "[I]t is coming to pass that
our voters-and so our lawmakers and rulers, indirectly, if not directly-
come more and more from the lowest class, because that class is able and
willing to have children, while the so-called better classes seem not to be."142
ter offers lengthy statistical analyses of who in the community is aborting, broken down by national
and socioeconomic backgrounds. See H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 15-64.
Similarly, Edwin Hale defined abortion as a crime, first because "[ilt lessens the population ofa
State or country, in an appalling degree," second because "it is a crime against physiology," third
because "it is a crime against morality," and lastly because "it is a crime against the law." E. HALE,
supra note 123, at 4-6. He then observed that "[elven ovular abortion, or the prevention of concep-
tion, may ... be considered in the light of an offence against the State ... because it prevents the
normal increase of population, and against physiology, because it prevents the occurrence of preg-
nancy ...." ld. at 6 n.
139. Whitmire, supra note 109, at 392.
140. Dr. Andrew Nebinger summarized an article from Harper's Monthly Magazine on the
relative population rates of "original native stock" and "foreign population" in New England, argu-
ing "that this non-production of offspring on the part of Americans ... is the result mainly of the
practice of criminal abortions." ANDREW NEBINGER, CRIMINAL ABORTION; ITS EXTENT AND
PREVENTION 6-7 (philadelphia, Collins 1876); see also 3 A. CALHOUN, supra note 126, at 236 (quot-
ing Dr. Nathan Allen to the effect that the "growth and prevalence of the practice of abortion" was
partly responsible for the "decline of productiveness among native New Englanders"), 225-54 (chap-
ter on "Race Sterility and Race Suicide" quoting doctors and other social observers on the causes
and social implications of the declining birth rate of so-called "native" Americans, and containing
much medical commentary on abortion); Pallen, supra note 68, at 198-99.
141. A. GARDNER, supra note 79, at 5. On the reticence of the nation's clergy to join the
antiabortion campaign, see J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 182-96; see also id. at 195-96 ("The origins
and evolution of anti-abortion attitudes in the United States owed relatively little to the influence or
the activities of organized religion."); id. at 167 ("There can be little doubt that Protestants' fears
about not keeping up with the reproductive rates of Catholic immigrants played a greater role in the
drive for anti-abortion laws in nineteenth-century America than Catholic opposition to abortion
did.").
142. H.S. POMEROY, supra note 114, at 39.
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In his succinct adage, "preform lies back of reform."143 Similarly, in Why
Not? Storer lectured his female audience about the larger political implica-
tions of abortion:
All the fruitfulness of the present generation, tasked to its utmost, can
hardly fill the gaps in our population that have late been made by disease
and the sword, while the great territories of the far West, just opening to
civilization, and the fertile savannas of the South, now disinthralled and first
made habitable by freemen, offer homes for countless millions yet unborn.
Shall they be filled by our own children or by those of aliens? This is a
question that our own women must answer; upon their loins depends the
future destiny of the nation. l44
Translating the creed of manifest destiny into reproductive terms, Storer
fused America's populations, territories, and women in a powerful image of
reproductive potentiality. The nation's fate now depended on the "loins" of
"our own women," whose refusal to reproduce threatened it with miscege-
nous decay.145 In this vision, the state was its populations, and its identity
was determined by the reproductive conduct of its female citizens. Political
power resided in control of those citizens who would bear citizens.
By attacking abortion on physiological grounds, the doctors channeled
wide-ranging social concern into the act of reproduction itself. The claim
that life begins at conception provided a persuasive basis for criminaIizing
abortion, as one of many arguments that identified the reproductive process
as the basis of social life. Taken together, the import of these claims was
clear: Regulating the physical act of reproduction was necessary to ensure
reproduction of the social order. As various members of the profession ex-
pressed it, the incidence of abortion was a "leprosy upon the body poli-
tic,"146 a "foul sore in the body politic,"147 a "constitutional disease ...
poisoning the blood and distilling its venom into every fiber of the body
politic."148 It thus followed that to protect "life"-be it the unborn, the
"health" of America's wives, or the political power of the "native" Ameri-
can classes-it was necessary to wrest from women control over decisions
respecting reproduction. The arguments employed by the profession to per-
143. Id. at 34:
In a republic all civil reform must have its roots in reform of the individual and the family.
Tracing a reform back to its source, we find that an officer of the law carries out the orders
ofthe executive, the executive carries out the provisions of the law, the law is an expression
of the will of the Legislature, the Legislature is elected by the voter, and the voter's will is
usually the expression of his birth and home training. And so we may trace reform back to
the nursery. I shall endeavor in these pages to show that reform may be traced still farther
back, or, rather, that prefonn lies back of reform.
144. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 85; see also H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at
41-53 (analyzing relative birthrates of "native" American and immigrant populations in
Massachusetts).
145. See note 239 infra and accompanying text (discussing relation of mid-century campaigns
against abortion and miscegenation).
146. Pallen, supra note 68, at 195.
147. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 35.
148. Gibbons, supra note 88, at 97.
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suade the public of the necessity of regulating abortion were arguments
about the necessity of controlling women.
C. The Doctors' Arguments: The Disorder ofLife
The antiabortion campaign repeatedly insisted that women's reproduc-
tive conduct demanded regulation, using arguments which are striking in
their rhetorical range and tenor. These arguments provide ample evidence
that the campaign itself was the product of sexual conflict reaching far be-
yond the question of abortion.
To some extent the doctors' attacks on women can be explained in paro-
chial. professional terms. During the period or"the criminalization cam-
paign. the gynecologists and obstetricians of the AMA were seeking to
appropriate management of the birthing process from midwives. and to pre-
vent women from entering the medical profession. I49 At the same time. they
were struggling to build a practice of female patients. and so were peculiarly
subject to the market demands of women. many of whom were interested in
procuring services that doctors refused to provide. ISO These socio-economic
concerns informed the physicians' case against abortion. leading them to de-
pict the practice of abortion as a female conspiracy requiring male interven-
tion. ISI For example, Storer and Heard's treatise Criminal Abortion IS2
discussed the perpetrators of abortion by sex. It identified them. in order of
culpability. as the pregnant woman. her female friends and acquaintances.
nurses. midwives and female physicians-then husbands. quacks and pro-
fessed abortionists. and druggists. but rarely. ifever. male physicians in regu-
lar standing. IS3 Others joined Storer and Heard in depicting abortion as a
149. See G.J. BARKER-BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN LIFE: MALE ATIl-
TUDES TOWARD WOMEN AND SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 61-62,84-85,87-
88,255 (1976); B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH, supra note 78, at 54-61; J. MOHR, supra note 65, at
168-69; P. STARR, supra note 78, at 47-51, 117, 124; Dara Clapper Brack, Displaced-The Midwift
by the Male Physician, in WOMEN LoOK AT BIOLOGY LoOKING AT WOMEN: A COLLECTION OF
FEMINIST CRmQUES 83, 90-95 (Ruth Hubbard, Mary Sue Henifin & Barbara Fried eds., 1979); see
also J. LEAvrrr, supra note 80, at 87-115 (role ofgender in the birthing room during the nineteenth
century).
150. See E. HALE, supra note 123, at 14:
[f]he honorable physician who refuses to accede to the wishes of such patrons, is often
obliged to see their patronage transferred to other and less scrupulous persons.•.. [S]uch a
transfer of patronage is a growing evil which needs to be abated by some influence-moral,
religious, or legal-which is not now in operation.
See also K. LUKER, supra note 65, at 37 (physicians who.turned away patients who requested abor-
tions might lose those patients to other practitioners); J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 37 ("as the regulars
themselves pointed out, it was not so much the short-term loss of a fee for the abortion that upset
them, but the prospects of a long-term loss of patients").
151. See C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 65, at 231-36.
152. See note 95 supra. Jurists often cited this treatise as an authoritative commentary on
abortion in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See Harper, supra note 74, at 132; see also note
228 infra and accompanying text (Ohio legislative committee report cites Criminal Abortion).
153. H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 97-103. Storer and Heard addressed the role
of male physicians in a separate chapter entitled "Its Innocent Abettors." ld. at 104-35.
Storer and Heard impugned the competence of midwives and female physicians with the sum-
mary observation that
they still are and must be subject to the periodical infirmity of their sex; which for the time,
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female crime, encouraged by female practitioners154 and indulged in by un-
ruly female patients. A standard complaint attacked pregnant women for
refusing to comply with medical advice during "confinement":
They eat and drink, they walk and ride, they will practice no self restrain-
ment, but will indulge every caprice, every passion, utterly regardless of the
unseen and unloved embryo....[E]very obstetrician can bear testimony to
the great difficulty of inducing our wayward patients to forego certain grati-
fications, to practice certain self-denials, and to adopt efficient means for the
salvation of the child}55
In demanding public action to protect unborn life, the doctors were si-
multaneously attempting to control women who were their competitors and
clientele. Yet these parochial professional concerns plainly converged with
wider cultural preoccupations. The "wayward patients" whom the doctors
sought to control were none other than rebellious wives. As one doctor ob-
served, there was " 'widespread determination on the part of many who are
married to avoid the labor of caring for and rearing children.' "156 Another
physician warned of women's "'increasing propensity to fight against the
maternal instinct,' " complaining that "'[s]ome wives are bold enough to
declare that they do not want any children; and a few even dare to proclaim
openly that they will forego propagation if possible.' "157 As the antiabor-
tion campaign perceived and portrayed her, the wife who chose to abort a
pregnancy challenged the social structure of marriage itself. The profession
thus invested the act of abortion with wider social implications, depicting it
as an expression of women's resistance to marital and maternal obligation.
The campaign invested abortion with gendered significance by means
both overt and oblique, many of which are not immediately apparent to a
modem audience. When campaign rhetoric is examined in socio-political
context, it becomes clear that the medical profession was engaged in a debate
with the feminist movement of the era over the institution of marriage and
and in every case, however unattended by physical suffering, unfits them for any responsi-
ble effort of mind, and in many cases, body also..•. We could hardly allow to a female
physician convicted of criminal abortion the plea that the act was committed during the
temporary insanity of her menstruation; and yet at such times a woman is undoubtedly
more prone than men to commit any unusual or outrageous act.
ld. at 100 n.2. In the 1859 edition, Storer denied that his purpose was to suppress midwives and
female physicians; in the 1868 edition, he retracted the denial, explaining that his personal experi-
ence with female physicians proved that they were unfit to practice. ld.; cf. J. MOHR, supra note 65,
at 168-69 (Storer supports AMA efforts to exclude women from the profession).
154. The professional concerns underlying Storer's account of women's role in abortion were
also expressed by Edwin Hale: "Female Abortionists, assume the name of 'Midwives,' 'Nurses,'
'Fortune-tellers,' 'Madam -, Female Physician,' et cetera, and under these apparently harmless
avocations, ply their murderous trade." E. HALE, supra note 123, at 17; see also J. MOHR, supra
note 65, at 161 (Detroit physicians characterizing the abortionist as an "old woman, of one sex or the
other"). Similarly, the Reverend John Todd, a follower of Dr. Augustus Gardner, argued in his
antiabortion tract that "seventy-five per cent. of all the abortions produced are caused and effected
by females." JOHN TODD, SERPENTS IN THE DOVES' NEST 4 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1867).
155. H. HODGE, supra note 108, at 32-33; see also Pallen, supra note 68, at 202..03.
156. J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 89 (quoting Dr. George E. Smith of Hillsdale, Michigan).
157. 3 A. CALHOUN, supra note 126, at 242 (quoting Thomas S. Sozinskey, M.D., in Potter's
American Monthly of 1881).
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motherhood that only peripherally concerned the question of abortion. Re-
constructing this debate reveals the political reference and social resonance
which antiabortion rhetoric had for its nineteenth century audiences. By
identifying the practice of abortion with feminist criticism of prevailing gen-
der roles, the campaign encouraged Americans to oppose birth control as a
means of defending prevailing gender roles. The profession's antifeminist
arguments imbued the practice of controlling birth with emancipatory signif-
icance, whether or not it had this meaning for women who sought abortions.
1. The aborting wife: antiabortion as antifeminism.
The doctors who led the criminalization campaign regularly complained
that it was America's wives who most frequently sought abortions. ISS While
doctors sometimes attributed the prevalence of abortions to women's igno-
rance of the reproductive process1S9 or to aberrations in feminine judgment
induced by pregnancy,l60 they more frequently portrayed abortion as reflect-
ing a growing self-indulgence among American women.161 Doctors scarcely
acknowledged that wives had meaningful reasons for aborting a pregnancy;
instead, they attributed the practice to simple egoism. Dr. Andrew Nebinger
spoke for many when he observed that most women sought abortions be-
cause of "the inconvenience incident to pregnancy, fear of the pains and
risks of labor; but mainly ... to avoid the labor and the expense of rearing
children, and the interference with pleasurable pursuits, fashions, and frlvol-
ities."162 Nebinger invited his audience to consider "the causes inducing the
committal of the crime" and find "even a shadow of a sufficient reason" for
an abortion.163 As the profession presented it, all of women's reasons for
seeking an abortion were equally and unnaturally egoistic because all were
derogations of maternal duty. Augustus Gardner made this quite explicit:
158. See generally C. DEGLER, supra note 74, at 229-33 (surveying medical literature); J.
MOHR, supra note 65, at 86-90 (same).
159. See K. LUKER, supra note 65, at 21-22. But see id. at 23-26 (popular manuals on birthing
reflect an understanding of gestational development as continuous, thereby suggesting that women
understood the facts of physiological development, but differed with doctors over their moral im-
port); Sauer, supra note 88, at 56 ("While the literature universally condemned abortion, all writers
agreed that a large segment of the public did not regard abortion as such a heinous practice."); see
also Pallen, supra note 68, at 201 ("when such individuals are informed of the nature of the transac-
tion, there is an expression of real or pretended surprise, that anyone should deem the act improper,
much more guilty").
160. See Walter Channing, Effects ofCriminal Abortion, 60 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 134,
135 (1859) ("Women for whom this office of foeticide ..• is committed, are strong-minded, and the
natural is strengthened by the recently-established uterine function. It becomes irritable, morbidly
sensitive, ... and what is resolved upon is done."), quoted in C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 65,
at 238; see also H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 74-75.
161. J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 108 (citing doctors who attributed the incidence ofabortion to
the "growing self-indulgence among American women").
162. A. NEBINGER, supra note 140, at 11.
163. Id. See E. Hale, supra note 123, at 7-15 (reviewing and dismissing all rationales women
might advance for aborting, finding most of them "shallow"). The complaint was commonplace and
the rhetoric standard. Hugh Hodge attributed wives' practice of abortion to "the fear of labor, ...
[the] indisposition to have the care, the expense, or the trouble of children, or some other motive
equally trifling and degrading." H. HODGE, supra note 108, at 32-33. Montrose Pallen echoed him
verbatim. Pallen, supra note 68, at 201.
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"Is it not arrant laziness, sheer, craven, culpable cowardice, which is at the
bottom of this base act? . . . . Have you the right to choose an indolent,
selfish life, neglecting the work God has appointed you to perform?"164
The campaign did offer other explanations for women's efforts to avoid
motherhood. Some doctors blamed antimatemalism on fashions of leisure
and luxury accompanying industriaIization;I65 others insisted its roots were
more importantly political than social, attributing the incidence of abortion
to disturbances produced by woman's rights advocacy.
Statements hostile to the woman's rights movement appeared in many of
the antiabortion tracts penned by America's doctors and their supporters.166
The campaign's leader, Horatio Storer, announced his antifeminist views as
a statement of first principles: "I would not transplant [women] from their
proper and God-given sphere, to the pulpit, the forum, or the cares of state,
nor would I repeat the experiment, so patiently tried by myself, and at last so
emphatically condemned-of females attempting the practice of the medical
profession."167 More frequently, however, the doctors attacked feminist ad-
vocacy on the grounds that it incited American women to practice abor-
tion. I68 Thus, Dr. Montrose Pallen attributed birth control practices to the
corrosive influence of the woman's rights movement:
Woman's rights and woman's sphere are, as understood by the American
public, quite different from that understood by us as Physicians, or as Anat-
omists, or Physiologists.
"Woman's rights" now are understood to be, that she should be a man,
and that her physical organism, which is constituted by Nature to bear and
rear offspring, should be left in abeyance, and that her ministrations in the
164. Gardner, supra note 126, at 225. A physician identifying himself only as D.H. counseled
doctors to rebuke wives who approached them for an abortion in similar terms: "[Alre you not
ignoring the demands of duty and pleading the most intense and unmitigated selfishness as a justifi-
cation for destroying life? Is self-indulgence the only thing to be sought in this life?" D.H., supra
note 134, at 200. Similarly, the AMA's 1871 Report on Criminal Abortion depicted abortion as a
breach of marital duty, indulged in by the wife who "yields to the pleasures but shrinks from the
pains and responsibilities ofmatemity." O'Donnell & Atlee, supra note 121, at 241 (quoted in text
accompanying note 128 supra).
165. See A. GARDNER, supra note 79, at 17-18, 180-81,224-29. Industrialization did provide
economic incentives for middle-class families to practice birth control. See text accompanying notes
86-88 supra. But cf. J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 107-08 ("The most common variant of the view that
abortion was a manifestation of the women's rights movement hinged upon the word 'fashion.' ").
166. See J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 104-09 (discussing antifeminism of the doctors' campaign
against abortion); see also G.J. BARKER-BENFIELD, supra note 149, at 84-85, 87-88, 193,284-85 (on
antifeminist attitudes of nineteenth century medical profession); J. HALLER & R. HALLER, supra
note 113, at 76-87, 123; S. STAGE, supra note 80, at 84-85; Graham John Barker-Benfield, The
Spermatic Economy, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIAL-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 385
(Michael Gordon ed., 2d ed. 1978).
The antifeminist motif of the medical profession's campaign against abortion was perpetuated
by nonprofessional critics of the practice. John Todd, one of the most outspoken religious opponents
ofabortion, wrote both antiabortion and antifeminist tracts. Compare J. TODD, supra note 154, with
JOHN TODD, WOMAN'S RIGHTS (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1867).
167. H.R. STORER, supra note 123, at 89-90.
168. Cf. H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 2 n.l (discussing woman's rights tract
"in which, however covertly, the idea is practically upheld, that, whatever her other rights, a woman
is certainly entitled to decide whether or no she shall bear children"); Gibbons, supra note 88, at 105-
07, 111 (blaming feticide on antimatemalism and free love).
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formation ofcharacter as mother should be abandoned for the sterner rights
of voting and law making.
The whole country is in an abnormal state, and the tendency to force
women into men's places, creates new ideas ofwomen's duties, and therefore
... the marriage state is frequently childless . . .. These influences act and
react on public sentiment, until the public conscience becomes blunted, and
duties necessary to woman's organization are shirked, neglected or crimi-
nally prevented.169
H.S. Pomeroy reasoned along similar lines, contending that "it is impossible
to treat the sin against parenthood without touching upon what is called the
Woman Question."170 He charged that the "opinions and theories" of
"many ... connected with the Woman's Rights Movement, and at least,
some of the advocates of higher education for women ... indirectly at least,
have aided and abetted the sin against maternity."17l As he explained:
There are lecturers "to ladies only" who profess to be actuated simply by
good-will toward their unfortunate sisters, who yet call woman's highest and
holiest privilege by the name ofslavery, and a law to protect the family from
the first step toward extinction, tyranny.
There are apostles ofwoman's rights who, in their well-meaning but mis-
directed efforts to arouse women to claim privileges now denied them, en-
courage their sisters to feel ashamed of the first and highest right which is
theirs by the very idea of their nature.
There are advocates of education who seek to deter woman by false
pride, from performing the one duty she is perfectly sure of being able to do
better than a man! And there are those who teach that their married sisters
may save time and vitality for high and noble pursuits by "electing" how
few children shall be born to them . . . .172
Doctors considered abortion as a rebellious, incipiently political act, so
that for Pallen and Pomeroy, women's conduct in " 'electing' how few chil-
dren shall be born to them" suggested an interest in exercising the franchise
itself. By linking abortion to feminist advocacy, the medical profession in-
vested abortion with far-reaching social import. To grasp the rhetorical
terms and practical concerns of the campaign's antifeminist polemic in their
largest form, it is necessary to examine the feminist demands physicians
opposed.
2. Feminism and the concept of voluntary motherhood.
The doctors leading the antiabortion campaign could not directly indict
the feminist movement for advocating abortion because, in this era, no
leader of the American feminist movement publicly endorsed abortion or
contraceptives as a method of birth contro1.173 Nineteenth century feminists
169. Pallen, supra'note 68, at 205-06.
170. H.S. POMEROY, supra note 114, at vii.
171. Id. at 137-38.
172. Id. at 95-96.
173. See L. GORDON, supra note 65, at 97-111; Linda Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Femi-
nists Did Not Support 'Birth Control' and Twentieth-Century Feminists Do: Feminism. Reproduction.
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did demand reproductive choice. But their demand for "voluntary mother-
hood" referred, not to abortion, but instead to a wife's right to refuse her
husband's sexual advances. 174
The feminist movement's refusal to endorse abortion may be explained
on several grounds.l75 Yet focusing on this issue obscures the extent to
which feminists of the era tacitly condoned abortion. 176 It also obscures the
wide-ranging conflict over marriage and motherhood in which medical op-
ponents of abortion and feminist proponents of voluntary motherhood were
engaged. Nineteenth century feminist demands for voluntary motherhood
prompted debate over fundamental issues of women's status often neglected
in the debate over abortion rights today.
Feminist demands for voluntary motherhood flowed from the move-
ment's larger critique of marriage. From its inception, the woman's rights
movement attacked the common law of marital status, which endowed a
husband with rights in his wife's "services" in exchange for his obligation of
support. Feminists protested the doctrine of marital service because it
vested a husband with rights in a wife's labor and sexuality, transforming
wives into "unpaid housekeepers & nurses, & still worse, chattels personal to
be used and abused at the will of a master."177 As woman's rights advocates
insistently argued, a wife had a right to self-ownership in marriage, or, as
they put it, a right in her own body, and so was entitled to control her labor,
sexuality, and reproductive life; the movement thus demanded rights for
women which both law and custom viewed as prerogatives of the husband.
Lucy Stone reflected on the logic of the movement's demands in a letter to
Antoinette Blackwell written in 1855:
It is clear to me, that . . . all our little skirmishing for better laws, and the
right to vote, will yet be swallowed up in the real question, viz: Has woman
a right to herself? It is very little to me to have the right to vote, to own
property, &C. if I may not keep my body, and its uses, in my absolute right.
Not one wife in a thousand can do that now, and as long as she suffers this
and the Family, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUESfIONS 40, 43 (Barrie Thorne &
Marilyn Yalom eds., 1982).
174. See L. GORDON, supra note 65, at 108-11.
175. Linda Gordon suggests that feminists of the era saw birth control practices as a threat to
women's welfare precisely because they severed the relation between sexuality and procreative activ-
ity. Making birth control accessible would impair women's ability to secure and hold a husband and
thus deprive them of a relation indispensable to their financial security, while conferring sexual
freedom upon women in a cultural milieu in which they were unable to exercise it. See id. at 109-11.
It would have been difficult for the feminist movement to endorse birth control practices for
other reasons. Endorsing abortion and/or contraception would have further marginalized the femi-
nist movement, which was already depicted as inimical to family life, and continually attempting to
refute charges that it promoted "free love." Just as importantly, endorsing birth control practices
would have been at odds with the maternaIist ethic from which many feminists drew moral power.
See id. at 96-100.
176. See note 184 infra and accompanying text. For feminist arguments justifYing abortion,
see note 185 infra and text accompanying notes 202-205 infra. For a feminist argument "deploring"
abortion, but opposing criminal abortion legislation, see note 206 infra.
177. Sarah M. Grimke, Marriage, in THE FEMALE EXPERIENCE 89, 96 (Gerda Lerner ed.,
1977) (1855 essay quoted and discussed at note 188 infra).
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bondage, all other rights will not help her to her true position.178
The demand for voluntary motherhood thus grew out of feminist criti-
cism of marriage as an institution of economic and sexual disempowerment
for women.l79 In the years after the Civil War, this critique of marriage
consolidated in the demand for voluntary motherhood, a concept which fem-
inists employed in constructive and critical ways. On the one hand, the con-
cept of controlling motherhood played a key role in a new vision of wives'
emancipation: The demand for voluntary motherhood was asserted at a
time when movement activists were beginning to explore various schemes for
collectivizing domestic labor and to sketch out a relationship which they
called "two-career marriage."180 At the same time, the concept of voluntary
motherhood enabled feminists to voice far-reaching criticisms of the existing
structure of the marriage--many of which took the form of commentary on
the practice of abortion.
Unlike the medical profession, proponents of voluntary motherhood
blamed the practice of abortion on the social conditions in which women
conceived and raised children. Most frequently, they attributed the inci-
dence of abortion to marital rape,181 but they also attributed abortion to the
onerous work of motherhood, some even tracing it to the expropriation of
women's domestic labor in marriage.182 For example, Abigail Duniway, edi-
178. Letter from Lucy Stone to Antoinette Brown (Blackwell) (Iuly 11, 1855), quoted in
ELIZABETH CAZDEN, ANTOINETTE BROWN BLACKWELL: A BIOGRAPHY 100 (1983).
179. In the post-war period, a voluntary motherhood argument, virtually condoning abortion
under prevailing conditions of marriage, defined woman's emancipation as: "The ability to frame
laws, making the husband and wife equal owners in the property accumulated by their united indus-
try and economy, [and] making the mother the guardian of her own children, the owner of her own
body in short, the controller of her own destiny." M. Brinkerhoff, Woman and Motherhood,
REVOLUTION, Sept. 2, 1869, at 138; see also Matilda E.I. Gage, Is Woman Her Own?, REVOLUTION,
Apr. 9, 1868, at 215, 215-16 (situating abortion in the context of women's legal disabilities in mar-
riage). For an account of nineteenth century feminism examining the movement's demands for re-
productive autonomy in light of its wider socia-political agenda, see Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing
the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution,
1820-1878, 741. AM. H1ST. 836, 842-44 (1987).
180. See DOLORES HAYDEN, THE GRAND DOMESIIC REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF FEMI-
NIST DESIGNS FOR AMERICAN HOMES, NEIGHBORHOODS, AND CrnES 66-131 (1981) (feminist
schemes for cooperative housekeeping); WILLIAM LEACH, TRUE LoVE AND PERFEcr UNION: THE
FEMINIST REFORM OF SEX AND SOCIETY 195-202 (1980) (feminist visions oftwo-career marriage);
id. at 202-12 (cooperative housekeeping).
181. See notes 184 & 185 infra. Storer discusses the frequency and practice of marital rape in
Is it I?, H.R. STORER, supra note 123, which he intended for a male readership. See note 195 infra.
182. During the period of the criminalization campaign, the woman's rights movement repeat-
edly objected to the expropriation of women's family labor in marriage. See Reva Siegel, Home As
Work: Political Feminism and the Question of Domestic Labor, 1850-1880 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
From this critique emerged a counter-narrative of domesticity, in which motherhood appeared
as an institution that denied women the fruits of their labor. Readers of suffrage newspapers sup-
ported this critique with personal testimonials of their own exploitation. See, e.g., A Wife's Protest,
WOMAN'S 1., Mar. 6, 1875, at 72 (analyzing the social work of reproduction performed by a man's
mother, mother-in-law, his first and sometimes second wife, and concluding that "[i]t takes three,
and sometimes four women to get a man through from cradle to the grave ..•. It is time we stated
facts and called things by their right names, and handled this subject without kid gloves"); Subjec-
tion of Women, THE BALLOT Box, Nov. 1876, at 2 (letter from farmer's wife who raised nine chil-
dren and cared for several grandchildren, reporting that "[h]usband owns and controls everything,"
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tor of the suffrage paper The New Northwest observed: "All work becomes
oppressive that is not remunerative. To this idea, more than any other, may
be traced the prejudice against bearing children which has become so in-
grafted upon the minds of married women, that tens of thousands annually
commit ante-natal murder."183 Given their view of the conditions of con-
ception and maternity, many feminists publicly condemned, yet tacitly con-
doned, women who turned to abortion. I84 Some even argued that wives
compelled to submit to marital relations were justified in aborting, character-
izing abortion as an act ofself-defense under prevailing conditions of "forced
motherhood."185
Thus, the feminist demand to "keep my body, and its uses, in my abso-
lute right" was no abstract statement of allegiance to principles of auton-
omy. It was a far-ranging critique of the social relations of reproduction
embodied in institution of marriage. I86 As structured by law and custom,
and "advising every woman to not do another day's labor unless she can be owner of the value of
it"); see also Letter from S.H. Graves to Isabella Beecher Hooker (Oct. 24, 1871), in THE LIMITS OF
SISTERHOOD 204, 204 (Jeanne Boydston, Mary Kelley & Anne Margolis eds., 1988) ("Of course,
[my husband] is bitterly opposed to 'woman's rights' and loses no opportunity for the usual sneer. I
have no money and but few clothes..•. [E]verything is his and nothing mine. In short I am nothing
but a housekeeper without wages, doing all the work of the family."). It is this sense of motherhood
as not merely life-giving, but life-consuming work, that drives the voluntary motherhood polemic
and the two-career marriage concept to which it was increasingly affiliated.
183. Liberty for Married Women, NEW NORTHWEST, Aug. 15, 1873, at 2. Matilda Gage ar-
gued substantially the same point in a letter to Revolution, which discussed abortion in the context of
women's common law disabilities, especially the expropriation of their family labor. Gage, supra
note 179; see Brinkerhoff, supra note 179, at 139.
184. For a popular marriage manual of the era condemning abortion, but virtually condoning
it in cases of "enforced childbearing," see E.B. DUFFEY, WHAT WOMEN SHOULD KNOW: A
WOMAN'S BOOK ABOUT WOMEN 124-25, 130-33 (photo. reprint 1974) (philadelphia, J.M. Stoddart
& Co. 1873). See also C. DEGLER, supra note 74, at 204-05 (discussing Duffey's career). Similarly,
Henry Wright's argument for voluntary motherhood condemned abortion, but presented the oner-
ous burdens of compelled motherhood in such vivid terms that his case histories effectively excused
the actions of women who sought to terminate a pregnancy. See H. WRIGHT, THE UNWELCOME
CHILD; OR, THE CRIME OF AN UNDESIGNED AND UNDESIRED MATERNITY (Boston 1858).
Whether or not proponents of voluntary motherhood condoned abortion in circumstances of
compelled marital relations, they consistently attributed the incidence of abortion to such relations.
Thus, an editorial in Stanton and Anthony's Revolution observed:
I know men who call themselves Christians, who would insist that they are gentlemen, who
never insult any woman-but their wives. They think it is impossible that they can outrage
them; they never think that even in wedlock there may be the very vilest prostitution; and
if Christian women areprostitutes to Christian husbands, what can we expect but the natu-
ral sequence-infanticide?
Marriage and Maternity, REVOLUTION, July 8, 1869, at 4; see also Child Murder, REVOLUTION,
Mar. 12, 1868, at 146-47.
185. See Child Murder, REVOLUTION, Apr. 9, 1868, at 217 (quoted in text accompanying note
205 infra); Woman and Motherhood, REVOLUTION, Sept. 2,1869, at 138 ("As law and custom give
the husband the absolute control of the wife's person, she is forced to not only violate physical law,
but to outrage the holiest instincts of her being to maintain even a semblance of that freedom which
by nature belongs to every human souL").
186. Feminist demands for "self-ownership" derived from, and yet exceeded, the traditions of
classical liberal thought. The demand for self-ownership was employed to criticize the conditions of
conception and maternity in marriage, the very "contract" excepted from liberal paradigms of self-
determination. Thus, feminists appropriated a liberal discourse of self-ownership, inverted its
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feminists insisted, marriage was little better than "legal robbery,"187 or,
worse yet, a species of "legalized prostitution"-a polemic frequently em-
ployed in their attack on the law "which makes obligatory the rendering of
marital rights and compulsory maternity."188
3. Voluntary motherhood: the debate.
The doctors quite self-consciously attacked the voluntary motherhood
critique. In their view, it was shirking the duty to procreate that rendered
marriage a relation of "legalized prostitution." "I am thoroughly convinced
with Dr. Storer of Boston," observed Thaddeus Reamy, "that ... preventing
gendered perspectives, and then used the discourse to mount a critique of the marriage relation. See
Siegel, supra note 182.
It is important to note that, despite the sexual concerns of the demand for self-o"mership and its
repeated articulation in rhetorics of the body, the claim focused on the social, not physical, relations
of reproduction. Consider Elizabeth Cady Stanton's early articulation of the demand for voluntary
motherhood:
Did [man] ever take in the idea that to the mother of the race, and to her alone, belonged
the right to say when a new being should be brought into the world? Has he, in the gratifi-
cation of his blind passions, ever paused to think whether it was with joy and gladness that
she gave up ten or twenty years of the heyday of her existence to all the cares and sufferings
of excessive maternity?
Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Dec. 21, 1855), in 1 HlSfORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE 839, 840 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., New
York, Fowler & Wells 1881).
187. See. e.g., Resolutions of the Fifth National Woman's Rights Convention, in HISTORY OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 186, at 817-18; Proceedings of the Woman's Rights Convention,
Held at the Broadway Tabernacle in the City of New York, on Tuesday and Wednesday, Sept. 6th
and 7th, 1853, at 59 (1853) (remarks of Clara Nichols) ("Man takes from her her right in property-
her right over her own earnings, and offspring and services, and then, to compensate her for the
robbery, enacts that she shall be held under no obligation to support her children.").
188. Address by Paulina Wright Davis to a convention of the National Woman Suffrage Asso-
ciation (1871), quoted in L. GORDON, supra note 65, at 104. Feminists denounced marriage as a
species of "legalized prostitution" in the decades before and after the Civil War. In the antebellum
era, for example, Sarah Grimke employed the charge to advance a social and legal critique of the
marital relation. See Grimke, supra note 177, at 94-96 (1855 essay responding to New York Times
editorial charging that the woman's rights movement leads to "Free Love"):
A revolting experience has forced upon her the conviction that she is a legal prostitute, a
chattel personal, a tool that is used, a mere convenience. Man seems to feel that Marriage
gives him the control of Woman's person just as the Law gives him the control of her
property....
. . • [Wives] have too soon discovered that they were unpaid housekeepers & nurses, &
still worse, chattels personal to be used & abused at the will of a master. O! the agony of
realizing that personal & pecuniary independence are annihilated by that "Law which
makes the husband and wife one & that one is the husband."
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Ernestine Rose also condemned marriage as "legalized prostitution" in
their demands for divorce reform at the Tenth National Woman's Rights Convention in 1860. See
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 186, at 719, 731. In the post-war period, the movement
continued the refrain, adopting it as part of its demands for voluntary motherhood. See, e.g., Mar-
riage and Maternity, supra note 184, at 4:
[T]each [woman] that submission to any man without love and desire is prostitution; and
thunder in her ear, 'Who so defileth the body, defileth the temple of the Holy Ghost!' let
maternity come to her from a desire to cherish love and train for high purposes an immor-
tal soul, then you will have begun to eradicate this most monstrous crime.
See also L. GORDON, supra note 65, at 112; C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, supra note 65, at 242; DuBois,
supra note 179, at 843.
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conception, is but little else than legalized prostitution."189 This polemical
inversion was quite intentional. Montrose Pallen launched his attack on the
woman's rights movement with the observation that "[m]arriage now seems
to be, not for the purposes intended by the Creator, but . . . a species of
legalized prostitution, whereby men and women strive not to have chil-
dren."190 William Goodell even described "legalized prostitution" as the
cause of feminist discontent: "The sexual instinct has been given to man for
the perpetuation of the species.... Dissociate one from the other, and ...
wedlock lapses into licentiousness; the wife is degraded into a mistress; love
and affection change into aversion and hate."191 Lacking reproductive ful-
fillment, the wife "takes distorted views of life and of the marriage relation,
and harbors resentment against her husband as the author of all her ills."192
The doctors' use of the "legalized prostitution" polemic creatively dis-
torted the feminist claim. Woman's rights advocates insisted that marriage
was no better than legalized prostitution if a wife's consent to marital sex
was inferred from the marital contract itself, or ifmarital sex was treated as
a reciprocal obligation flowing from the fact of marital support.193 By con-
trast, doctors argued that marriage was a relation oflegalized prostitution so
long as man's natural sexual urge were allowed expression in marriage with-
out reproductive consequence.194 Thus, while feminists used the critique of
marriage as "legalized prostitution" to argue that wives should control deci-
189. E.g., Thaddeus A. Reamy, Report on Obstetrics, 21 TRANSACTIONS OHIO ST. MED. SOC'y
55, 69 n.* (1866), quoted in Harper, supra note 74, at 133. For examples of Storer's uses of the
polemic, see H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 127; H.R. STORER, supra note 123, at 97
(quoting Dr. John Gray, commenting on Why Not'!); H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 83.
190. Pallen, supra note 68, at 205. For a minister's use of the legal prostitution motif, see J.
TODD, supra note 154, at 23-24.
191. Goodell, supra note 118, at 162.
192. ld.
193. Victoria Woodhull was perhaps the most radical proponent of this view. Woodhull em-
ployed the claim of self-ownership to criticize concepts of consent used to legitimate the terms of
marital status law: "Every human being belongs to himself or herself by a higher title than any
which, by surrenders, or arrangements or promises, he or she can confer upon any other human
being. Self-ownership is inalienable." Victoria Woodhull, The Greatest Social Drama of Modern
Times, The Beecher-Tilton Scandal (1873), reprinted in WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S WEEKLY: THE
LIVES AND WRmNGS OF NOTORIOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL AND HER SISTER TENNESSEE CLAF-
LIN 38, 43 (Arlene Kisner ed., 1972). In 1873 she offered this portrait of the marriage relation:
To what does modern marriage amount, if it be not to hold sexual slaves, who otherwise
would be free? ••• Beside the evils of improper sexual relations resulting from legalized
prostitution, there are the still more terrific conditions to which they are condemned, who
languish in single cursedness.•.. Add to this class who are sexually starved, those who are
compelled to undesired relations with the legal owners of their sexual organs, and a sum
total of misery is formed which altogether beggars description.
VICTORIA WOODHULL, THE ELIXIR OF LIFE, OR WHY Do WE DIE? 8-9 (New York, Woodhull &
Claflin 1873). Many in the feminist movement distanced themselves from Woodhull's forthright
endorsement of "free love" principles. But others, like Isabella Beecher Hooker, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony stood by her. Cf. Letter from Isabella Beecher Hooker to Susan B.
Anthony (Mar. 11 and 14, 1871), in THE LIMITS OF SISTERHOOD, supra note 182, at 205 (attempting
• to coordinate a stance in which woman's rights activists will refrain from publicly endorsing, or
criticizing, Woodhull).
194. See Goodell, supra note 118, at 162 (quoted in text accompanying note 191 supra); see
also text accompanying notes 116-120 supra (discussing medical concepts of "physiological sin").
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sions respecting reproduction, physicians used the same metaphor to justify
depriving women of control over decisions respecting reproduction.195 In
feminist usage, the critique of marraige as "legalized prostitution" identified
a range of social reasons why a wife would seek to avoid maternity; in medi-
cal usage, the critique ofmarriage as "legalized prostitution" condemned the
very aspiration to avoid maternity as an expression of unnatural egoism or
immoral license.
The antiabortion campaign attacked the voluntary motherhood claim in
other ways. Some doctors openly denounced the concept of two-career mar-
riage,196 while others challenged its root premises. When, for example, Au-
gustus Gardner complained, "The moral sense of the community is at a
fearful pass. Each individual claims to decide for herself whether or not to
have children,"197 he condemned not merely the practice of contraception
and abortion, but, as his audience well understood, the feminist claim that
motherhood was a choice for women rather than a duty. From this perspec-
tive, it is clear that the profession's continual denigration ofwomen's reasons
for aborting, and its incessant portrayal of the aborting wife as an unnatural
egoist or a creature of fashion, were redolent with antifeminist animUS.198
The profession's antifeminist polemic can be traced even further. Many
of the profession's physiological arguments against abortion and contracep-
tion quite clearly disparaged the emancipatory aspirations of the voluntary
motherhood claim. In condemning birth control practices, for example,
Storer invoked arguments from physiology to mock the very notion that
women could make responsible choices in matters of reproduction:
If each woman were allowed to judge for herself in this matter, her decision
upon the abstract question would be too sure to be warped by personal con-
siderations, and those of the moment. Woman's mind is prone to depres-
sion, and, indeed, to temporary actual derangement, under the stimulus of
195. Horatio Storer did find feminist claims of marital rape sufficiently troubling that he
warned husbands to restrain the assertion of their conjugal rights in marriage, lest it drive wives to
abortion. See H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 11-13, 94-95 (discussing marital rape as lawful, but
inappropriate, conduct). Yet, in so doing, he hastened to reassure his male audience:
And here let me say, that I intend taking no ultra ground; that I am neither a fanatic nor
professed philanthrope; and that in loosing, as I hope to do, some of woman's present
chains, it is solely for professional purposes, to increase her health, prolong her life, extend
the benefits she confers upon society-in a word, selfishly to enhance her value to
ourselves.
Id. at 89.
196. Dr. H.S. Pomeroy, for example, complained:
[T]here has grown to be a feeling among many women .•. that the duties ofmatemity are a
sort of low-grade drudgery which properly may be left to those who lack the will and
ability necessary to carry them into a higher sphere.•.. Some of our noblest women .••
feel in their hearts a tendency to grudge the time and vitality demanded by the nursery.
H.S. POMEROY, supra note 114, at 138; see also text accompanying notes 17Q-I72supra. He devoted
an entire chapter of The Ethics of Marriage to the argument that women's reproductive role was
incommensurate with paid labor, and contended that, in all but instances of economic necessity,
women were to be supported by men. H.S. POMEROY, supra note 114, at 125-51; see also note 168 •
supra.
197. Gardner, supra note 126, at 224-25.
198. See. e.g., J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 107-08.
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uterine excitation, and this alike at the time of puberty and the final cessa-
tion of the menses, at the montWy period and at conception, during preg-
nancy, at labor, and during lactation ....
Is there then no alternative but for women, when married and prone to
conception, to occasionally bear children? This, as we have seen, is the end
for which they are physiologically constituted and for which they are des-
tined by nature.... [The prevention and termination of pregnancy] are
alike disastrous to a woman's mental, moral, and physical well-being.199
Motherhood was not a matter ofchoice for women; it was their destiny. The
anatomical imperative the doctors discerned in a woman's reproductive or-
gans "physiologically" negated the possibility of voluntary motherhood as a
natural, legitimate, or lawful practice.zoo
Just as medical opponents of abortion attacked the social premises of the
voluntary motherhood claim, the woman's rights movement was quite out-
spoken in challenging the social premises of the antiabortion campaign.
Though woman's rights advocates of the era seemingly (at least, publicly)
accepted the doctors' scientific arguments against abortion,zOl few conceded
that the science of physiology supplied an analytical framework adequate to
assess the morality of abortion. Even when feminists characterized abortion
as a moral evil, they insisted on framing the ethical question more expan-
sively, with attention to the social conditions ofmotherhood. From this per-
spective, those with the greatest moral culpability for abortions were not
women, but men; women did not lack reasons for aborting a pregnancy, but
instead suffered from an abundance of compelling social reasons for the act.
Thus, a reader of the suffrage journal Revolution responded to a physician's
199. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 74-76. Thus, physiological arguments were used to attack
the concept of voluntary motherhood in two ways. In addition to arguing that women's capacity to
bear children rendered them incapable of making responsible choices in matters concerning repro-
duction, Storer (and others) claimed that women would injure their health if they practiced abortion
or contraception or otherwise wilIfuIIy resisted assuming the role of motherhood. See note 126 supra
and accompanying text.
During the antiabortion campaign, Storer wrote a full-length treatise arguing that most cases of
insanity in women could be traced to their reproductive system. See HORATIO ROBINSON STORER,
THE CAUSATION, COURSE, AND TREATMENT OF REFLEX INSANITY IN WOMEN 30 (photo. reprint
1972) (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1871) ("[I]n women mental disease is often, perhaps generally, depen-
dent upon functional or organic disturbance of the reproductive system."). For other examples of
the gynecologists' theory that the reproductive system caused peculiar mental ("nervous") disorders
in women, see H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 100 n.2 (applying argument to midwives
and female physicians); Channing, supra note 160, at 134-35; Christian, supra note 125, at 146.
200. Montrose Pallen made this explicit when he observed: "Woman's rights and woman's
sphere are, as understood by the American public, quite different from that understood by us as
Physicians, or as Anatomists, or Physiologists." Pallen, supra note 68, at 205 (quoted in full at text
accompanying note 169 supra).
201. For a feminist who accepted the doctors' argument that the facts of embryonic develop-
ment governed the ethics of abortion, see Lectures ofDr. Anna Densmore, REVOLUTION, Mar. 19,
1868, at 170 (arguing that this information would change women's conduct). Cf. Woman and Moth-
erhood. supra note 185, at 138 (arguing that a woman seeking an abortion is "forced to not only
violate physical law, but to outrage the holiest instincts of her being to maintain even a semblance of
••• freedom"). In her marriage manual, Eliza Duffey insisted that scientific knowledge of the repro-
ductive process would deter women from seeking abortions, see E.B. DUFFEY, supra note 184, at
124-27, although her ensuing analysis of women's motives for aborting a pregnancy implied other-
wise, id. at 127-33.
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report that "four hundred children were annually murdered in Androscog-
gin county, [Maine]" by questioning whether "educating women to the
knowledge that there was life in the embryo" would in any way ameliorate
the situation.202 The reader was acquainted with the physician, as well as
with a few of the women included in his statistics, and observed, "I do not
think this knowledge would deter one out of ten, if it did one out of a hun-
dred, with us, from the commission of this deed. They do it with the knowl-
edge that it endangers their own lives, but the cry is 'Liberty or Death.' "203
As she saw it, the crux of the abortion question was not the embryo, but the
"wretched homes where heart-broken women work day and night, for the
most shameful pittance, to provide food for the little ones whom the brutal
lusts of a drunken husband have forced upon them."204 She closed her letter
with the observation that "[t]he Tribune laments over this 'conspiracy
against marriage,' but it is time to conspire against an institution which
makes one human being the slave of another," and signed it, "Conspira-
tor."20S The letter is unusual in openly defending the practice of abortion,
but representative of the voluntary motherhood claim in pivoting questions
concerning the morality of abortion away from the physical, to the social,
relations of reproduction-and consequently, in shifting the focus of social
criticism away from the conduct of women to that of men.20G
A few feminists directly challenged the authority of medical science, spe-
cifically objecting to the profession's efforts to politicize the physiology of
reproduction. When asked by a magazine what she meant by a woman own-
ing her own body, Elizabeth Cady Stanton replied: "'[W]omanhood is the
primal fact, wifehood and motherhood its incidents.... Must the heyday of
her existence be wholly devoted to the one animal function of bearing chil-
dren? Shall there be no limit to this but woman's capacity to endure the
fearful strain on her life?' "207 In defining woman's demand to control her
own body as an aspiration for a social identity distinct from "the one animal
function ofbearing children," Stanton was quite plainly repudiating the doc-
tors' physiological arguments.20g Similarly, when Matilda Joslyn Gage re-




206. For example, an editorial in Revolution which "deplore[d] the horrible crime of child-
murder" nevertheless criticized the New York Medical Gazette for advocating the enactment of a
criminal abortion statute, insisting that "such a law [would] only mow[] off the top of the noxious
weed, while the root remains." As the editorial explained, "[w]e wantprevention, not merely punish-
ment. We must reach the root of the evil, and destroy it." Marriage and Maternity, supra note 184,
at 4. The editorialist described the social conditions in which women conceived and raised children,
and observed: "It is clear to my mind that this evil wholly arises from the false position which
woman occupies in civilized society ..••" ld. She judged women who sought abortions "awfully
guilty," but considered their guilt slight by comparison to men's: "[T]OOce guilty is he who, for
selfish gratification, heedless of her prayers, indifferent to her fate, drove her to the desperation
which impelled her to the crime." ld.; see also E.B. DUFFEY, supra note 184, at 127-33 (emphasizing
male culpability for abortions of single and married women); H. WRIGHT, supra note 184 (same).
207. L. GORDON, supra note 65, at 104.
208. This deliberate inversion of medical logic seems to have been a motif ofStanton's lectures
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viewed The Law ofPopulation 209 in 1878, she offered this sharp assessment
of the political functions of scientific discourse:
The law of motherhood should be entirely under woman's control, but in
order to be that, woman mustfirst ofall be held as having a right to herself.
When society, and especially the church, becomes permeated with the belief
that woman was created for herself, and not for man, that she and not man
should be the law of the family; ... when each girl born into the world is
taught from birth that she, and no other, has a right to her own body; when
each boy from birth is taught self-control, self-restraint, and that man has no
right to enforce maternity, then "science" will not be asked to step into the
domain of justice and inherent right, to settle questions of this nature.210
Scientific construal of the human body was a form of sexual politics,
transposing religious and legal norms into physiological imperatives in a way
that obscured questions of ''justice and inherent right." As Gage well
grasped, just as the feminist demand for bodily self-ownership was an attack
on the social relations of reproduction, so the doctors' scientific arguments
about the human body were offered in their defense.211 Gage's
emancipatory vision of a "society ... permeated with the belief that woman
was created for herself, and not for man, that she and not man should be the
law of the family ... that she, and no other has a right to her own body" was
in the post-war period. In 1871, a newspaper reported that she was advising wives to "learn and
practice the true laws of generation," insisting that the "[w]oman must at all times be the sovereign
ofher own person." Dubois, supra note 179, at 856, (quoting For Women Only. DES MOINES DAILY
REG., July 29, 1871). She described these lectures in correspondence to a friend: "Whenever we
stay in town two days I talk one afternoon to women alone. The new gospel of fewer children and a
healthy, happy maternity is gladly received." Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Martha Coffin
Wright, June 19, 1871, quoted in Dubois, supra note 179, at 857. In invoking "the true laws of
generation," the "new gospel of fewer children," and "a healthy, happy, maternity," Stanton elabo-
rated the creed of voluntary motherhood in terms that both invoked and inverted the doctors' argu-
ments from reproductive physiology.
Antoinette Brown Blackwell challenged the sexual logic ofscientific discourse by similar means.
See Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Sex and Work-No. 7, WOMAN'S J., Apr. 25, 1874, at 129 (apply-
ing physiological advice intended for men to women, and countering physicians' claims that
women's reproductive role disabled them for all but one activity in life with the observation that
woman was endowed "with a special structure and functions admirably adapted to enable her, far
beyond man, to bear any unusual ta.'!: upon her energies, whether of underwork or of overwork, in
one or in all directions"); cf. ROSALIND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: INTELLECTUAL
ROOTS OF MODERN FEMINISM 12-27 (1982) (examining ways in which feminists of the era partici-
pated in and challenged prevailing physiological discourses about women).
209. ANNIE BESANT, THE LAW OF POPULATION: ITS CoNSEQUENCES, AND ITS BEARING
UPON HUMAN CoNDuer AND MORALS (New York, Asa K. Butts 1878). Besant was an English
woman ofsocialist-feminist persuasion who accepted Malthusian premises and argued that the eleva-
tion of the working class required limitation ofchildbirth. Nevertheless, she rejected the notion that
deferral of marriage (as advocated by Malthus and Mills) was an appropriate method, as it would
encourage resort to prostitution. Besant thus argued for marital contraception.
210. Our Book Tale, NAT'L CmzEN & BALLOT Box, Nov. 1878, at 2 (paper edited by Ma-
tilda Joslyn Gage, who likely reviewed book).
211. The review rejected Desant's endorsement ofcontraception, see note 209 supra, as resting
on the "pernicious doctrine ... as to the necessities of man's nature, 'necessities' which call for the
sacrifice of woman," and instead announced its belief "in the right of woman to herself, and in her
right to the control of all such questions," concluding that "Mrs. Besant has the misfortune to look
at this population question from the man stand-point." Our Book Tale. supra note 210, at 62. For
Gage's views on the question of abortion, see Gage, supra note 179.
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precisely the vision that doctors explaining the "laws of physiology" were
determined to occlude.
Thus, the physicians' campaign aroused opposition to abortion by two
distinct strategies. Doctors d~monstratedthe threat to life abortion posed by
tracing the practical consequences of the act, as it threatened the unborn, the
health of America's wives, and the political power of their social class. At
the same time, doctors aroused opposition to abortion by portraying the
practice symbolically, as a symptom of women's resistance to the status con-
straints of marriage and motherhood. At the simplest level, this was accom-
plished by attributing abortion to the effects of woman's rights advocacy.
But it was more powerfully effectuated by the profession's habit of opposing
abortion in rhetorical terms that engaged, shadowed, and mocked woman's
rights advocacy. Because campaign rhetoric explicitly and implicitly associ-
ated abortion with feminist demands to reform the laws and customs ofmar-
riage and to expand women's participation in economic and political life,
doctors invested abortion with explosive social significance. The campaign
thus encouraged nineteenth century audiences to oppose abortion as an
emancipatory act-one that threatened gender roles in matters concerning
sexuality and motherhood, education and work, and affairs of suffrage and
state.
D. The AMA's Accomplishments: The Example of Ohio
"Between 1860 and 1880," James Mohr observes, "the regular physi-
cians' campaign against abortion in the United States produced the most
important burst of anti-abortion legislation in the nation's history."212 At
least forty antiabortion statutes were enacted, with thirteen jurisdictions for-
mally outlawing abortion for the first time, and at least twenty-one states
revising existing legislation.213 The majority of states that adopted antiabor-
tion statutes prohibited abortion induced before quickening, although many
conditioned more severe criminal penalties upon proof of quickening.214
The penalties imposed for abortion and attempted abortion varied considera-
bly in severity;215 a number of states broke with common law tradition and
penalized women for seeking or obtaining an abortion.216 Federallegislation
enacted in 1873, popularly known as the Comstock Act, classified informa-
tion concerning contraception and abortion as obscene, and prohibited its
212. J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 200; see also id. at 200-45 (recounting the achievements of the
physicians' campaign, in legislation enacted, as well as in the alteration of reproductive practices
generally).
213. [d. at 200.
214. M. GROSSBERG, supra note 120, at 174-75, 185 (suggesting punishment increased with
late term abortions because of greater maturity of fetus and increased health risk to the woman on
whom abortion was performed); James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century
Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 29, 34 nn.18-19 (1985) (citing
state statutes as of 1868 that increased punishment for abortion based on proof of quickening).
215. Witherspoon, supra note 214, at 53 n.70.
216. [d. at 59-61.
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circulation in the U.S. mails.217 Many states adopted statutes banning con-
traceptives and abortifacients, as well as the distribution of information
about them, in the years before and after enactment of the federal statute.218
So-called therapeutic exceptions to the new abortion legislation, which al-
lowed the procedure where necessary to preserve a woman's life, removed
control of decisions about abortion from women to the medical profes-
sion.219 In this respect, the AMA realized its professional ambitions in the
criminalization campaign. With the enactment of criminal abortion legisla-
tion, the profession began to consolidate its control over the provision of
medical care generally and women's reproductive health care in
particular.220
Post-war abortion reform in Ohio illustrates all the preoccupations of the
national campaign, and provides abundant evidence of the medical profes-
sion's role in persuading state legislators to adopt the new legislation. Doc-
tors were active in Ohio, as they were elsewhere,221 in pushing for reform of
the state's criminal abortion statute.222 Two statutes were enacted in 1867
as a result of the physicians' advocacy. The first eliminated the quickening
requirement of prior legislation, and made it "a high misdemeanor" punish-
able by one to seven years imprisonment to attempt, advise, or devise instru-
ments for abortion which caused the death of a "vitalized embryo, or foetus,
or mother."223 The second was a mini-Comstock law, adopted to "prevent
217. Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (repealed 1909). On the history of the Com·
stock legislation, see C.T. DIENNES, supra note 120, at 20.42; M. GROSSBERG, supra note 120, at
176-77, 187·93; Paul, supra note 120; Harper, supra note 74, at 183·207.
218. See C.T. DIENNES, supra note 120, at 42-47; M. GROSSBERG, supra note 120, at 177·93;
J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 200.25; Harper, supra note 74, at 179-83, 207.Q9.
219. See K. LUKER, supra note 65, at 32-35 (explaining that by 1900 the vast majority of state
statutes had a therapeutic exception conferring discretion upon doctors to determine what abortions
were necessary to preserve a woman's life; the criminalization movement may thus be understood to
have reallocated social responsibility for assessing the conditional rights of the pregnant woman and
fetus, shifting that responsibility from women to the medical profession); Witherspoon, supra note
214, at 45 n.49 (citing various state statutes).
220. See K. LUKER, supra note 65, at 32-45; J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 160-64; id. at 238·39
(assessing achievements of the physicians in securing professional control of the field).
221. For the medical profession's role in lobbying other state legislatures, see, e.g., J. MOHR,
supra note 65, at 205.Q6 (Illinois); id. at 210.11 (Vermont); id. at 211·15 (Maryland); id. at 215-19
(New York); id. at 219·21 (Michigan).
222. The Ohio state medical society delivered a memorial to the State Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee demanding tougher criminal abortion laws. A special committee created to consider the peti-
tion was duly lobbied by the physicians, and the report the committee produced (advocating the
adoption of more stringent abortion laws) amply reflects the medical profession's advocacy. See id.
at 206.Q7.
223. Act of Apr. 13, 1867, 1867 Ohio Laws 135·36, repealed by Amended Substitute House
Bill No. 511, 1972 Ohio Laws 2032 (Vol. 134), quoted in Witherspoon, supra note 214, at 63. This
act amended legislation enacted in 1834 which was in fact exceptionally severe for the year of its
enactment: The 1834 act classified attempted abortion at any stage of pregnancy as a misdemeanor,
unless necessary to save the life of the mother or advised by two physicians as necessary for that
purpose. The crime was punishable by up to one year of imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $500.
Abortion after quickening was classified as a high misdemeanor, punishable by one to seven years
imprisonment. OHIO GEN. STAT. §§ 111, 112, at 252 (1841) (enacted Feb. 27, 1834), quoted in
Quay, supra note 85, at 504; see also J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 39. The post-bellum statute elimi-
nated this quickening requirement.
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the publication, sale or gratuitous distribution of drugs, medicines and nos-
trums intended to prevent conception, or procure abortion."224 A published
report of the state senate special committee that introduced the legislation
illustrates the full impact of the physicians' campaign.
The report opened by denouncing the "alarming and increasing fre-
quency" of abortion as it reduced "the number of children born alive of
native American parentage" in the nation generally and in Ohio in particu-
lar.22s The committee attributed its understanding of abortion to the AMA,
indicating that it had "drawn many of the facts presented in this report"
from Horatio Storer's essay Why Not?,226 published one year earlier.227 The
report then proceeded to reject the common law doctrine of quickening on
physiological grounds. It sought to have it "proclaimed to the world, and
... impressed upon the conscience of every woman in the land [that abortion
is] 'murder.' "228 To substantiate this judgment, the report contended that
the "independent existence" of the fertilized ovum was demonstrable, offer-
ing as proof the embryo-as-suckling-infant analogy Storer elaborated in Why
Not?229 It then shifted focus, demanding more stringent criminal abortion
laws for reasons related to women's conduct. The report characterized abor-
tion as a source of grave physical and moral danger to women, because abor-
tion was a "violation of nature's laws" and "[a]ny interference with nature's
law results in evils innumerable."230 It deplored the ignorance which led
"our otherwise amiable sisters to the commission of this crime," and held
women who resisted motherhood in the utmost contempt, condemning those
who yielded to "[t]he demands of society and fashionable life" and suc-
224. Act of Apr. 16, 1867, 1867 Ohio Laws 202·03, repealed by Amended Substitute House
Bill No. 511, 1972 Ohio Laws 2032 (Vol. 134), quoted in J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 209.
225. 1867 OHIO SENATE J. App. 233, 233, 235 (twice noting that abortion was most prevalent
among the privileged classes).
226. H.R. STORER, supra note 79.
227. OHIO SENATE J. App., supra note 225, at 233,235 (citing essay under earlier title).
228. ld. at 234 (quoting H.R. STORER, ON CRIMINAL ABORTION IN AMERICA (philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1860)).
229.
When the impregnated ovum leaves the ovary and enters the womb, it becomes at-
tached to that organ by a net-work of vessels, through which it receives its nourishment
from the mother, just as after birth it is nourished from its mother's breast, and it has an
independent existence as much in one case as the other.
ld. The passage from the committee report is borrowed from the argument of Storer's Why Not?
Cf text accompanying notes 100-104 supra (discussing Storer's use of suckling infant and kangaroo
analogies to establish the independent existence of the unborn).
230. OHIO SENATE J. App., supra note 225, at 234. The committee cited many health risks,
including sterility and death, that might result from interruption of the normal progress ofgestation,
id.• offering an abbreviated version of arguments Storer advanced in Why Not? See H.R. STORER,
supra note 79, at 36-38.
As Storer encouraged, the committee viewed the physical harms that might result from an
abortion as evidence that abortion violated natural law. Cf note 126 supra and accompanying text.
Like Storer, the committee argued that abortion placed a woman at physical risk because she inter-
fered with the purposes nature intended for her body. OHIO SENATE J. App., supra note 225, at 234.
Thus, the public health reasons for regulating abortion were also moral arguments for regulating
abortion, rooted deep in the gender code. Cf note 123 supra and accompanying text (pregnancy
"necessary to the physical and moral health of women").
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cumbed to "the desire of freedom from care and home duties and responsi~
bilities."231 The report concluded with a stern warning to the married
women of Ohio. Echoing Storer's tract, Why Not?, the report charged that
wives who "avoid[ed] the duties and responsibilities of married life" were
"living in a state oflegalized prostitution," thereby endangering the manifest
destiny of the race.232
The committee, however, was unable to secure a statute punishing abor-
tion as murder. Instead, the legislature classified abortion at any stage of
gestation as a "high misdemeanor."233 Nor did the committee persuade the
legislature to abolish women's common law immunity for soliciting or ob-
taining an abortion, although the state senate considered adopting an
amendment that would have criminalized only a married woman's participa-
tion in her own abortion.234 The legislature's readiness to consider such an
unprecedented measure suggests that it was in fact influenced by the com-
mittee's argument that imposing restrictions on abortion was necessary to
enforce wives' marital obligations. Indeed, the legislature's decision during
that same session to adopt a statute criminalizing contraceptives and abor-
tifacients demonstrates that the physicians were generally successful in ad-
vancing their pronatalist agenda. Ohio's criminal abortion statute was
enacted out of a confluence of concerns, reflecting an interest in enforcing
women's adherence to marital roles, in preserving the hegemony of those of
"native American parentage," and in protecting unborn life. These concerns
were mutually reinforcing motivations at the state and national level.
As the legislative record in Ohio suggests, doctors presented the protec-
tion of unborn life as a means to various social goals as much as an end in its
231. OHIO SENATE J. ApP., supra note 225, at 235.
232. See id.:
Do [our otherwise amiable sisters] realize that in avoiding the duties and responsibilities of
married life, they are, in effect, living in a state of legalized prostitution? Shall we permit
our broad and fertile prairies to be settled only by the children of aliens? If not, we must,
by proper legislation, and by the diffusion ofcorrect public sentiment, endeavor to suppress
a crime which has become so prevalent.
Cf. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 83,85. The passage in question combines a version of the legal
prostitution polemic, see text accompanying notes 189-191 supra, with a version of the manifest
destiny argument Storer advanced in Why Not?, see text accompanying note 144 supra.
233. See note 223 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ohio legislature's
resistance to the physicians' arguments in favor of criminalization, see J. MOHR, supra note 65, at
209-10. The physicians well understood that public sentiment opposed such stringent penalties on
abortion. See Witherspoon, supra note 214, at 52 (noting that in 1872, the New York Medico-Legal
Society considered a proposal to make abortion a capital felony, and rejected it on the theory that it
would reduce chances ofobtaining a jury conviction); see also E. HALE, supra note 123, at 33 (distin-
guishing between the theory that punishment for abortion should be constant throughout pregnancy
and the practical political reality that "until the popular sentiment is educated up to the proper
point, it may be impossible to procure a law so stringent and severe"; advocating increased punish-
ment for late-term abortions); note 214 supra and accompanying text (states adopt criminal penalties
that distinguish between abortion prior to and after quickening).
234. The proposed amendment failed by one vote. See J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 208-09. The
concept of singling out married women for more stringent punishment surely reflected the doctors'
advocacy. Storer explicitly suggested that while all women seeking abortions should be subject to
criminal sanctions, married women ought be punished more harshly. See H. STORER & F.F.
HEARD, supra note 95, at 145.
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own right. Protecting unborn life simultaneously functioned as a method of
enforcing marital roles and protecting the political prerogatives of the physi-
cians' social class. The argument that contraception and abortion endan-
gered women's health echoed and reinforced these sentiments, rationalizing
the criminalization ofbirth control in paternalist terms that defined women's
physiological welfare as a condition of perpetual reproductive activity.235
Thus, the argument for protecting unborn life that stood at the heart of
the campaign cannot be understood apart from the social concerns that mo-
tivated the campaign. Men interested in establishing their professional au-
thority over women's role in reproduction encouraged other men to assert
their political authority over women's role in reproduction by criminalizing
the means of controlling birth, each acting to preserve life in the social order
as they knew it. There is no reason to doubt that advocates of criminaliza-
tion sought to protect unborn life; but it is equally clear that they perceived
the unborn as threatened by rebellious middle-class women and teeming im-
migrant populations, and it is in this context that their judgments about the
morality of abortion and contraception must be understood. Those who val-
ued the unborn as worthy of protection valued women as worthy of respect
only insofar as they adhered to their social role in the reproduction of life.236
Concerns of gender, ethnicity, and class were not peripheral to this ethic, but
an integral part of it. The interest in protecting unborn life was an interest in
preventing (certain) women from practicing birth contro1.237
235. There is no doubt that abortion posed health risks to women, but it is not clear that,
absent criminal sanctions, the risks ofabortion were any greater than the risks ofchildbirth-or even
that the medical profession believed they were. See note 125 supra.
Cyril Means has argued that a concern to protect women's health motivated enactment of the
criminal abortion laws in New York. See Means, supra note 96. The argument that abortion posed
health risks to women appears in Ohio's committee report, supra note 225; see note 230 supra and
accompanying text, and the Supreme Court gave considerable weight to this explanation for the
enactment of criminal abortion laws in Roe. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149-51 (1973). In
retrospect, it is impossible to assess the force or sense of this concern. It may have reflected a
response to sensational newspaper coverage of women maimed or killed by abortionists, or deference
to medical authority in the matter. But these arguments may well have been compelling as they
played upon the larger sentiments the doctors' campaign so assiduously cultivated: Abortion was
dangerous to women's health because it interrupted their "natural" physiological function and pur-
pose in life. See notes 123, 126 & 230 supra and accompanying text.
236. This ethic is plainly expressed in Ohio's abortion reform record. Similar sentiments are
reflected in the New York record. In 1867, the Medical Society of the State of New York conveyed
to the state assembly its view that abortion was "murder," and thereafter resolved "[t]hat this society
will hail with gratitude and pleasure, the adoption of any measures or influences that will, in part or
entirely, arrest this flagrant corruption ofmorality among women, who ought to be and unquestiona-
bly are the conservators of morals and virtue." 1867 N.Y. AssEMBLY J. 443, 443-44. The moral
standard invoked was part of a gender code that defined women as mothers, the same code that led
Ohio legislators to condemn women for "avoiding the duties and responsibilities of married life,"
and thus "living in a state oflegalized prostitution." See text accompanying note 232 supra. Within
a year, New York adopted a "mini-Comstock" statute similar to Ohio's, which not only strength-
ened sanctions against abortion, but for the first time outlawed contraception. See note 120 supra
and accompanying text (situating New York's statute in context of campaign arguments against
nonprocreative marital sexuality).
237. Arguments for criminalizing abortion and contraception reasoned about the unborn in a
manner distinctive to the birth control context. Though doctors sometimes characterized abortion
as murder, they did not expect legislators to punish abortion as murder and even recognized that the
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E. A Transformation in the Law of Gender Status
The campaign to criminalize birth control had significant effects on law.
Physicians offered the American public a new way of understanding the so-
cial relations of reproduction, and with it, a new method of regulating them,
one detached from traditional doctrines of marriage and family law.238
Laws against abortion and contraception fused concerns about reproduction
of the social order with concerns about the physical process of reproduction,
thus resembling antimiscegenation laws239 and other eugenics legislation240
penalties for abortion would vary with the stage of gestation. See note 233 supra; see also note 214
supra and accompanying text (discussing structure ofcriminal penalties in post-war abortion legisla-
tion).
Other examples illustrate the context-specific manner in which the American legal system rea-
soned about unborn life. When New York criminalized abortion from the point of conception, the
state preserved unaltered a law allowing the execution ofa pregnant felon unless she were quick with
child. See Means, supra note 96, at 441-42. Similarly, in 1884, after Massachusetts adopted its
reform statutes, State Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ruled that a quickened fetus
surviving a tortiously induced miscarriage for ten to fifteen minutes was not a "person" within the
meaning of the state wrongful death statute. Holmes reasoned that the fetus "was a part of the
mother at the time of the injury." Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). Until 1946,
all American jurisdictions followed Dietrich's ruling that the common law did not recognize a cause
ofaction in tort for prenatal injuries to a fetus. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 271, 531
N.E.2d 355, 357 (1988); A.A. White, The Right ofRecovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv.
383, 394 & n.50 (1952) ("A second reason given by most courts for denying recovery •.• is that the
child is a part of the mother until birth and therefore is not a person in being.") (footnote omitted).
The value attached to unborn life in the criminalization campaign was thus context-specific: It per-
tained only to questions of birth control. For a contemporary illustration of the context-bound ways
in which the law values unborn life, see William Saletan, Reductio ad absurdum in Missouri: If
Fetuses Are People, NEW REpUBLIC, Sept. 18 & 25, 1989, at 18.
238. Unlike marital status laws of the sort cited in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684
(1973) (plurality opinion), which have ancient roots in Anglo-American common law, laws prohibit-
ing the practice of abortion and contraception were adopted only in the nineteenth century. Cf. M.
GROSSBERG, supra note 120, at 175.
239. The term "miscegenation" was coined in 1864 by a New York newspaper editor, amid
growing fears among Northern and Southern whites that emancipation of the slaves and enactment
of federal civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination in contracting would break down social
and legal barriers to interracial marriage and cause an "amalgamation" of the races. See M. GROSS-
BERG, supra note 120, at 136; Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARITAN 39, 42-44
(1989).
In the latter half of the nineteenth century argnments against interracial marriages began to
emphasize issues of heredity, focusing on purity of lineage, or "blood." Saks, supra, at 40. Increas-
ingly, concerns about social reproduction of the racial order found expression in concerns about the
physical act of reproduction in marriage. Eva Saks describes this shift: "theories of heredity begin
to appear in miscegenation jurisprudence in Reconstruction, underwriting the modern institutional-
ization of blood and race. Social Darwinism, employing biology's survival mechanism to explain
and justify social conditions, offered a philosophy of human hierarchy compatible with the general
biologization that supported miscegenation laws." Id. at 45; see also THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE:
THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 151 (1963) (citing Herbert Spencer, who urged that inter-
marriage should be " 'positively forbidden. It is not at root a question of social philosophy. It is at
root a question of biology.' "). On the rise of physiological modes of reasoning about race in the
nineteenth century, see MICHAEL BANTON, RACIAL THEORIES at xi-xii, 28-76 (1987) (explaining
that notions of race as physiological type displace ethnographic models of racial difference). See also
MICHAEL BANTON & JONATHAN HARWOOD, THE RACE CONCEPT 26-27 (1975) (in 1800 George
Cuvier makes first case for classifying races in permanent physiological types, and for the physiologi-
cal causes of cultural variation); PETER J. BOWLER, EVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
IDEA 98-99 (1984) (Spencer uses biological model of evolution to explain social position of the
races). On the passage ofantimiscegenation statutes in the Reconstruction era, see M. GROSSBERG,
supra note 120, at 136-40.
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adopted in the postbellum period. Just as antimiscegenation laws of the era
played an important role in maintaining a particular regime of racial status,
laws that criminalized birth control helped maintain a particular regime of
gender status. Considered in retrospect, the criminalization campaign can
be understood as having both practical and jurisprudential effects on law,
shaping both the means of regulating gender status and mode of its
justification.
The significance of this change becomes apparent if one considers devel-
opments in marital status law during the era of the criminalization cam-
paign. During the very period in which states were enacting the abortion
legislation doctors sought, they were simultaneously reforming the common
law of marital status in response to feminist demands. These reform statutes
granted wives property rights in their own earnings, and conferred upon
them the formal capacity to contract, to hold property in their own right,
and to file SUit.24I Criminalization ofbirth control thus proceeded during an
era in which states were moderating, and in some cases abolishing, impor-
tant elements of an ancient body of gender status law.
State legislatures apparently discerned no contradiction in criminalizing
abortion while extending aspects of civil equality to wives; the two types of
legislative reform flowed from distinct conceptual premises.242 The country
was increasingly willing to concede that a married woman was a legal per-
son, autonomous and distinct from her husband, but this concession of civil
240. Post-war developments in miscegenation law were part of a broader campaign to regulate
marriage in order to control the prOduction of offspring. In this period, various reformers persuaded
state legislatures to regulate eligibility for marriage in such a way as to preclude "unfit" unions. As
in the campaign against miscegenation, advocates for increased state supervision of those fit to marry
often employed arguments from science or "physiology." M. GROSSBERG, supra note 120, at 140-
52. Like antiabortion statutes, eugenics restrictions on marriage channeled concerns about repro-
ducing the social order into the physical act of reprOduction itself. See C. ROSENBERG, supra note
67, at 33-34 (although scientific understanding of heredity "remained generally stable throughout
the nineteenth century, hereditarian modes of explanation were utilized quite differently in the latter
half of the nineteenth century," which witnessed an "increasingly aggressive employment of
hereditarian arguments in the analysis of human behavior, especially antisocial behavior"); see also
id. at 25-53 (hereditarian modes of explanation of the era); id. at 89-97 (eugenic thought); P.
BOWLER, supra note 239, at 274-78 (eugenic thought).
241. For a summary of reform as of 1861, see ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANG-
ING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-1861, at 275-91 (1987). For an overview of reform
statutes adopted in the 1860s and 18705, see Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law:
1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1424 n.361 (1983); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage
Labor: Rights ofContract in the Age ofEmancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988). See also NORMA
BASCH, IN THE EyES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY NEW YORK (1982).
242. The common law treated abortion in terms entirely distinct from questions of marriage.
While the common law required a wife to obtain her husband's consent to engage in many transac-
tions, it did not require wives to obtain spousal consent for an abortion. See Means, supra note 96, at
428-34. When state legislatures abolished the common law quickening distinction in criminal abor-
tion laws, none imposed a requirement of spousal consent. See Quay, supra note 85, at app. (re-
printing text of abortion and contraception statutes adopted during past century for all states).
Medical proponents of criminalization did advocate imposing higher penalties on a married woman
procuring an abortion, see, e.g., note 234 supra and accompanying text, but none seemed interested
in requiring a husband's consent. Instead, the profession sought, and successfully secured, authority
to appropriate that prerogative to itself. See notes 132 and 219 supra and accompanying text.
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personhood evidently had little to do with the special interest the public had
in her conduct as a mother. In an incremental fashion, concepts of marital
status had begun to change. State legislatures were now willing to recognize
married women as legal persons, and to grant them rights in their earnings
performed for third parties. But no state would grant a wife rights in her
family labor.243 Those engaged in reforming the common law of marital
status increasingly defined a wife's role with reference to her obligation to
perform labor for the family, while those seeking to reform the common law
of abortion defined a wife's role with reference to her obligation to bear chil-
dren.244 These developments were mutually reinforcing, a product of the
gender role conventions associated with the "separate spheres" tradition.
With this reconceptualization of marital status norms, a wife was gradually
transformed from a juridical appendage of her husband into one who per-
formed the physical and social work of reproducing family life.
Thus, the campaign to criminalize abortion offered a new way of regulat-
ing wives' obligations that was distinct from, but in important respects con-
sistent with, the traditional body of marital status law being reformed in the
post Civil War period. In addition, it provided a new way ofreasoning about
wives' obligations. For centuries the Anglo-American common law had de-
fined women's obligations through marriage, denominating the husband as
his wife's "head and representative in the social state."245 By contrast, the
criminalization campaign defined women's obligations physiologically, de-
riving women's duties from facts about the female body. In this way, the
campaign made it reasonable to reason about women's roles as a status con-
ferred by nature rather than by the social state.
Two renowned constitutional cases of the era supply evidence of this
shift in gender status norms. In 1873, when the Supreme Court held in
Bradwell v. Illinois 246 that a woman's right to practice law was not a privi-
lege and immunity of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Bradley's concurrence invoked "nature" to justify the occupational
exclusion, yet relied primarily upon women's social and legal status as wives
to explain the proper boundaries of women's roles.247 By contrast, several
243. NANCY Corr, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 186-87 (1987); Reva Siegel, Of
Status and Contract, Marriage and Market: Judicial Construction of the Earnings Statutes (1987)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review); see Arnold v. Rifner, 16 Ind. App.
442,443,45 N.E. 618, 619 (1896) ("The [earnings] statute does not relieve the wife from the per-
formance of any of the duties owing to her husband or family, but it simply vests in her the owner-
ship of the earnings resulting from her services to others."); see also Lee v. Savannah Guano Co., 99
Ga. 572, 27 S.E. 159 (1896); Riley v. Mitchell, 36 Minn. 3, 29 N.W. 588 (1886); Coleman v. Burr, 93
N.Y. 17 (1883).
244. In this sense, the two reform movements were compatible, defining a wife's productive
and reproductive labor in the family sphere as a matter of legal obligation.
245. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring); see note
247 infra.
246. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130.
247. To demonstrate that "the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman," Justice Bradley invoked com-
mon law doctrines of marital status. [d. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). He emphasized that it was
a maxim of that system ofjurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from
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decades later, when the Court decided in Muller v. Oregon 248 that a state
was free to enact protective legislation restricting women's employment as it
could not men's, the Court justified its decision by reasoning from women's
"physical structure," rather than the legal or social structure of the marriage
relation. Muller's reasoning in fact illustrates this movement of gender sta-
tus norms from the locus of marriage to the female body.
The Court began its analysis in Muller with the observation that:
The current runs steadily and strongly in the direction of the emancipation
of the wife, and the policy, as disclosed by all recent legislation upon the
subject in [Oregon], is to place her upon separate footing as if she were a
feme sole, not only with respect to her separate property, but as it affects her
right to make binding contracts.249
Yet, despite the contractual capacities recently conferred on married women
by state statutes, and despite the constitutional liberty of contract recognized
three years earlier in Lochner v. New York,250 the Court concluded that a
state might nonetheless regulate women's employment:
Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be removed
by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life which will
operate against a full assertion of those rights. . .. [H]er physical structure
and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not
merely her ovm health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to
protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. The limitations
which the statute places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to
agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed
solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all. Many words
cannot make this plainer. The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the
functions to be performed by each . . .. This difference justifies a difference
in legislation and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of
the burdens which rest upon her.251
The Court's decision in Muller, which relied on social science and medi-
cal evidence,252 was contemporaneously celebrated as an expression of social
her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and
notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of [its] special rules
.•. still exist in full force in most States.
ld. He stressed that a wife's inability to contract without her husband's consent "was one circum-
stance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incom-
petent fully to perform the duties of an attorney." ld.
In Justice Bradley's view, the fact that "many women are unmarried and not affected by [the
common law]" was a mere "exception[] to the general rule," which dictated that "[t]he paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." ld.
Justice Bradley did refer to "nature" as a basis for gender differentiation, but he primarily drew upon
legal and social concepts of marriage to explain women's roles.
248. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
249. ld. at 418 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Leonard, 36 Or. 390, 396, 59 P. 873, 875 (1900».
250. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
251. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23.
252. See id. at 419 & n.l (reciting public health evidence suggesting reduction of women's
working hours was necessary in view of "(a) the physical organization of woman, (b) her maternal
functions, (c) the rearing and education of the children, (d) maintenance of the home" as concerns
"so important and so far reaching that the need for such reduction need hardly be discussed"); see
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 323 1991-1992
January 1992] REASONING FROM THE BODY 323
realism in constitutional jurisprudence.253 But it was "realism" of a new
sort. At least five times in Muller, the Court reiterated that its decision qual-
ifying women's due process liberties reflected "woman's physical structure,
and the functions she performs in consequence thereof"254-reasoning
about women's bodies as no constitutional or common law opinion of the
early nineteenth century ever did.
In Muller, the Court employed claims about women's bodies to reach a
result which some decades earlier it might have justified by invoking the
common law of marital status, as Justice Bradley did in Bradwell v.
Illinois.255 The opinion's physiological reasoning and its repeated pronatal-
ist themes256 are a product of the campaign to criminalize abortion as well as
the interest in eugenics that grew in its wake.257 The campaign to criminal-
ize abortion did not supplant marital status law, nor did it eliminate the use
of marriage concepts in explaining women's social status. Instead it gave
them more "modem," scientific sense. As the Muller opinion illustrates, the
campaign enabled the Court to repudiate traditional norms of gender status
and still find reasons for enforcing women's roles-reasons now rooted in
immutable facts of nature rather than transitory and contestable social
norms.
The criminalization campaign thus played a pivotal role in modernizing
norms of gender status, affecting the manner in which the legal system both
enforced and justified them. Precisely as the campaign modernized norms of
gender status, it rendered them natural, reasonable, hence invisible. In the
wake of the campaign, and we remain today in its legacy, facts about the
female body possess normative force, justifying regulation of the female citi-
zen. In the eyes of the law, women are corporeally embodied in circum-
stances where men are not, their bodies supplying reasons for the distinctive
constraints imposed upon them.
III. FETAL-PROTECTIVE REGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Were woman intended as a mere plaything, or for the gratification of her
own or her husband's desires, there would have been need for her of neither
uterus nor ovaries, nor would the prevention of their being used for their
clearly legitimate purpose have been attended by such tremendous penalties
also id. at 421 (citing "abundant testimony of the medical fraternity" respecting women's
physiology).
253. See. e.g.• Felix Frankfurter, Hours ofLabor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV.
L. REv. 353, 364-65 (1916).
254. Muller. 208 U.S. at 420, 421, 422-23.
255. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873); see note 247 supra and accompanying text.
256. Muller. 208 U.S. at 421 ("[A]s healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the
physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race."); id. at 422 (twice invoking the "well-being ofthe race" as a justifica-
tion for regulating women's employment).
257. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 67; DONALD PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRES-
SIVES 32-46 (1968); see also 3 A. CALHOUN, supra note 126, at 225-54 (contemporary observers on
"Race Sterility and Race Suicide").
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as is in reality the case.258
[Vol. 44:261
-Horatio Storer (1866)
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement,
free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, be-
cause we do, we have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis
upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about
man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries.259
-Roe v. Wade (1973)
For some readers, the history of the nineteenth century campaign may be
rich with present import, while others may find the connections between
past and present more difficult to discern. It is therefore crucial to consider
how the history of the campaign bears on contemporary modes of reasoning
about reproductive regulation before attempting to situate the question of
abortion in a constitutional framework.
If one examines contemporary arguments for protecting unborn life, it is
readily apparent that physiological justifications for regulating women's con-
duct persist. By contrast, claims about women's roles openly voiced in the
nineteenth century campaign do not appear in arguments for protecting un-
born life today. Yet, as I will show, gender-based judgments do continue to
inform arguments for regulation of women's reproductive conduct; today
these judgments can be articulated in the physiological modes of argument
the campaign inaugurated.
In the following sections, I illustrate the persistence of physiological rea-
soning in popular antiabortion arguments and in legal arguments for regulat-
ing women's reproductive conduct. I then analyze several instances of fetal-
protective regulation, posing questions about its incidence and structure that
courts generally have not. This exercise reveals that judgments about
women's roles can and do shape fetal-protective regulation-notwithstand-
ing its apparent preoccupation with protecting the unborn. Engaging in this
exercise reveals deep commonalities between fetal-protective regulation of
the present and the antiabortion laws of the past that are obscured by habits
of physiological reasoning the campaign engendered. It thus creates a con-
ceptual foundation for reconsidering the question of abortion-restrictive reg-
ulation in a constitutional framework.
A. Physiological Reasoning in Popular Antiabortion Arguments
Objections to abortion voiced in popular debate today both resemble
their nineteenth century precursors and differ from them in important ways.
Unlike antiabortion arguments of the last century, which openly addressed
concerns of family life, contemporary arguments against abortion seem to
concern themselves almost exclusively with protecting the unborn. Yet
many contemporary opponents of abortion reason about the unborn in ways
258. H.R. STORER, supra note 79, at 80-81.
259. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1973).
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that betray the influence of the nineteenth century campaign. The science of
human development now provides a coherent framework for reasoning
about the morality of abortion, one so compelling that it is possible to make
claims about abortion that seem to have no roots in matters of religious faith
or judgments about family life. Antiabortion arguments that are cast in this
scientific tradition define the moral problem presented by abortion in the
form of the question, "when does human life begin?" and answer it, "at con-
ception." Considered in this analytical framework, there appear to be no
significant differences between the embryo/fetus and a born person, or be-
tween abortion and murder. One reason why such arguments attach no
moral significance to the facts that might distinguish the embryo/fetus from
a born person and distinguish abortion from murder is that they scarcely
notice them: They reason about abortion in "scientific" ways that ignore
women's role in gestating human life.
Ever since physicians of the nineteenth century employed physiological
arguments to attack quickening doctrine, it has been possible to reason about
the embryo/fetus and the dynamics of human development in scientific ways
that do not refer to the physical and social work of reproduction women
perform.260 Thus, a recent editorial column in the New York Post urged
readers to "rush out and buy a copy of Life to view the most spectacular
series of photographs ever taken of the formation of a human being, from the
moment of conception," asserting, without more, that "these pictures virtu-
ally render obsolete the whole abortion debate."261 As the column
explained:
Here, in graphic color, is living, thrilling, irrefutable proof that within hours
of conception, a unique, distinctive human being has been formed. The
magazine says that within 20 hours of conception, when the sperm enters
the ovum, "the result is a single nucleus that contains an entire biological
blueprint for a new individual, genetic information governing everything
from the length of the nose to the diseases that will be inherited.262
As the Post editorial describes the embryo depicted in the photograph, it
already is all that it might become, containing "an entire biological blueprint
for a new individual" and so apparently capable of autonomous self-realiza-
tion. Examining this photographic enlargement of the embryo, the Post as-
sures its readers, settles all moral questions concerning abortion.263
Analyzing photographs like those described in the Post editorial and fea-
tured in the antiabortion film The Silent Scream, Rosalind Petchesky has
observed, "[f]rom their beginning, such photographs have represented the
fetus as primary and autonomous, the woman as absent or peripheral."264
260. See text accompanying notes 94-115 supra.
261. Ray Kerrison, Backdrop to Bush's Court Selection; Pictures Show What Abortion is About,
N.Y. POST, July 25, 1990, at 2.
262. Id.
263. Id. ("Let Molly Yard, Faye Wattleton, Gloria Steinem, Mario Cuomo or Jesse Jackson
look at these pictures and say that the destruction of a 21-day old 'fetus' is not the destruction of a
human being.").
264. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of
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As the commentary in the Post editorial illustrates, this tendency is not lim-
ited to visual representations. Arguments against abortion often employ
"objective" modes of reasoning about human development that scarcely re-
fer to women's role in gestating and nurturing human life. Thus, an an-
tiabortion pamphlet observes, "[n]othing has been added to the fertilized
ovum who you once were except nutrition,"265 just as Horatio Storer once
argued that the "total independence" of the unborn could be discerned in the
fact that "its subsequent history after impregnation is merely one of develop-
ment, its attachment merely for nutrition and shelter."266 In such physio-
logical accounts of human genesis, all that women give to the work of
bearing and rearing children and all that it exacts from them is utterly invisi-
ble, except as it might be part of the "nutrition" digested by the fertilized
ovum in the course of its autonomous project of self-realization. Narratives
of human genesis that omit reference to women's work as mothers are in-
voked to condemn the conduct of women who resist becoming mothers.
Just as often, the embryo/fetus invoked in arguments against abortion ap-
pears to have no physical or social relation to women who seek abortions.267
In this respect, then, the nineteenth century campaign inaugurated tradi-
tions of reasoning about the unborn, the influence of which can still be seen
in popular debate. By contrast, claims about women's roles that dominated
arguments for criminalizing abortion in the past no longer find similar ex-
pression. Because it is no longer acceptable to speak about women as the
physicians once did, and because it is now possible to speak about the un-
born without seeming to refer to women, demands for criminalizing abortion
today seem bereft of gender-role concerns. Yet when Representative Henry
Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 268 (1987); see id. at 263-71 (analyzing photographs in pop-
ular media dating back to 1962).
265. J. WILLKE, DID You KNow (n.d.) (antiabortion pamphlet), quoted in Olsen, supra note
5, at 128. The observation quoted in text is a reply to the following queries:
Did you "come from" a human baby? No! You once were a baby.
Did you "come from" a human fetus? No! You once were a fetus.
Did you "come from" a fertilized ovum? No! You once were a fertilized ovum.
A fertilized ovum? Yes! You were then everything you are today. Nothing has been added
to the fertilized ovum who you once were except nutrition.
ld.
266. H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 10-11.
267. For example, when a reader complained that journalist Nat HentolI' failed to grasp the
olI'ensive attitudes toward women underlying abortion-restrictive regulation, HentolI' published the
following reply:
There is a new medical book, The Unborn Patient: Prenatal Diagnosis and Treatment, pub-
lished by W.B. Saunders, a textbook firm in Philadelphia, which is a subsidiary ofHarcourt
Brace Jovanovich. As the book clearly and abundantly demonstrates, the fetus is also a
patient. I am for free speech in all contexts, and I am against killing. That is my mindset.
Nat HentolI', VILLAGE VOICE, July 9, 1991, at 6 (reply to reader letter) (reproduced in full). Com-
pare id. with Petchesky, supra note 264, at 271 ("Along with the external political and cultural
pressures, traditional patterns endemic to the male-dominated practice of obstetrics help determine
the current clinical view of the fetus as 'patient,' separate and autonomous from the pregnant
woman.") and BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY: PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS
AND THE FUTURE OF MOTHERHOOD 114 (1986) ("[T]he fetus in utero has become a metaphor for
'man' in space, floating free, attached only by the umbilical cord to the spaceship. But where is the
mother in that metaphor? She has become empty space.").
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Hyde passionately argues that "that tiny little atom of humanity surrounded
by a wom[a]n called 'mother' is a member of the human family,"268 his com-
ments suggest that tacit assumptions about "the wom[a]n called 'mother'"
and her role in the "human family" may still inform judgments about the
morality of abortion, despite their apparent focus on the unborn. Indeed,
when opponents of abortion call "that tiny little atom of humanity" a
"baby," and condemn the practice as murder, killing, or the destruction of
human life, they are in fact expressing a moral judgment about a relation
between mother and child, and condemning women for violating the most
fundamental conceptions of the maternal role.269
In Abortion and the Politics ofMotherhood,270 sociologist Kristin Luker
analyzes the ways in which the abortion debate reflects conflicts about
women's role as mothers, tracing value judgments about protecting unborn
life to value judgments about the structure of family life.271 Examining a
group of female activists on both sides of the abortion debate, Luker illus-
trates how divergent modes of reasoning about the unborn correlate with
divergent modes of reasoning about the nature ofsexuality, work, and family
commitments in women's lives. Analyzed from this perspective, the abor-
tion debate can be seen as a conflict between those who see "motherhood as
the most important and satisfying role open to a woman," and those who see
"motherhood [as] only one of several roles [open to women], a burden when
defined as the only role."272 Recent poll data supports Luker's characteriza-
tion of the controversy. The Los Angeles Times described the world view of
abortion opponents it surveyed in the following terms: They "[f]eel the
country is in a state of moral decline and hold conservative views on 'family
values.' "273 It reported that while "[t]he majority of people who support
abortion think that raising children can hold back a woman in her ca-
reer... , [t]he majority of those who oppose abortion believe that mother-
268. 137 CoNG. REc. H5125 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Hyde).
269. Ifopponents ofabortion in fact believe that the embryo/fetus is a baby and that abortion
is murder, then they are accusing mothers of murdering their own children, a charge with explosive
gendered import. Cf. J. MOHR, supra note 65, at 169 (1871 report for Iowa State Medical Society
attacking abortion, asking what would become of the country when "American women ... for
selfish and personal ends, butcher or poison their children?").
Yet, to my knowledge, opponents of abortion are not seeking to prosecute women for murder.
Cf. note 233 supra (similar reticence in nineteenth century). It seems more reasonable to assume
that the assertion "abortion is murder" is a context-specificjudgment, a way ofexpressing outrage or
repugnance at the violence ofabortion itself. Cf. George Skelton, Most Americans Think Abortion is
Immoral, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAJPAP File, at 3. (poll
finding that 57% ofAmericans think that abortion is "murder," but also finding that 74% ofrespon-
dents agreed with the statement, "I personally feel that abortion is morally wrong, but I also feel that
whether or not to have an abortion is a decision that has to be made by every woman for herself.").
Of course, if the murder charge is a context-specific way of reasoning about abortion, it is quite
specifically a judgment about women~ conduct.
270. K. LUKER, supra note 65.
271. See id. at 192-215; id. at 193 ("abortion debate is so passionate and hard-fought because it
is a referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood") (emphasis omitted).
272. Id. at 214.
273. Skelton, supra note 269, at 6 ("To them, a woman's place is in the home and motherhood
must always be a woman's most important and satisfYing role.").
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hood should be the most important, satisfying thing a woman does."274
Related value judgments are expressed in opinion polls asking Americans to
identify circumstances in which they believe women are justified in seeking
an abortion. While Americans do countenance abortion in many circum-
stances, few believe that women are justified in seeking an abortion when
they are attempting to pursue a career other than motherhood, with only 26
percent agreeing that a woman has a legitimate reason for seeking an abor-
tion if the pregnancy threatens her education or employment opportuni-
ties.27s This same assumption that motherhood is women's primary role is
expressed when critics of the abortion right scorn women who seek abortion
"on demand," "as a mere convenience," or for "no reason at all"-treating a
woman's decision not to commit her body and her life to the work ofbearing
and rearing a child as an expression of petty expedience or self-indulgence,
just as nineteenth century doctors claimed.276
Thus, even if the contemporary abortion debate lacks the open discussion
of women's duties that marked the nineteenth century campaign, there is
indeed evidence that concerns about women's conduct as mothers may lie
just beneath its surface. Those who seek to protect unborn life want to regu-
late the conduct of women who fail to act as good mothers should.277 Judg-
ments about women's conduct as mothers are expressed by those interested
in protecting unborn life outside the abortion context, as well. Thus, one
commentator surveying a hospital ward of babies born to drug-dependent
women angrily warned his readers that "[t]he sins of the mothers are apt to
become the burden of society for generations to come,"278 and then ap-
plauded a female journalist and six other women who had volunteered to
274. ld. at 5.
275. In a recent New York Times poll, respondents indicated that a pregnant woman should be
allowed a legal abortion in the following circumstances: if the woman's health is seriously endan-
gered by pregnancy (87% yes; 7% no); if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby (69%
yes; 21 % no); if the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children (43% yes;
49% no); if she is not married and does not want to marry the man (42% yes; 50% no); if the
pregnancy interfered with work or education (26% yes; 65% no). E.J. Dionne, Poll on Abortion
Finds the Nation is Sharply Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1989, at AI; see also text accompanying
note 399 infra (reporting similar results in a poll of Louisiana residents).
276. Cj Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (Court's decision in
Roe protects women's right to terminate a pregnancy for reasons of "convenience, whim, or caprice"
or for "no reason at all"); Skelton, supra note 269, at 1 ("Americans adamantly object to abortion if
its only purpose is birth control. . " And they oppose it 'on demand,' as a mere convenience.").
During the nineteenth century, doctors also charged that women sought abortions for "shal·
low" reasons, of "inconvenience," "selfishness," or "laziness." Their objections were explicitly pre-
mised on the belief that, in avoiding the work of gestation and nurturance, wives were "ignoring the
demands ofduty" and "neglecting the work God has appointed you to perform." See text accompa·
nying notes 161-164 supra.
For an examination of the types of moral reasoning underlying women's decisions whether to
terminate a pregnancy, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 64-105 (1982).
277. Cj CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC 25, 26, 33, 106-07
(1990) (approval or disapproval of abortion often turns on whether the woman seeking an abortion
appears to comport herself as a good mother).
278. AI Martinez, Babes in Machines and Babes in Arms. S.F. CHRON., May 5, 1991, (Sunday
Punch), at 2.
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hold the "damaged babies" with the exhortation, "Good for Victoria. Good
for the women who cuddle babies."279
Interest in regulating women's conduct to protect the unborn is most
prominently focused on the issue of abortion, about which public debate has
raged since Roe, but it is by no means limited to matters of abortion. For
example, state actors have begun to compel pregnant women to submit to
surgical delivery and other physically invasive procedures for the benefit of
the unborn.280 Despite the fact that few drug treatment programs admit
pregnant women, an increasing number of state and local authorities are
now prosecuting pregnant women whose drug use is deemed to threaten the
unborn, and depriving women of child custody when their newborns test
positive for drug exposure.281 Until Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was
recently construed to prohibit the practices, many employers sought to ex-
clude fertile women from employment believed to threaten the welfare of
prospective generations.282 Pregnant women are now subject to public and
private admonitions that their conduct may threaten the welfare of the un-
born/83 receiving warnings which many advocates of the unborn would
279. Id.
280. See Veronica E.B. Kolder, Janet Gallagher & Michael Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical
Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987); Lawrence W. Nelson, Brian P. Buggy & Carol J.
Weil, Forced Medical Treatment ofPregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live As Seems Good to
the Rest, " 37 HAsTINGS L.J. 703, 704 (1986); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room:
The Emergence of Court-Ordered Coesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951 (1986).
281. "Ofabout 7,000 drug treatment programs nationwide, only about 50 offer female patients
child and obstetric care." Susan Diesenhouse, Drug Treatment is Scarcer Than Ever For Women,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1990, at E26. In New York City, for example, a recent survey of78 rehabilita-
tive programs "found that 54% exclude all pregnant women; 67% do not accept pregnant women on
Medicaid; and 87% do not treat pregnant women on Medicaid who are addicted to crack." Id.; see
also note 344 infra (discussing shortage ofprenatal care for women on public assistance). It is in this
context that public officials are prosecuting drug-dependent women, and depriving women of child
custody when their infants test positive for drug exposure. See Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During
Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278 (1990) (prosecutions and custody deprivation); Bonnie I.
Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem ofthe Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to Prinpipled Interven-
tion, 42 STAN. L. REv. 745 (1990) (custody deprivation). Pregnant drug-dependent women are also
subject to "protective" incarceration, without being charged for a drug-related crime. See,e.g.,
Diesenhouse, supra, at E26 (state official admits that during 1989 over 100 pregnant, drug-dependent
women were incarcerated in Massachusetts for one to thirty days without being charged for a crime
because the state lacked treatment programs for them); Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy: New
IssuejOr the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14 (discussing "protective" incarceration prac-
tices in South Carolina); see also United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 441, 447 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1989) (judges in District ofColumbia use sentencing discretion to detain pregnant, drug-
dependent women convicted for other reasons) (discussed in note 335 infra).
282. See, e.g.. Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1219, 1226, 1237-39 (1986); Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Women to Protect the
Fetus: The Reconciliation ofFetal Protection with the Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title
VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981). But see UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991)
(prohibiting fetal-protective regulation ofwomen's employment under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); text accompanying notes 302-329 infra.
283. See San Jose State University, Presidential Directive 90-02 (Sept. 12, 1990) (on file with
theStanjOrd Law Review) (implementing the Drug Free Schools and Communities Act of 1989, P.L.
101-226, elaborating guidelines or "standards ofconduct" for campus employees and students, speci-
fying that "[a]ny consumption of alcohol by a pregnant woman presents health risks to her unborn
child, and is thus discouraged"); see also note 332 infra (discussing alcohol warning statutes adopted
by states and municipalities).
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translate into legally enforceable duties of care.284 Today, the medical pro-
fession continues to play an important, though less prominent, role in defin-
ing and enforcing these regulatory norms.285
Each of these expressions of regulatory interest has its own justifications
and lineage. Considered cumulatively, however, they suggest that public in-
terest in regulating women's reproductive conduct is indeed growing, in
ways that seem to be in deep conflict with the sex-egalitarian norms cur-
rently endorsed by public law.286 Today, it is unlikely that state actors
would direct women to subordinate their interests to the act of bearing or
caring for children, forego nontraditional employment, or othel\"lise adhere
to conventional norms of feminine conduct as advocates for reform did in
the past. Yet, when such demands are cast as requirements for the protec-
tion of unborn and yet-to-be-conceived life, they are not merely acceptable;
increasingly, they are unchallengeable. This is so because those interested in
regulating the conduct of pregnant and fertile women do not openly impugn
women's rights as equal citizens of this nation; rather, they insist that sex-
specific regulation of women's conduct as parents is warranted for reasons
specific to the physiology of the female body-to protect unborn life that
women alone may bear.287
284. For arguments that the pregnant woman owes a duty of care to the unborn, see note 331
infra.
285. Medical textbooks present the fetus as the doctor's "second patient." See WILLIAMS OB-
STETRICS at xi (Jack A. Pritchard, Paul C. MacDonald & Norman F. Gant eds., 17th ed. 1985).
Doctors act on this understanding in ways that can lead to conflicts with their female patients. For
example, a survey of heads of fellowship programs in maternal-fetal medicine revealed that almost
half approved of using the courts to force women who refused medical advice to submit to medical
procedures that are potentially life-saving for the fetus; a quarter advocated state surveillance of
women in the third trimester of pregnancy who stay outside the hospital system. See Kolder et al.,
supra note 280, at 1193-94. Medical professionals have provided public authorities with information
on drug-dependent pregnant patients that will result in legal actions against them. See, e.g., Jan
Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted-And Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, (Magazine), at 33, 44;
Kary L. Moss, Legal Issues: Drug Testing ofPostpartum Women and Newborns as the Basisfor Civil
and Criminal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1406, 1409-11 (1990). Physicians have also
played a key role in the adoption of fetal-hazards policies excluding fertile women from the work-
place. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 875, 877-79 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(medical professional is "one of the primary proponents of Johnson Control's fetal protection pol-
icy"), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). They have played a less visible, but no less significant, role in
focusing medical research on female-mediated harms to the unboru, while tending to neglect re-
search concerning male-mediated harms to the unborn, thus skewing the evidentiary record on
which public policy decisions are made. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 282, at 655-65; cf. Sandra
Blakeslee, Research on Birth Defects Turns to Flaws in Sperm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I, 1991, at AI.
While the medical profession as a whole does not oppose abortion, medical conceptualization of the
fetus as a "second patient" and various fetal-imaging technologies develoPe9 for treating pregnant
women playa prominent role in antiabortion advocacy. See Petchesky, supra note 264; see also note
267 supra. Many doctors now refuse to provide legal abortions, and stigmatize those who do, see
Jane Gross, Opposing Abortion, More Doctors Seek Ethical Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, at
AI, A12 (1985 study by American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists reveals that more
than two-thirds of the nation's gynecologists will not perform abortions); Gina Kolata, Under Pres-
sures and Stigma, More Doctors Shun Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1990, at AI.
286. See, e.g, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. Rptr. 441, 447 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1989)
(fetal-protective sentencing of cocaine-dependent pregnant woman, convicted for a misdemeanor of
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Thus, while it is no longer acceptable to impose sex-based obligations on
women premised on their social role in family life, arguments premised on
women's physical role in the reproduction of life supply reasons for imposing
regulatory constraints on female citizens. Yet, the possibility that stereo-
typical conceptions of women's roles might find expression in regulation of
women's reproductive conduct is not recognized in law because courts con-
tinue to reason about such regulation within physiological paradigms that
have distant roots in the nineteenth century campaign.
B. Physiological Reasoning in the Jurisprudence ofReproductive
Regulation
As Part I of this article illustrates, when the Court has reviewed regula-
tion concerning matters of reproduction, it has discussed such regulation as
if characteristics of women's bodies could explain or justify it, emphasizing
that physical differences between the sexes supply "realistic," "objective," or
"inherent" reasons for imposing sex-based limitations on women's civil
rights.288 In this respect, the Court interprets the Constitution within the
naturalistic paradigms first elaborated in Muller: "Many words cannot
make this plainer. The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions
to be performed by each. . .. This difference justifies a difference in legisla-
tion ...."289 Thus, today, as in the past, physiological modes of reasoning
about women are invoked to limit principles recognizing woman's common-
ality with man and equality to him. Indeed, this mode of reasoning about
women seems to acquire cultural force as women's claims to equality acquire
cultural force.29o With the appearance of modern equal protection doctrines
forbidding discrimination on the basis of sex, arguments grounded in repro-
forging a check) ("It is true that defendant has not been treated the same as ifshe were a man in this
case. But then a man who is a convicted rapist is treated differently than a woman."); Johnson v.
Florida, 578 So. 2d 419,420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (conviction for delivery of controlled sub-
stance to a minor) (defendant "took cocaine into her pregnant body and caused the passage of that
cocaine to each of her children through the umbilical cord after birth of the child, then an infant
person. The statute was twice violated.").
288. See text accompanying notes 14-58 supra (discussing physiological naturalism in constitu-
tional jurisprudence that concerns the regulation of women's role in reproduction, as exemplified by
cases such as Roe, Gedu/dig, and Michael M.).
289. Muller v. Oregon, 208 u.S. 412, 422-23 (1908).
290. Relations of gender inequality can be justified by invoking social values or nature itself.
When overtly patriarchal modes of reasoning about women lose persuasive force, interest in physio-
logical modes of reasoning may grow-to ascertain, as it were, which aspects of sexual hierarchy will
or ought persist by reason of "nature." Thus, in circumstances where political discourse conceptual-
izes the citizen in genderless terms, arguments from reproductive physiology may come to serve a
particularly important role in articulating gender relations.
Thomas Laqueur and Carole Pateman have employed a dialectical model of this sort to describe
how the genderless rational subject featured in Enlightenment social contract theory prompted rea-
soning about women based on "nature." See THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GEN-
DER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 196-97 (1990); cj CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL
CONTRACT 41 (1988). The model supplies a provocative framework for thinking about the relation
of rights-expanding and rights-restricting regulation affecting women's status in the nineteenth cen-
tury, see text accompanying notes 241-242 supra, and again in the present era.
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ductive physiology now constitute one of the strongest constitutional ratio-
nales for class-based regulation of women's conduct.
Physiological analysis of reproductive regulation is by no means limited
to the constitutional context. Even when construing the federal statute that
forbids pregnancy discrimination in employment, courts continue to evalu-
ate reproductive regulation in physiological paradigms, rarely analyzing em-
ployer hostility to the pregnant employee in light of the traditional animus
against "working mothers"--or any aspect of the social history of the work-
place.291 So long as courts view the fundamental realities of reproduction as
physical and not social, they will ignore ways in which assumptions about
women's roles can prompt or structure regulation of the pregnant woman's
conduct.292
If physiological reasoning still plays an important part in justifying di-
verse forms of reproductive regulation, it plays an especially pronounced
role in the jurisprudence of fetal-protective regulation. To justify such regu-
lation, it is wholly unnecessary to appeal to considerations of maternal
duty--or of religion, class, and race--as physicians did a century ago. From
the standpoint of law, the fact that unborn life exists from the point of con-
ception is sufficient to explain social interest in protecting it, and the fact
that women alone may gestate life provides a sufficient and unimpeachable
reason for regulating their conduct. In law, it now appears a mere happen-
stance of nature that women's conduct must be regulated to protect unborn
life--a "distinction . . . based on the reality that only the female of the
291. Courts enforcing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988), have
derived a formal equality rule from its second clause, which specifies that employers should treat
pregnant employees the same as "other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
to work." Thus, under the PDA, courts still analyze pregnancy as a physiological condition, requir-
ing employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other employees whose capacity to work is
similarly physiologically impaired. See Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 931-33 (1985); cf. UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1206-07 (1991). Enforcement of the PDA in this fashion has produced a
marked change in employment practices, but enforcement has proceeded without critical evaluation
of the societal attitudes producing the pregnancy exclusions the amendment sought to remedy. Only
in attempting to distinguish between policies accommodating and penalizing the pregnant employee
under the PDA, has the Supreme Court begun tentatively to situate pregnancy discrimination within
a social framework. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-90 (1987).
Glimpses of this alternative conceptual framework also appear in the concluding paragraphs of the
Court's recent decision concerning fetal-hazards regulation of women's employment. See text ac-
companying notes 327-329 infra.
292. For example, it will appear reasonable to exclude women from the workforce when mat-
ters concerning women's reproductive role are in issue because of the assumption that women's
presence in the workforce is intermittent, subordinate to their role in childbearing, and, ultimately,
inconsistent with it. Similarly, matters of reproductive physiology may appear to supply reasons to
exclude the female employee whose persuasive force in fact derives from assumptions about the
characteristics of the "normal" employee in a particular job category. Cf. UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 879 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (industrial health expert testifies that "I was
never taught to place a reproductive female in the average work exposure oflead. And furthermore,
before the 60s, to my knowledge, no women were working in lead exposures."), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196
(1991); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994,996 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[t]hrough Delta's early years of
operation, flight attendants were obliged to be unmarried, and pregnancy-in or out of wedlock-
was grounds for firing") (upholding employer's decisions to bar pregnant women as flight attendants
for reasons of customer safety).
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human species is capable of childbearing."293 Or, as Roe put it: "The preg-
nant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and,
later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young
in the human uterus.... The situation therefore is inherently different" from
all other privacy precedents.294
Physiological reasoning about reproduction presents women as "the fe-
male of the human species" or simply as "the human uterus," locating fetal-
protective regulation within a frame of reference defined by women's bodies.
This scientific perspective acquires legal authority precisely as it reveals the
"true," "objective" facts of reproduction, none of which are social. Indeed,
the more physiological analysis strips human reproduction of its social char-
acter, the more objective and non-normative this mode of reasoning about
regulating women's reproductive conduct appears.
Legal analysis of fetal-protective regulation is further abstracted from
social context by habits of reasoning dating from the nineteenth century
campaign, which present the fetus as an object of public interest scarcely
connected physically or socially to the woman bearing it. When the fetus is
considered as an object of regulatory concern distinct and apart from the
woman bearing it, it becomes possible to reason about regulating women's
conduct without seeming to reason about women at all.
Consistent with this tradition, Roe and its progeny conceptualize the
state's interests in restricting abortion as a benign exercise of regulatory au-
thority to protect unborn life, not as coercive exercise of regulatory authority
against the pregnant woman. In this framework, state action against the
pregnant woman can be justified by reasoning about the characteristics of
the unborn life she bears. The fact that a fertilized egg has the physiological
potential to develop into a born person gives the state constitutionally cogni-
zable regulatory interests in a pregnant woman.295 The fact that a fetus is
"viable"-"capable of meaningful life outside the mother's womb"-para-
doxically provides "logical and biological justifications" for compelling a
woman to continue carrying it.296 When the maternal/fetal relation is con-
293. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 883, rev'd, III S. Ct. 1196 (1991); see text accompanying
notes 302-339 infra.
294. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (citations omitted).
295. [d.
296. See id. at 163. In Roe and again in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Blackmun justifies
prohibiting abortion at viability much as doctors once justified prohibiting abortion at conception:
by describing the viable fetus in terms that emphasize the autonomy of unborn life and its separation
from the woman bearing it. Compare Webster, 492 U.S. 490 with text accompanying notes 97-107
supra. Conceptualizing unborn life in this fashion makes it possible to justify abortion-restrictive
regulation in terms that scarcely refer to the citizen at whom state power is directed.
Critics of the viability standard derive the state's interest in regulating women's reproductive
conduct in terms similarly focused on the embryo/fetus. For example, Justice White has observed:
The governmental interest at issue is in protecting those who will be citizens if their lives
are not ended in the womb. . .. The State's interest is in the fetus as an entity in itself, and
the character of this entity does not change at the point of viability under conventional
medical wisdom. Accordingly, the State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally
compelling before viability.
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ceptually disaggregated in this fashion, state actors can discuss regulation
directed at the pregnant woman as if it merely concerned the fetus;297 and
they can impose duties on the pregnant woman by invoking the rights of the
fetus, for example, "the right to be born with a sound mind and healthy
body."298
This mode of reasoning about the fetus, as if it were scarcely connected
to a woman, is a mode of reasoning about women, one with a social history
tied to the regulation of women's reproductive role. Yet, the possibility that
gendered judgments might structure fetal-protective regulation is obscured
by the physiological paradigms in which it is analyzed. Physiological rea-
soning deflects attention from the social context in which judgments about
protecting unborn life are formed and enforced. Considered out of social
context, it seems entirely reasonable to explain fetal-protective regulation as
motivated by a concern for the unborn, just as it seems reasonable to require
the pregnant woman to act in ways that benefit the unborn. Yet "reason" in
such matters involves questions concerning women's roles and not simply
their bodies, as a simple act of recharacterization demonstrates. The interest
in potential life recognized in Roe can also be characterized as an interest in
making women who are resisting motherhood carry a pregnancy to term.
Similarly, the right of the unborn to begin life with a sound mind and
healthy body can be characterized as a duty of the pregnant woman to con-
form with communal expectations of how a pregnant woman ought to
act.299 Fetal-protective regulation of women's conduct defines and enforces
duties of motherhood; it remains a law of gender status although no overt
gender-based reasoning is employed to justify it.3OO Moreover, because judg-
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting); see also Webster, 492 U.S. at 519 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e do not see why
the State's interest in protecting human life should come into existence only at the point of viability,
and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting
it before viability.").
297. See In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Fam. Ct. 1985) ("this
'interest in potential life should extend to protection of the quality of life''') (quoting John E.B.
Myers, Abuse and Neglect ofthe Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 19 (1984)).
298. See Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy & Legal Implications of
Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 291
n.89 (1987-88); cf. Department of Social Servs. ex reL Mark S. v. Felicia B., 144 Misc. 2d 169, 171,
543 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (Fam. Ct. 1989) ("natural justice ... requires recognition of the legal right of
every human being to begin life unimpaired by physical, mental, or emotional defects resulting from
the neglectful acts of the parent"). But cf. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 275-80, 531
N.E.2d 355, 359-61 (1988) (denying that such a general right exists in law, and warning that gender
bias will inform its application to the maternal-fetal relation).
299. See, e.g., Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 278 ("In what way would prejUdicial and stereotypical
beliefs about the reproductive abilities of women be kept from interfering with a jury's determination
of whether a particular woman was negligent at any point during her pregnancy?").
300. Judicial reasoning about fetal-protective regulation reflects an uneasy awareness of this
problem, which can be detected whenever courts attempt to justify fetal-protective regulation in
social paradigms. When courts disaggregate the maternal-fetal relationship and reason about the
regulation of the pregnant woman as if it involved a relation between two born persons, they employ
gender-neutral analogies that treat the maternal-fetal relation as a relation between strangers, or
alternatively, as a relation between parent and child. Rarely, if ever, will courts analyze the mater-
nal-fetal relation as like (or part of) the mother-child relation, and so acknowledge its gender-based
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ments about women's obligations as mothers are forged in a society divided
by class and race, fetal-protective regulation is subject to every form of bias
that women in this society face.301
c. Gender Bias in Fetal-Protective Regulation
In reasoning about regulating women's conduct to protect the unborn,
state actors continue to make judgments about the duties and obligations of
motherhood, just as medical opponents of abortion did in the nineteenth
century. Yet, because of the physiological paradigms that organize this area
of law, their judgments are not subject to the scrutiny normally directed at
state action imposing sex-specific obligations of parenting on women. Con-
sequently, fetal-protective regulation is rife with diverse forms of bias.
At first glance, the physiological existence of the fetus and its susceptibil-
ity to real physical harm seem to dispel the possibility that fetal-protective
regulation could reflect stereotypical or otherwise biased reasoning about
women. But to assert that fetal-protective regulation is infected with diverse
forms of bias, one need not contend that harms facing unborn life are illu-
sory. The risk of harm to unborn life, and of bias against women in actions
undertaken to prevent it, may each be real. To see how unexamined assump-
tions about women's obligations as mothers can shape fetal-protective regu-
lation, it is necessary to consider the methods and resources this society
employs to prevent harm to the unborn. Examining when and how this soci-
ety intervenes in women's lives to protect the unborn illuminates the social
logic of fetal-protective regulation, revealing many ways in which the focus
and structure of such regulation reflect social judgments about women
rather than simple regard for the unborn.
To appreciate the social logic of fetal-protective regulation, it is helpful
to consider such regulation in several contexts. I begin by examining fetal-
protective regulation ofwomen in the workplace, because judicial analysis of
such regulation has recently shifted from physiological paradigms to a
framework that recognizes the possibility that such regulation may be sub-
character. This reticence reflects sex-equalitarian convictions or conventions that, superficially at
least, distinguish modem arguments for fetal-protective regulation from those of the past century.
But using gender-neutral analogies to analyze fetal-protective regulation hardly precludes gender-
based judgments about the equities of the regulation, especially where the risk of such judgments is
one that doctrines concerning reproductive regulation wholly disregard. When gender-neutral anal-
ogies are employed casually, as they often are, they may serve to obscure rather than constrain
gender-based judgments about the impositions on women which are warranted to protect the un-
born. See, e.g., note 330 infra (examining justifications for forced caesareans).
301. A recent survey of hospitals in 18 states revealed that 81% ofpreguant women subjected
to court-ordered surgical treatment were black, Asian, or Hispanic; all women were treated in teach-
ing-hospitals or were receiving public assistance. Kolder et al., supra note 280, at 1192, 1193. Simi-
larly, surveys ofprosecutions and of reporting practices in certain jurisdictions suggest that pregnant
women ofcolor have been disproportionately targeted for drug-related regulation. See Gina Kalata,
Racial Bias Seen in Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at AID; Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1421 n.6, 1432-36 (1991). For a discussion of the ways in which
judgments rooted in relations of race and class may structure fetal-protective regulation, see text
accompanying notes 337-341 infra.
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ject to gender bias. These important developments in employnient dJscrimi-
nation law have wider legal implications.
1. Fetal-hazards regulation in employment.
Until the Supreme Court held in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 302 that
fetal-hazards regulation of women's employment was prohibited under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and all federal circuit courts
to consider the question ruled that an employer could exclude fertile female
employees from hazardous workplaces to protect any offspring they might
conceive.303 The Seventh Circuit opinion which the Court overruled in
Johnson Controls illustrates how reasoning about fetal-protection policies in
physiological paradigms can obscure their social logic.
In Johnson Controls, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the facts of reproduc-
tive physiology supplied an objective basis for an employer to exclude all
fertile women, of any age and reproductive intention, from jobs at its battery
plant which exposed employees to lead and from all other jobs with bidding,
promotion, or transfer rights to such jobs304-even though the employer
adopted lead-exposure rules for women more rigorous than Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards, while ignoring an
OSHA finding that excessive lead exposure posed risks to the offspring of
male as well as female employees.305 The court held that evidence on male-
mediated reproductive harms was sufficiently uncertain that an employer in-
terested in protecting the offspring of its employees could focus special regu-
latory attention on women.306 Because compliance with OSHA standards
would not eliminate all risk ofharm to the offspring offemale employees, the
court ruled that an employer could exclude all fertile women from employ-
302. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
303. While the EEOC and federal courts employed different frameworks for analyzing fetal-
hazards policies, they agreed that properly structured policies were permissible under Title VII. See
id. at 1200-02 & n.!.
304. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 886 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane), rev'd. 111 S.
Ct. 1196 (1991). The policy was applied to any work environment having certain defined levels of
lead exposure, as measured by air and blood samples. See id. at 876.
305. The policy applied to work environments with lead exposure levels substantially below
OSHA's requirements. See id. at 876 n.7. OSHA recommended that men or women desiring chil-
dren should be provided with respirators allowing them to reduce lead exposure to the levels at
which the Johnson Controls' policy excluded women, because OSHA fOund that lead produced repro-
ductive harms transmissible through both sexes. See ic/. at 917 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (" 'Male
workers may be rendered infertile or impotent, and both men and women are subject to genetic
damage which may affect both the course and outcome of pregnancy.''') (quoting 43 Fed. Reg.
52,953, 52,966 (1978».
306. The court discounted plaintiffs' evidence that lead toxicity was transmissible to the off-
spring of male as well as female employees on the grounds that the studies cited were performed on
animals rather than humans and that studies on human males had established only "a correlation
between male lead exposure and sperm shape," characterizing this evidence as "at best, speculative
and unconvincing." ld. at 889. Judge Easterbrook in dissent pointed out evidence the majority
ignored, emphasizing that OSHA had ruled that lead toxicity was transmissible through both sexes,
and that the American Public Health Association had taken the same position. See id. at 917-19
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 337 1991-1992
January 1992] REASONING FROM THE BODY 337
ment to ensure that no woman would become pregnant while she had ele-
vated levels oflead in her blood.307 In the court's view, Johnson Controls's
decision to exclude nearly all women from most jobs at the plant was based
on physical facts of sex, not social considerations of gender: "The convinc-
ing scientific evidence of this risk and the very serious consequences of this
danger combine to make this health risk quite different from the concerns in
Muller v. Oregon which we would currently characterize as stereotypical
rather than real."30S The court was confident that "the challenged [employ-
ment policy] is based upon the reality that only the female of the human
species is capable of childbearing,"309 and repeatedly attributed the exclu-
sionary employment policy to scientific facts regarding women's bodies
rather than social judgments about women's roles.
There are in fact two ways in which social judgments about the maternal
role shaped Johnson Controls's fetal-protection policy. Evidence of the first
can be seen in the company's decision to focus its policy on women alone.
As the Supreme Court observed: "The bias in Johnson Controls' policy is
obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether
they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job."310 But even
if we assume that there are sex-based differences in the character or magni-
tude of reproductive risks, and further assume that such differences could
justify the company's decision to restrict only women's employment, there
still remains evidence of gender bias in the structure of the policy the com-
pany applied to women.
A simple hypothetical illustrates that the policy the company applied to
women reflects social assumptions about women's roles, and not merely
physical facts about their bodies. New epidemiological studies are now trac-
ing miscarriages and diverse forms of fetal injury to sperm that has been
damaged by exposure to alcohol, opiates like heroin and methadone, gases
used in hospital operating rooms, lead, solvents, hydrocarbons, metals, oils,
paints, pesticides, and a variety of industrial chemicals.311 Employers who
are concerned about protecting their employees' future offspring and who
credit this emerging body of scientific evidence will have to consider restrict-
ing the employment ofmen as well as ofwomen. But, with the benefit of this
307. Id. at 876 n.7, 878. As the court explained:
Limitation of the fetal protection policy to women actually pregnant was found ineffective
because there is the very definite possibility that lead exposure will occur between concep-
tion and the time the woman discovers her pregnancy. . .. Limitation of the policy to
women planning pregnancy also was not found to be a suitable alternative because of ..•
the frequency of unplanned or undetected pregnancies.
Id. at 878.
308. Id. at 898 (citing authority emphasizing distinction between "sterotyped characterizations
of the sexes" and "real .•• differences between men and women").
309. Id. at 883.
310. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1202 (1991); cf. notes 305-306 supra and
accompanying text (discussing evidence that the reproductive harms oflead exposure are transmissi-
ble through men and women both).
311. See, e.g., Blakeslee, supra note 285, at AI, A36; see also notes 305-306 supra (discussing
similar findings by OSHA and American Public Health Association relied upon by plaintiffs in the
Johnson Controls case).
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new research, would they ever consider excluding all fertile men ofany age
or reproductive intention from hospital operating rooms, auto body shops, or
lead-exposed employment, as well as from any line of work with options of
promotion or transfer to such jobs? The common sense answer to this ques-
tion is no. If the employment of men were at stake, it would simply not
seem reasonable to eliminate all risk of harm to unconceived life312 by re-
moving all fertile men from jobs exposing them to reproductive toxins. Even
if regulators were willing to impose restrictions on men's employment, they
would still tolerate some risk ofharm to employee offspring rather than limit
the employment prospects of so large a class of men. Thus, whether or not
Johnson Controls's decision to focus its fetal-protection policy on women
reflected social assumptions about the maternal role, it is clear that the ex-
clusionary policy the company applied to women was one that would never
have been applied to men.313
Similarly, when the Seventh Circuit disparaged the evidence on male-
mediated reproductive harms, and then concluded it was reasonable for an
employer to exclude all fertile women from lead-exposed employment, its
decision was based on something more than the facts of reproductive physi-
ology or even concern for the welfare of future generations. The Seventh
Circuit judged it reasonable to exclude all fertile women from employment
because the policy conformed with certain culturally specific assumptions
about women: assumptions that define women's ends by their organs so that
all women of any age and reproductive intention appear to be potentially
pregnant;314 that devalue women's employment on the premise that they are
or should be supported by men;31S and that denigrate women's competence
to make reproductive decisions that reconcile responsibilities to themselves
and other family members, existing and potential.316 From this perspective
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Johnson Controls does indeed reflect tradi-
tional gender role assumptions of the sort expressed in Muller v. Oregon.317
Both the opinion and the policy it sanctioned in fact tell us more about how
this culture values women than the unborn.
Recasting this analysis in more general terms, it can be observed that
those involved in designing and reviewing Johnson Controls's fetal-protec-
tion policy may well have been moved by a concern for the welfare of un-
born generations, but they would not have acted as they did but for certain
assumptions about the women the company sought to exclude from its work
312. This was what the Seventh Circuit sought to accomplish. See Johnson Controls. 886 F.2d
at 878, 892-93 (discussing reasons for extending policy to the entire class of fertile women). Of
course, the policy protects yet-to-be conceived children from only one potential source of injury, and
may subject them to new risks of harm. See id. at 916-18 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority's risk assessment).
313. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming ofBrown, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 935, 956-57 (1989) (discussing the "reversing the groups" test as a method ofdemonstrating
that a regulatory decision is infected by discriminatory bias).
314. Cf. notes 111-113 & 123 supra and accompanying texts.
315. Cf. note 196 supra.
316. Cf. note 199 supra and accompanying text.
317. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see text accompanying notes 248-254 supra.
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force. The possibility that Johnson Controls's fetal-protection policy was
based on traditional assumptions about women's roles eluded the Seventh
Circuit because it evaluated the policy in a framework focused on the physi-
cal, not social, relations of reproduction. When courts analyze pregnancy as
if it were simply a physiological condition, the physical facts of reproduction
will appear to supply reasons for regulating the conditions in which women
reproduce because these facts can be marshaled to support judgments based
on the social relations of reproduction. Like born children, unborn embryos
and fetuses are subject to real and diverse risks of harm. Yet, the reality of
this harm does not necessarily explain the ways this society chooses to regu-
late women's conduct.
This analysis does not, of course, identify the statutory grounds on which
the Supreme Court overruled the Seventh Circuit in Johnson Controls.318
While the Court observed the "obvious" "bias" in the company's decision to
give "fertile men, but not fertile women, ... a choice as to whether they wish
to risk their reproductive health for a particular job,"319 it held that the
fetal-hazards policy was prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, because the
policy "explicitly classifies [employees] on the basis of potential for preg-
nancy,"320 and by sex as well.321 In the Court's view, concerns about the
safety of third parties might justify a sex-based employment policy under the
statute's bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) provisions,322 but only
if such safety concerns were "occupational" in character323 and related to
the" 'essence' " or " 'central mission of the employer's business.' "324 Thus,
318. 111 s. Ct. 1196 (1991).
319. ld. at 1202.
320. ld. at 1203. The Court explained:
"The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that. for all Title VII purposes,
discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her
sex." In its use of the words "capable of bearing children" in the 1982 policy statement as
the criterion for exclusion, Johnson Controls explicitly classifies on the basis of potential
for pregnancy. Under the PDA, such a classification must be regarded, for Title VII pur-
poses, in the same light as explicit sex discrimination.
ld. (citation omitted).
321. ld. ("Johnson Controls' policy is facially discriminatory because it requires only a female
employee to produce proof that she is not capable of reproducing."); see also id. at 1204 ("Johnson
Controls' policy 'does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows "treatment ofa person
in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different." , ") (citations omitted).
The Court analyzed the terms of the exclusionary policy and held that they were facially dis-
criminatory; to reach this conclusion, it was unnecessary to determine whether Johnson Controls
had an adequate empirical basis for its policy or benign motives for adopting it. See id. ("The
beneficence of an employer's purpose does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-
based policy is sex discrimination under § 703(a) and thus may be defended only as a BFOQ.")
Justice Scalia took the same position in his concurrence. See id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
322. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988):
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees •.. on the basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
323. 111 S. Ct. at 1204.
324. ld. at 1205 (quoting Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985».
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concerns about the safety of third parties such as co-workers or customers
could justify a sex-based exclusion "because they went to the core of the
employee's job performance." By contrast, the Court reasoned,
[t]he unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls' female employees ... are
neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essential to the business
of battery manufacturing. No one can disregard the possibility of injury to
future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it transforms this
deep social concern into an essential aspect of batterymaking.325
The Court found independent support for this conclusion in the statute's
language: "[T]he PDA's amendment to Title VII contains a BFOQ standard
of its own: unless pregnant employees differ from others 'in their ability or
inability to'work,' they must be 'treated the same' as other employees 'for all
employment related purposes.' "326
While the Court's holding in Johnson Controls depends on an act of stat-
utory construction, prior cases demonstrate that the statute's language was
not sufficient to compel the Court's decision. Concluding the Johnson Con-
trols opinion, the Court itself suggested that its reading of the statute was
rooted in larger socio-historical concerns:
Concern for a woman's existing or potential offspring historical1y has been
the excuse for denying women equal employment opportunities. See, e.g.,
Muller v. Oregon[.] Congress in the PDA prohibited discrimination on the
basis of a woman's ability to become pregnant. We do no more than hold
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act means what it says.327
In holding that "the Pregnancy Discrimination Act means what it says" in
matters concerning fetal-hazards regulation of women's employment, the
Court did more than aClhere to the language of the statute. It followed the
"plain meaning" of the statute, as courts before had not, because effective
advocacy alerted it to a history of gender bias relevant to the exclusions at
issue in the case.328 From this perspective, one can read the Court's holding
that "the BFOQ ... is not so broad that it transforms ... deep social con-
cern [about the risk of "injury to future children"] into an essential aspect of
batterymaking" as a statement of wider legal and social import: Allowing
employers to reduce the risk of injury to future children by excluding women
from the workplace would perpetuate a tradition of gender-based reasoning
about women that is at odds with the central policy concerns informing the
Civil Rights Act.329
325. ld. at 1206.
326. ld. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988».
327. 111 S. Ct. at 1210 (citing Muller, 208 U.S. 412 (1908». "It is no more appropriate for the
courts than it is for individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more
important to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress has left this choice to the
woman as hers to make." ld.
328. See Becker, supra note 282 (comparing fetal hazards regulation of women's employment
to the premises of the protectionist legislation sanctioned in Muller, 208 U.S. 412).
329. To understand the Court's statements about the importance of protecting employee off-
spring, it is crucial to situate them in doctrinal context. The only reason for determining whether a
business concern is "essential" to an employer's enterprise under Title VII is to decide whether it is
of sufficient importance to that business to justifY a sex-based employment policy vlithin the meaning
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 341 1991-1992
January 1992] REASONING FROM THE BODY 341
2. Other forms offetal-protective regulation.
If one takes the Court's historical cautionary seriously and examines the
incidence and structure of fetal-protective regulation with a critical eye, the
lessons of Johnson Controls can be applied outside the employment context.
As Johnson Controls clearly illustrates, regulators may adopt particular
means for protecting unborn life because social assumptions about the ma-
ternal role lead them to underestimate the impact of the regulation on
women-a tendency that frequently can be detected in the justifications
courts have offered for compelling women to submit to caesarian delivery or
other physically invasive procedures for the benefit of the unborn.330 When
justifications for regulating women on behalf of the unborn ignore, devalue,
or discount the significance ofwomen's work, liberty, or judgment in matters
of motherhood, they reflect persisting status-based assumptions about the
duties of motherhood. The impositions of fetal-protective regulation will be
invisible, or appear "reasonable," precisely to the extent they conform to
social expectations concerning the maternal role.331
of the BFOQ defense. See note 321 supra. Therefore, the Court's holding that protecting employee
offspring is not essential to the operations of a business means only that such an objective is not a
sufficient reason for limiting women's employment opportunities under Title VII. After Johnson
Controls, businesses are still free to adopt gender-neutral policies that reduce the risk of harm to
unborn employee offspring; indeed, they are subject to federal and state laws requiring them to do so.
The Court's holding in Johnson Controls merely deprived them of one method of protecting con-
ceived and yet-to-be-conceived fetuses: They cannot pursue this end by excluding pregnant or fertile
women from the workplace.
The same policy concerns informing the Court's interpretation ofthe BFOQ standard inform its
interpretation of the PDA. The Court emphasized that Congress adopted the PDA's "ability to
work" standard to repudiate traditional business practices which excluded women from employment
for reasons associated with their reproductive role. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206-07; see
also id. at 1210 (quoted at text accompanying note 327 supra).
330. Courts have applied the doctrine that parents may not refuse needed medical treatment
for their children to the case of a pregnant woman refusing physically invasive therapy for the un-
born life she bears. See In re A.C. 533 A.2d 611, 616 (D.C. App. 1987) (discussing precedents),
vacated en bane, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990). This reasoning gives no weight to the fact that
the procedure in question requires cutting open the parent refusing treatment. For the most part,
courts have not identified as a relevant analogical inquirY whether parents (or other family members)
can be forced by the state to submit to physically invasive medical procedures for the benefit of born
children. But cf. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44 (after judge ordered caesarian delivery that may
have contributed to the death of a pregnant cancer patient, the reviewing court vacated opinion,
observing that "courts do not compel one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his or her
bodily integrity for the benefit of another person's health"). For an account of how courts under-
value women's interest in bodily integrity in such cases, see Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's
Silence in Law: The Dilemma ofthe Gendered Nature ofLegal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
886, 901 (1989).
331. For example, some proponents of fetal-protective regulation argue that the pregnant
woman who chooses not to obtain an abortion assumes a duty to act in the best interest of the
unborn life she bears. See, e.g., United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. Rptr. 441, 442 (D.C. Sup.
Ct. 1989); McNulty, supra note 298, at 291-92 & n.91; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and
the Control ofConception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 438 (1983) ("The mother
has, if she conceives and chooses not to abort, a legal and moral duty to bring the child into the
world as healthy as is reasonably possible . . • . [O]nce the mother decides not to terminate the
pregnancy, the viable fetus acquires rights to have the mother conduct her life in ways that will not
injure it.") (footnote omitted); cf. Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs. supra note 6, at 191-93 (discuss-
ing the wide variety of daily activities affected by this duty). Even if a woman's failure to obtain an
abortion can be construed as an affirmative choice to continue the pregnancy, it does not follow from
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Similarly, assumptions about women's special responsibilities as mothers
may produce regulatory strategies that single out the conduct of pregnant
women for intensive social scrutiny. Women's unique physical role in repro-
duction identifies them as special conduits of harm to children so that preg-
nant women appear as a threat to the unborn life they are gestating-
sometimes the only threat to children's welfare. Thus, many states now re-
quire liquor sellers to post signs warning pregnant women not to drink, yet
do not require liquor sellers to warn men (or women) of the vast array of
other harms that their drinking may pose to family members and strangers
alike.332 Here, as in Johnson Controls, selective regulation of women's con-
duct is justified on the grounds that pregnant women have a unique physical
capacity to harm children, when the regulation may in fact reflect the view
that pregnant women have a unique social obligation to protect children.
This would seem to explain why pregnant women have been forced to sub-
mit to surgery for the fetus in utero, when family members are not required
to submit to surgery for each other's benefit;333 or why regulators have pros-
ecuted women for acts of fetal neglect while ignoring the conduct of hus-
bands who batter them during pregnancy.334 In these and other cases,
this choice alone that she assumes an obligation to "conduct her life" in ways that serve the interests
of the unborn. Imposing this duty on the pregnant woman seems reasonable because we assume that
mothers should live "for" their children; the argument acquires its persuasive force from unarticu-
lated assumptions about the maternal role. See, e.g., note 333 infra (forced surgery); cf. Stallman v.
Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 273-80 (1988) (rejecting negligence claim asserted by child against
mother for acts she took during pregnancy on the grounds that the claim reflects stereotypical views
of women's roles). Concepts of consent have long been used to justify laws enforcing gender status
roles. See note 362 infra and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.3871 (1990); 1991 N.Y. Laws, ch. 57. Drinking by pregnant
women, in amounts which are as yet undetermined, may cause fetal alcohol syndrome. New re-
search suggests that drinking may also cause male-mediated reproductive harms. See text accompa-
nying note 311 supra. But one need not credit this evidence to discern the selective bias of alcohol
warning statutes. Alcohol causes a range of social problems more prevalent than fetal alcohol syn-
drome, such as traffic accidents, economic deprivation, and diverse forms of neglect, abuse, and
violence.
The Assembly sponsor of New York's alcohol warning statute, John Brian Murtaugh, justified
that state's decision to warn only pregnant women of the dangers of drinking on the grounds that
pregnant women have a "special responsibility." Kevin Sack, Unlikely Union in Albany: Feminists
and Liquor Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at Bl. "'There certainly are other alcohol-related
problems you could talk about,' " Murtaugh observed, "'[b]ut ifyou put all of them on a poster you
would dilute the message.''' Id.
333. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44 (doctors must obtain patient's informed consent to
perform surgery; similarly, they must obtain consent to perform an operation on one family member
that will save the life or health of another, such as skin grafts or bone marrow transplants); see also
note 330 supra.
A latent premise of the forced surgery cases seems to be that a normal mother would do any-
thing for her children, and if she does not, can be made to. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1257 n.7
(Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The vast majority of women will accept
significant risk, pain, and inconvenience to give their babies the best chance possible. One obstetri-
cian who performs innovative fetal surgery stated that most of the women he sees 'would cut off their
heads to save their babies.''') (quoting Rhoden, supra note 280, at 1959); In re A.C., 573 A.2d at
1251 n.21 ("the welfare of the fetus is of the utmost importance to the majority of women; thus only
rarely will a conflict arise") (citations omitted).
334. In two recent cases in which pregnant women were prosecuted for fetal abuse, the women
involved appear to have been battered by their husbands during their pregnancies. See Johnsen,
From Driving to Drugs, supra note 6, at 210 ("Ms. Stewart may have been a battered woman; the
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mothers are held to higher standards of self-subordinating conduct than fa-
thers; women's breach of these exacting standards excites social rage in ways
that men's breach of lesser standards does not. Thus, men may abandon
children they "father," failing to participate in their care or economic sup-
port in a fashion that compromises a child's welfare just as surely as any act
of maternal neglect, yet their conduct does not elicit communal retribution
of the sort faced by pregnant women judged neglectful today.335
There are other types of selectivity evident in fetal-protection policies,
which often single out for regulation certain groups of women who may de-
viate from cultural expectations of "normal mothers." For example, fetal-
hazards exclusions have been directed at women in male-dominated sectors
of the work force, although reproductive toxins are not limited to those areas
of the work force.336 Hospitals have adopted automatic drug testing proce-
dures for pregnant women who receive public assistance or lack prenatal
police were called ten to fifteen times over one year to respond to violence directed at Ms. Stewart
and her mother-in-law by Mr. Stewart."); Lewin, supra note 281, at A14:
[A] Wyoming judge dismissed child abuse charges against Diane Pfannenstiel, a pregnant
29-year-old who had gone to the police to report that she had been beaten by her husband.
She then went to the hospital emergency room for treatment, but was arrested there and
charged with abusing her unborn child by being intoxicated. The judge dismissed the
charges because, he said, no harm to the fetus had been shown.
335. For example, in United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 441 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1989), ajudge incarcerated a pregnant woman who was before him on misdemeanor forgery charges,
for the duration of her pregnancy when he discovered that she had been using cocaine. When she
became eligible for release under an emergency overcrowding order, the judge still insisted on detain-
ing her, offering this physiological justification for his gender-selective sentencing practices:
It is true that defendant has not been treated as if she were a man in this case. But
then a man who is a convicted rapist is treated differently from a woman. She has also not
been treated the same as a nonpregnant woman. But Ms. Vaughn became pregnant and
chose to bear the baby who, like most criminal defendants the court sees so frequently, will
start life with one other severe strike against it-no father is around. Arguably Ms.
Vaughn should have demonstrated even greater responsibility toward her child.
Id. at 447. As the comparison ofVaughn to "a man who is a convicted rapist" suggests, the jUdge is
"horrified," id., at Vaughn's conduct. Here and elsewhere he openly chastises Vaughn, blaming her
for her addiction, her failure to obtain an abortion, and for the fact that she has been abandoned by
the father of her child. The judge seems more "horrified" at Vaughn's breach of maternal conduct
than concerned for her fetus, bluntly expressing indifference to whether incarcerating a pregnant
woman in an overcrowded prison will in fact promote the welfare of the unborn life she bears. See
id. ("It is ironic for her to complain she is unable to get the [nutrition] she craves while pregnant in
jail when her real craving is a devastating drug."); cf Loren Stein & Veronique Mistiaen, Pregnant in
Prison, THE PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1988, at 18 (advocates for incarcerated pregnant women complain
that the women receive grossly inadequate medical care, receive little exercise or fresh air, eat
poorly, and are crowded into unsanitary cells, with the result that their miscarriage rates are su~
stantially higher than normal; miscarriage rates are even higher for drug dependent women who are
forced to detoxify by incarceration).
If the purpose of incarceration is not to protect the particular fetus the pregnant woman is
carrying, but instead is to punish, deter, or rehabilitate the substance-dependent pregnant woman,
any physiological justifications for this court's gender-selective sentencing practices would seem to
be weak at best. Men who are addicted to drugs or alcohol, or who abandon their children, also pose
grave risks to their children's physical, emotional, and material welfare, but nowhere in the Vaughn
opinion does the judge indicate that he considers men's parental conduct in sentencing for unrelated
crimes.
336. See Becker, supra note 282, at 1237-40. One can explain this discrepancy in either of two
ways: employers saw their employees as engaging in acts contrary to the maternal role when they
were working in areas of the industrial sector traditionally dominated by men, id., or, employers
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care, although drug use is by no means limited to the poorer classes of soci-
ety.337 Along similar lines, accumulating evidence suggests that prosecu-
tions of drug-dependent pregnant women have focused on women of color in
rates disproportionate to their presence in the population or propensity for
drug use.338 Where the class of women targeted for regulation is defined by
criteria associated with norms of gender, race, or class, it is all the more
likely that fetal-protection policy reflects tacit assumptions about the women
whose conduct is regulated, rather than simple solicitude for the welfare of
future generations. Openly normative judgments about women's maternal
conduct that purport to rest on standards which are neutral with respect to
matters of gender, race, and class may instead rest on unexamined normative
assumptions about the group of women selected for regulation; these same
assumptions may tacitly influence the means chosen to protect the unborn.
Would this society so readily contemplate criminal prosecution, "protective"
incarceration, or custody-deprivation as responses to maternal addiction if
the policies were to be applied to privileged women rather than the poor?339
Examining the structure of fetal-protective regulation in light of its social
incidence may reveal that regulators are deeply contemptuous of women
whom they judge to have violated the maternal role,34O or, as Dorothy Rob-
erts has argued, it may even reveal that those engaged in regulating the con-
duct of poor women (especially poor women of color) are hostile toward
them because they are bearing children.341 In other words, today as in the
past, judgments about motherhood in this society are delineated by class and .
race, as well as by sex.
judged it contrary to their self-interest to bar fertile women from working in predominantly female
sectors of the workforce because it would raise the marginal cost of labor.
337. See Moss, supra note 281, at 294; Roberts, supra note 301, at 1432-33.
338. See note 301 supra.
339. Cf Strauss, supra note 313, at 956-57 ("reversing-the-groups" test). Examining the his-
tory of public welfare programs, Dorothy Roberts observes that "[t]he state has .•• been more
willing to intrude upon the autonomy of poor Black families, and in particular of Black mothers,
while protecting the integrity of white middle-class homes." Roberts, supra note 301, at 1441.
340. Proponents of fetal-protective regulation often exhibit extraordinary regard for the wel-
fare of children and a striking lack of regard for the welfare of the women who bear them. See, e.g.,
Hoffman, supra note 285, at 34 (" 'If the mother wants to smoke crack and kill herself, I don't care,'
[said a police sergeant], " 'Let her die, but don't take that poor baby ....lith her.' ").
341. Public officials have adopted coercive policies to regulate a class of women who are gener-
ally not provided access to adequate prenatal care and drug treatment programs. See note 281
supra; note 344 infra. Nor is it clear that these policies actually redound to the benefit of children.
See note 347 infra. Dorothy Roberts argues that current modes of regulating drug-dependent
women should be analyzed as punishing women of subordinate social classes for having babies. See
Roberts, note 301 supra, at 1445-50; id. at 1445 ("it is the choice ofcarrying a pregnancy to term that
is being penalized"). Some advocates of fetal-protective regulation do in fact argue that the pregnant
woman has assumed the duties, burdens, and penalties they would inflict on her because she has
failed to obtain an abortion. See note 331 supra. Considered from this perspective, fetal-protective
regulation can be understood as providing incentives for abortion, which at least some of its propo-
nents may intend as a matter of conscious design.
Thus, some interest in fetal-protective regulation may reflect anxiety about underclass women
reproducing, cf text accompanying notes 137-145 supra (related concerns in the nineteenth century);
Roberts, note 301 supra, at 1442-44 (discussing sterilization of women of color), while some regula-
tion may reflect animus towards underclass women themselves, see id. at 1441 (discussing "stereo-
types that blame Black mothers for the problems of the Black family"); note 340 supra.
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If one considers the variety of methods the state has at its disposal to
promote the welfare of the unborn, it is easier to appreciate the substantial
role that judgments about women play in defining the incidence and struc-
ture of fetal-protective regulation. The state can promote the welfare of the
unborn in many ways-by means that subject women to state coercion in
their capacity as mothers, or by means that support women in their efforts to
bear and raise a healthy child. Supportive intervention may take various
forms. For example, poverty contributes to this nation's unacceptably high
infant mortality rates.342 Thus, a state may take measures reducing the ef-
fects of poverty on infant mortality, many of which may be sex-neutral.343
Or, the state may employ sex-specific means, such as providing pregnant
women with food and access to prenatal education and health care.344 Al-
ternatively, a state seeking to promote the welfare of the unborn may employ
coercive sex-specific means. Prominent examples include forcing women to
bear a child they do not want, compelling them to submit to physically inva-
sive surgery on behalf of the unborn, or punishing them when they do not
lead their lives in a fashion the state believes will enhance the physical wel-
fare of the embryo/fetus.
In considering these alternative approaches to promoting the welfare of
the unborn, it is important to observe that one policy goal can often be se-
cured by diverse means. A state wishing to reduce the exposure of the un-
342. Bach year in the United States nearly 40,000 babies die before reaching their first birth-
day. Robert Pear, 19 Cities Listed jOr Aid to Cut Infant Mortality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1991, at
AID. The U.S. ranks eighteenth in the world in infant mortality; and the infant mortality rate in
inner cities and the South is worse than that in such developing countries as Cuba, Costa Rica, and
Panama. Helen M. Wallace, Infant Mortality, in MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH PRACTICES 411,
412 (Helen M. Wallace, George Ryan, Jr. & Allen C. Oglesby eds., 3d ed. 1988); Julie Johnson,
Congress Shows Signs ofSpending to Fight Infant Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1989, at E4.
Poverty status is the single strongest predictor ofan infant's life prospects. The infant mortality
rate among infants born to poor families is 1.5 to 3 times that of infants born to non-poor families.
William S. Nersesian, Infant Mortality in Socially Vulnerable Populations, 9 ANN. REv. OF PUB.
HEALTH 361, 365 (1988). Poverty and minority status are the major risk factors for low birth
weight infants as well. Id. at 368. For example, babies born in Central Harlem are four times more
likely to have very low birth weight than babies born in more prosperous New York neighborhoods.
Elizabeth Rosenthal, Health Problems ofInner City Poor Reach Crisis Point; Illness Rates Skyrocket,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1990, at AI, A9. Low birth weight is a major determinant of infant mortality
in the U.S.; half of all infant deaths in the first year of life occur among low birth weight infants.
Dorothy C. Howze, The Black Infant Mortality Rate: An Unequal ChancejOr Life, 9 URB. LEAGUE
REv. 20, 21 (1985-1986). Low birth weight babies who survive also have an increased risk for a
range of health problems, including neurodevelopmental handicaps, congenital.anomalies, mental
retardation, blindness, autism, and growth and development problems. Id.; COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE PREVENTION OF Low BIRTHWEIGHT, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PREVENTING Low
BIRTHWEIGHT 6-8 (1985).
343. Given the consistent correlation between community wealth and infant mortality and
morbidity, see note 342 supra, any strategy of economic revitalization that targets an impoverished
community will improve the life prospects of its offspring.
344. Presently, adequate maternity care is largely unavailable for poor or uninsured women.
For example, in Los Angeles County, patients who use public clinics must wait as long as 19 weeks
after requesting an appointment to get one. Fourteen of 58 counties in California have no state or
federally funded clinic offering prenatal care, and 26 counties have so few obstetrics providers for the
poor that pregnant women on public health insurance have virtually no access to services. Moss,
supra note 285, at 1412. Similarly, in inner city clinics in New York, the typical wait to schedule a
pediatric appointment is several months. Rosenthal, supra note 342, at A16.
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born to cocaine may offer drug-dependent pregnant women a place in a drug
treatment program-or it may incarcerate any drug-dependent pregnant
woman who comes to the attention of public health authorities and deprive
women of child custody when their newborns test positive for drugs. State
actors wishing to reduce the exposure of the unborn to lead can eliminate
lead-based paint from the walls of public housing, implement requirements
or incentives for similar treatment of private dwellings, and improve regula-
tions governing auto emissions and employee exposure to toxic conditions in
the workplace.34s Or, the state can pursue this same end by excluding (or
permitting the exclusion of) fertile women from any job that presents a risk
of lead exposure. In short, some strategies of fetal-protection impose the
costs of protecting unborn life solely on women, while others distribute them
across the community as a whole; some strategies control and punish women
in their capacities as mothers, while others empower and assist women in
their efforts to bear and rear healthy children. Various means of promoting
the welfare of the unborn reflect dramatically different views of women, and
have dramatically different effects on women's lives.
Absent careful scrutiny of regulatory judgments, unexamined assump-
tions about women's obligations as mothers will inevitably inform actions
undertaken on behalf of the unborn. Given the profoundly gendered con-
cerns that fetal-protective regulation implicates and the race and class status
of the women at whom it is often directed,346 it seems altogether likely that
fetal-protective regulation will assume coercive and punitive rather than sup-
portive and facilitative forms-for reasons ultimately having nothing to do
with the welfare of children or the physiology of reproduction. Regulators
seeking to protect the unborn will impose extraordinary restraints on the
lives of pregnant women without determining whether their actions in fact
serve the welfare of children or are consistent with normal modes of regulat-
ing parental conduct.347 In these and other ways, they will burden women
345. Although Congress banned residential use of lead paint more than a decade ago, studies
estimate that nearly 900,000 units of public housing, and some 40 million units of private housing,
still have lead-based paint. William E. Schmidt, Lead Paint Poisons Children Despite 1971 Law on
Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at AI, A20. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development reports that 20 million homes have excessive lead dust, peeling paint, or chippings, and
3.8 million of those homes are inhabited by children under the age of7. Steven Waldman, Lead and
Your Kids, NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1991, at 42,44,48. In urban areas, the problem is aggravated by
emissions from automotive and industrial sources. One public health report indicates that 55% of
poor, black, urban children under the age of 6 have elevated levels of lead in their blood. Schmidt,
supra, at AI. Adults living in these environments are exposed to lead as well, in ways that can affect
the health of offspring they bear. See Waldman, supra, at 47-48.
346. See note 301 supra.
347. Subjecting pregnant, drug-dependent women to "protective" incarceration and depriving
women ofchild custody when their newborns test positive for drug-exposure, see note 281 supra, are
often characterized as policies of fetal-protection, but it is not clear that such policies promote the
welfare of children. Both regulatory responses quite predictably drive poor women out of a public
health care system already grossly inadequate in providing normal prenatal care, cf. note 344 supra,
and even the most minimal forms of drug treatment for pregnant women, cf. note 281 supra. In
addition, incarcerating women presents substantial risks to any pregnancy, especially if it is high-
risk, as those of drug-dependent women generally are. Cf. note 335 supra. Custody deprivation
dismantles families and communities, injecting large numbers of children into an overburdened fos-
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as they would not men, and burden poor women as they would not those of
means. Whether considering restrictions on women's employment or re-
strictions on abortion, they will underestimate the impact of fetal-protective
regulation on women's lives, and offer physiological justifications for impos-
ing costs on women that the community is in fact capable of sharing. They
may well be tempted to single out women, especially the most vulnerable
women in the community, for symbolic acts of control or punishment that
demonstrate a concern for children's welfare, because controlling and pun-
ishing women is cheaper and easier than actually doing something substan-
tial to improve children's welfare. One need not take the position that
women are entitled to immunity in their conduct during pregnancy to de-
mand that fetal-protective regulation be subject to the kind of scrutiny that
will ensure it is the product of rational and responsible social deliberation.
For this reason, review of fetal-protective regulation must proceed in a fash-
ion that is attentive to its social incidence, animus, and impositions.
When the state imposes duties of motherhood on pregnant women, it
employs public power to enforce a gender status role. Only by evaluating
the burdens and obligations it imposes on women in a framework attentive
to the social organization of reproduction, and not simply physical facts con-
cerning gestation, can the constitutional legitimacy offetal-protective regula-
tion be determined. It is from this standpoint that I now tum to reconsider
the constitutional question of abortion.
IV. REVISITING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION OF ABORTION
[T]he fetus in utero has become a metaphor for "man" in space, floating
free, attached only by the umbilical cord to the spaceship. But where is the
mother in that metaphor? She has become empty space.348
-Barbara Katz Rothman (1986)
Did [man] ever take in the idea that to the mother of the race, and to her
alone, belonged the right to say when a new being should be brought into
the world? Has he, in the gratification of his blind passions, ever paused to
think whether it was with joy and gladness that she gave up ten or twenty
years of the heyday of her existence to all the cares and sufferings of exces-
ter care system, where they may endure intermittent and transient placements for years. Both forms
of regulation appear to be relatively effective methods of punishing women and relatively dysfunc-
tional methods of protecting children. In fact, some public officials are now beginning to concede
that policies separating mother and child do not ultimately redound to the welfare of children. For
example, both New York and Los Angeles are now experimenting with rehabilitating addicted
mothers rather than separating them from their children. See Joseph B. Treaster, Plan Lets Addicted
Mothers Take Their Newborns Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at Al (New York officials note
that cost ofintensive counseling for mother is far cheaper than foster care, and that this arrangement
is better for the child and the family); James Willwerth, Should We Take Away Their Kids?, TIME,
May 13, 1991, at 62, 63.
If incarceration and custody-deprivation are in fact maternal-punitive, rather than fetal-protec-
tive, then they demand careful evaluation in light of normal modes of regulating parental conduct.
Cf note 335 supra; Robin-Vergeer, supra note 281, at 759-60.
348. B.K. ROTHMAN, supra note 267, at 114.
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-Elizabeth Cady Stanton (l855)
For all the genuine empathy for women the Supreme Court brought to
its decision to protect the abortion right in Roe v. Wade,350 the opinion rea-
sons about the regulation of abortion within the premises of the legal regime
it repudiated. Roe never recognizes the possibility that a state's decision to
restrict access to abortion might reflect traditional assumptions about
women's roles, or that such a law might enforce or aggravate inequalities in
the status of the sexes. These possibilities are obscured by the physiological
framework in which the Court analyzed the constitutionality of abortion-
restrictive regulation.
Roe in fact derives the state's interests in regulating abortion from the
history and traditions associated with its criminalization, and defines the cir-
cumstances in which the state can restrict abortion in a framework based on
medical facts about gestation.351 Within this framework, Roe analyzes the
state's interest in restricting access to abortion as a benign exercise of state
power for the unborn, and not as a coercive exercise of power against
women. Though the Court did explain why a woman had a constitutionally
protected interest in terminating a pregnancy, the Court never analyzed the
exercise of state power involved in compelling women to continue a preg-
nancy: It never examined the "state's interest in potential life" as an interest
in forcing women to bear children or as a warrant to expropriate from
women the labor necessary to make "potential life" into a person. Because
the Court never analyzed the state's interest in protecting unborn life as an
interest in forcing women to perform the work of motherhood, it opened the
way for its critics to discuss the "interest in potential life" as a constitution-
ally benign regulatory interest,352 which Roe had subjected to unreasonable,
inappropriate, or illogical restraints.353 At the same time, the Court left
women who sought to defend Roe in an untenable spot: To defend Roe, they
disparaged the significance of unborn life, when they in fact objected to the
349. Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Dec. 21, 1855), reprinted in 1 HIS-
TORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 186, at 839, 840.
350. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
351. ld. at 148-52.
352. Cf. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793
(1986) (White. J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems apparent to me that a free, egalitarian. and democratic
society does not presuppose any particular rule or set of rules with respect to abortion.").
353. Cf. id. at 795 (White, J., dissenting) ("The State's interest is in the fetus as an entity in
itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of viability under conventional
medical wisdom. Accordingly, the State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling
before viability.") (footnote omitted); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458,
(1983) (O'Connor, J.• dissenting) ("The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with
itself. . .. As medical science becomes better able to provide for ~he separate existence of the fetus,
the point of viability is moved further back toward conception."); id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("[PJotential life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or
afterward. . .. The choice of viability as the point at which the state interest inpotential life becomes
compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or any point afterward.");
Ely, supra note 2, at 926 ("Dogs are not 'persons in the whole sense' nor have they constitutional
rights, but that does not mean the state cannot prohibit killing them.").
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"interest in potential life" as a regulatory interest in controlling their bodies
and lives.
Only in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists,354 some thirteen years after Roe, did the Court begin to address the
constitutional question in terms that broke sufficiently with Roe's physiolog-
ical framework to situate the abortion decision and its regulation within a
larger social context. Surveying the abortion legislation enacted and re-
viewed since Roe, Justice Blackmun began to analyze abortion-restrictive
regulation as a coercive exercise of power against women: "The States are
not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to
intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."355 And in concluding its
opinion in Thornburgh, the Court asserted for the first time that state regula-
tion of abortion posed issues of equality for women.356 Yet despite the inti-
mations of a new analytic framework that appear in Thornburgh, the Court
never broke sufficiently from Roe's reasoning to elaborate upon them. The
Court's o,Pinion in Thornburgh does not explain what might be constitution-
ally problematic about using state power "to intimidate women into continu-
ing pregnancies,"357 or why depriving women of choice in matters of
abortion would "protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty
that our law guarantees equally to all."358 No opinion addressed these ques-
tions until Justice Blackmun penned his angry dissent in Webster, describing
abortion regulation as a matter of sex equality for women359-raising issues
which, for the most part, the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist
chose to overlook.360
354. 476 U.s. 747 (1986).
355. Id. at 759. At several points in the opinion, the Court described ways in which abortion
restrictions can involve abuse ofpublic power and problems ofsexual imposition. See, e.g., id. at 762
(pennsylvania's mandated informed consent dialogue "is not medical information that is always
relevant to the woman's decision, and it may serve only to confuse and punish her and to heighten
her anxiety, contrary to accepted medical practice") (footnote omitted); id. at 767 ("Pennsylvania's
reporting requirements raise the specter of public exposure and harassment of women who choose to
exercise their personal, intensely private, right, with their physician, to end a pregnancy.").
356. Id. at 772 ("Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise
that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of govern-
ment. That promise extends to women as well as men.") (citations omitted).
357. Id. at 759.
358. Id. at 772-
359. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women
who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided."). Only in Justice Black-
mun's dissent is the social significance of the abortion decision described as "vital to the full partici-
pation of women in the economic and political walks of American life,'" id. at 557; only in this
dissenting opinion is state action restricting abortion analyzed as a use of power against women and
not merely for the benefit of the unborn-as regulation designed to "conscript a woman's body and
to force upon her a 'distressful life and future,'" id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 116, 153
(1973)).
360. Cf. id. at 521 (plurality opinion)
[The dissent's] suggestion ... that legislative bodies, in a Nation where more than half of
our population is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact abortion
regulation reminiscent of the dark ages not only misreads our views but does scant justice
to those who serve in such bodies and the people who elect them.
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To determine the constitutionality of abortion-restrictive regulation, it is
necessary to evaluate a particular exercise of state power against women.
An individual woman deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy will evalu-
ate the morality of that act in light of her obligations to herself and others,
including the unborn, if she conceptualizes the embryo/fetus as separate
from herself.361 By contrast, a community deciding whether to adopt legis-
lation restricting abortion must confront a question that she does not:
whether it is appropriate to use state force against women to compel them to
continue a pregnancy they otherwise would terminate. This question is often
absent from deliberations about the morality or constitutionality of abortion-
restrictive regulation, which are too often conducted as recapitulations of the
decisional process in which an individual woman might engage. None of the
Court's opinions since Roe has devoted serious consideration to this ques-
tion. Does the Constitution allow the state to force women to bear children?
Abortion-restrictive regulation is state action compelling pregnancy and
motherhood, and this simple fact cannot be evaded by invoking nature or a
woman's choices to explain the situation in which the pregnant woman sub-
ject to abortion restrictions finds herself. A pregnant woman seeking an
abortion has the practical capacity to terminate a pregnancy, which she
would exercise but for the community's decision to prevent or deter her. If
the community successfully effectuates its will, it is the state, and not nature,
which is responsible for causing her to continue the pregnancy. Similarly, a
woman's choice to engage in sexual relations is no longer significant as a
cause of pregnancy, if she would terminate that pregnancy, but for the inter-
position of communal force. A woman's "choice" to engage in (protected or
unprotected) sex may be relevant to the state's justifications for enacting
abortion-restrictive regulation, but it does not absolve the state from respon-
sibility for compelling the pregnancy of a woman it prevents from obtaining
an abortion. Indeed, ifnature or a woman's "choices" playa prominent role
in the state'sjustifications for imposing motherhood upon her, such explana-
tions will obscure the fact that the state's decision to enact abortion restric-
tions rests on social judgments about the pregnant woman, just as they
obscure the fact that such restrictions are an act of communal force against
her. The significant role that arguments about women's nature and choices
have played in rationalizing abortion-restrictive regulation, today and in the
past,362 should raise suspicions about them: Both types of explanations ex-
361. For an examination of the types of moral reasoning underlying women's decisions about
whether to terminate a pregnancy, see C. GILLIGAN, supra note 276, at 64-105. For one elaboration
of a feminist morality bearing on the practice of abortion, see R.P. PETCHESKY, supra note 15, at
330-60.
362. Consent-based arguments have long been used to justify gender status laws. For centu-
ries, they were invoked to justify the disabilities imposed on a wife by the marriage contract. So, for
example, a husband could not rape his wife because in consenting to marriage, she consented to sex.
See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 164, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (1984)
("Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse
has been cited most frequently in support of the marital [rape] exemption."), cert. denied. 471 U.S.
1020 (1985). Consistent with this tradition. claims of marital consent played a role in nineteenth
century arguments against abortion. See D.H., supra note 134. at 201:
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press normative judgments about women, and do not eliminate the task of
analyzing abortion-restrictive regulation as an act of state force against
women.
When abortion-restrictive regulation is analyzed as state action compel-
ling motherhood, it presents equal protection concerns that Roe's physiolog-
ical reasoning obscures, concerns that can and should be identified more
precisely than the Court described them in Thornburgh. Along with a grow-
ing number of commentators,363 I would like to explore this equality claim
as the Court has not. Constitutional analysis of abortion-restrictive regula-
tion need not be confined to an equal protection framework,364 but the his-
tory of such regulation suggests important reasons why such an inquiry
should be an integral part of any constitutional review.
A. Equal Protection Analysis: Some Preliminaries
Since its decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation,365 the Court has em-
ployed the Equal Protection Clause to analyze class- or caste-based legisla-
tion, including caste-based regulation of women's conduct.366 From a
historical perspective it is clear that abortion-restrictive regulation is caste
legislation, a traditional mode of regulating women's conduct, concerned
with compelling them to perform the work that has traditionally defined
their subordinate social role and status. From a historical perspective, it is
also clear that this society's reasons for enacting restrictions on abortion
have been deeply entangled in its conceptions of women as mothers. In the
Ifyou are not willing to accept the cares, labors, responsibilities, and duties, ofmarried life,
why did you enter into that state? You were not forced into it; but you voluntarily and
deliberately assumed that relation, and now you have no right to attempt to escape from
what you knew beforehand is one of its most natural consequences, and a duty you tacitly
promised the State.
Cf. notes 181, 184-185 & 193-195 supra and accompanying texts (nineteenth century physicians and
feminists discussing abortion in the context of marital rape).
Today, proponents of abortion-restrictive regulation locate a woman's putative act of consent,
not in her decision to marry, but in her decision to have sex. See text accompanying notes 402-403 &
413 infra. They argue that the pregnant woman has a duty to bear children because she has chosen
to have sex, just as some proponents of fetal-protective regulation argue that the pregnant woman
has a duty to conduct her life in ways that serve the interests of the unborn because she has chosen
not to have an abortion. See note 331 supra.
Arguments that derive duties of motherhood from women's choices acquire much of their per-
suasive force from traditional assumptions about women's obligations as mothers; these status obli-
gations seem to be duties women voluntarily assume so long as some act of choice can be found to
support the claim. For an analysis of the argument that women's choice to have sex justifies forcing
them to bear children, see note 403 infra. For a general discussion of consent-based derivations of
gender status norms, see c. PATEMAN, supra note 290.
363. See note 5 supra.
364. Abortion-restrictive regulation entails an extraordinarily invasive exercise of state power;
its impositions are sufficiently diverse in their impact on women's lives that they can, in fact, be
registered across several bodies of constitutional jurisprudence: as a problem of privacy, takings,
punishment, servitude, or equal protection. See note 367 infra.
365. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
366. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based legislation is subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (quoted at
note 369 infra).
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nineteenth century, the physicians' arguments against abortion depended en-
tirely on the fact that the state was regulating women-women's bodies,
women's work, women's roles. It was in this framework that fetal life-saving
by compelled pregnancy seemed reasonable. The same, I believe, is true in
the present. Given the centrality of sex in defining the objects, impositions,
and justifications for abortion-restrictive regulation, it is crucial to analyze
restrictions on abortion from the standpoint of equal protection commit-
ments, whether as a primary or complementary focus of constitutional re-
view. Equal protection doctrine is the only body of constitutional
jurisprudence explicitly skeptical about the rationality of gender-based judg-
ments and specifically concerned with the justice of gender-based
impositions.367
There are obvious doctrinal impediments to applying equal protection
concepts to abortion-restrictive regulation. As this article has explored in
some detail, the Equal Protection Clause as currently construed imposes vir-
tually no restraints on state regulation of women's reproductive lives. To-
gether, the Court's physiological view of reproduction and its formal
conceptualization of equality and discrimination present formidable obsta-
cles to equal protection analysis of restrictions on abortion.368 Yet, analyzed
367. It is in this respect that equal protection analysis of abortion-restrictive regulation differs
from review under other bodies of constitutional jurisprudence. Nonetheless, it may well be entirely
compatible with them. Equal protection and other constitutional arguments against abortion-re-
strictive regulation focus, as Roe did not, on the particular use ofstate power entailed in compelling
motherhood.
For example, Jed Rubenfeld defines the right to privacy as "the fundamental freedom not to
have one's life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state." Rubenfeld, supra
note 5, at 784. From this perspective, the constitutionally offensive aspect of antiabortion laws is
that they "produce motherhood: they take diverse women with every variety ofcareer, life-plan, and
so on, and make mothers of them all." ld. at 788. Similarly, commentators analyzing abortion-
restrictive regulation from a Thirteenth Amendment perspective have emphasized that "[s]uch laws
violate the Amendment's guarantee of equality, because forcing women to be mothers makes them
into a servant caste, a group which, by virtue of a status of birth, is held subject to a special duty to
serve others and not themselves." Koppelman, supra note 5, at 484; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 5,
§ 15-10, at 1354 ("more than a play on words links [a woman's] forced labor with the concept of
involuntary servitude"); cf. Regan, supra note 5, at 1619 (compelled pregnancy offends the "non-
subordination value ... at the core of the thirteenth amendment," and conflicts with an Eighth
Amendment interest in "freedom from physical invasion or imposed physical pain or hardship").
What these arguments from privacy, Thirteenth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence share in
common with arguments rooted in equal protection values is a concern about the way restrictions on
abortion employ public power against women to define and organize their lives.
Unlike arguments premised on other constitutional protections, however, an equal protection
analysis ofabortion laws will explore these concerns within a body ofdoctrine attentive to the risk of
bias in public judgments about and impositions upon women. Because equal protection doctrine
recognizes that women's secondary social status has long been enforced and jnstified through the
institution of motherhood, it offers a doctrinal framework to ensure that when state actors make
judgments about imposing maternal obligations on women, their reasoning is not distorted by stere-
otypical assumptions about women.
368. The Court has upheld reprOductive regulation against equal protection challenge by a
series of formal arguments that insulate it from the weight of concerns and commitments equal
protection doctrine otherwise embodies. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), held that state
regulation of pregnancy is not sex-based because such regulation does not categorically differentiate
the class of women from the class of men. At the same time, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981), the Court suggested that state regulation of pregnancy cannot discriminate on the
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in historical perspective, it is clear that restrictions on abortion are deeply at
odds with the values and commitments informing constitutional guarantees
of equal protection.
Two clusters of values define the branch of equal protection jurispru-
dence concerned with state action directed at politically insular or under-
represented groups. Antidiscrimination values are concerned with the
reasoning of state actors, prohibiting them from acting on the basis of preju-
dicial or traditional habits of thought that deny the full humanity, individual
worth, or dignity of members ofparticular social groups. Antisubordination
values are concerned with the material and dignitary injuries inflicted on
members of particular social groups by public actions premised on such prej-
udicial habits of thought. Both sets of values find expression in equal protec-
tion doctrine,369 but in differing degrees. While the case law is rich with
diverse expressions of antisubordination values, the "mediating" principles
of the Equal Protection Clause are cast in antidiscrimination terms, demand-
ing heightened scrutiny of state action directed at certain protected groups
to ensure it is free of prejudicial or stereotypical modes of reasoning about
them.370 Doctrine is thus most visibly concerned with analyzing the judg-
ments of public decisionmakers adopting class-based regulation, and less vis-
ibly concerned with analyzing the impact of such regulation on the members
of social groups at whom it is directed.371
basis of sex-because such regulation pertains to a real and categorical difference between the sexes.
See text accompanying notes 16-37 supra.
369. The doctrine of suspect classifications reflects both antidiscrimination and antisubordina-
tion values. As Justice Brennan explained in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), equal protection
doctrine requires heightened scrutiny of some forms of legislative classifications because "[s]ome
classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative ra-
tionality in pursuit of some legitimate objective" and "[l]egislation predicated on such prejudice is
easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be
judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law." Id. at 216 n.14. He then shifts
focus from the character of a legislature's judgments to the harm that state action can inflict upon
members of protected groups, observing that "[l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue ofcircumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treat-
ment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish." Id. at 217 n.14; cf. L. TRIBE, supra
note 5, § 16-21, at 1514-21 (distinguishing and comparing antidiscrimination and antisubordination
principles).
370. The doctrinal standards for determining when race- and sex-based state action offend
equal protection are more concerned with the state's rationale for adopting the policy in question
than its impact on a protected class. They adopt a "perpetrator" rather than "victim" focus. See
note 425 infra and accompanying text.
371. For example, in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), the Court
held that a state could not maintain a school of nursing solely for women, because its single-sex
admissions policy violated constitutional requirements ofequal protection. In reaching this decision,
the Court scrutinized the state's objective in adopting the challenged policy and the particular means
chosen to pursue it to determine whether they reflected stereotypical reasoning about women. Yet,
after conducting this inquiry, the Court announced its constitutional objections to the single-sex
admissions policy in terms that focused on its impact on women: "Rather than compensate for
discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the
School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's
job." Id. at 729. It further noted that excluding men from the field might depress nurses' wages. Id.
at 729 n.15. Rationales for the doctrine of suspect classifications similarly fuse concerns about the
reasoning of state actors with concerns about the impact of state action on members of protected
groups. See note 369 supra.
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I will examine abortion-restrictive regulation from both antidiscrimina-
tion and antisubordination perspectives, in the first instance considering the
types of gender-based judgments that may inform its enactment, and in the
second, its gender-based impositions on women as a class. My analysis gives
substantial weight to federal equal protection precedent, without conforming
to it in all particulars. In this way, I hope to explore concerns that should be
part of any equal protection inquiry, yet are omitted from most doctrinal
formulations of its terms. Ultimately, antidiscrimination and antisubordina-
tion perspectives on abortion-restrictive regulation must inform each other.
The concern that stereotypical reasoning about women can playa role in a
legislature's decision to enact abortion-restrictive regulation acquires special
significance in view of injuries that such regulation inflicts on women; corre-
spondingly, these injuries demand consideration in light of the types of gen-
der-based judgments that may prompt legislatures to inflict them. In short,
to understand why the Equal Protection Clause should condemn abortion-
restrictive regulation premised on unexamined assumptions about women's
obligations as mothers, it is necessary to examine how state action compel-
ling motherhood injures women.
B. The Antidiscrimination Inquiry
In analyzing abortion-restrictive regulation from an antidiscrimination
standpoint, I premise my discussion on the assumption that laws forbidding
or impairing women's practical access to abortion are sex-based. I assume,
as most commentators -have, that when the Court revisits Geduldig v.
Aiello,372 it should modify it to accord with the common social understand-
ing and the amended terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that regulation
concerning women's capacity to gestate categorically differentiates on the
basis of sex, and so is facially sex-based.373
Once abortion-restrictive regulation is classified as sex-based state action,
372. 417 u.s. 484 (1974).
373. For criticism of Geduldig, see Law, supra note 5, at 983-84. For discussion of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, see note 28 supra. The Act itself treats employment policies implicating
abortion as sex-based. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
The sex-based character of abortion-restrictive regulation is evident if one examines either the
regulation's social impact or the intentions oflegislatures enacting it. Women, who alone can gestate
life, seek abortions; men, who cannot become pregnant, do not. Because laws restricting abortion
subject women to state-compelled pregnancy, they shape the social horizons of every woman who
believes herself capable ofbecoming pregnant. Thus, for reasons physiological and social, such regu-
lation affects women's lives in ways it simply cannot affect men's. As importantly, today as in the
past, legislators who adopt restrictions on abortion believe they are adopting policies to govern
women's conduct; they are not interested in regulating the conduct of men except insofar as men are
instrumental in effectuating women's decisions respecting abortion.
Abortion-restrictive regulation is categorically sex-based: It affects all women, not just pregnant
women, and it is adopted with the intention of regulating the conduct of all women, not just preg-
nant women.
Because legislatures adopting abortion-restrictive regulation intend such policies to apply to
women and not men, and because such regulation affects women as it does not men, abortion-restric-
tive regulation presents all the risks of gender bias and imposition which equal protection analysis is
intended to preclude. Cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 101-02; Law, supra note 5, at 1003.
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prevailing equal protection doctrine subjects it to heightened scrutiny. To
pass constitutional muster, the state's decision to regulate by sex-based
means must be substantially related to the achievement of important govern-
mental objectives.374 On the face of it, it seems that abortion-restrictive reg-
ulation should easily satisfy constitutional requirements. Preventing or
deterring women from obtaining abortions is "substantially related" to the
"important governmental objective" of protecting unborn life. Yet, the in-
termediate scrutiny standard the Court articulated in Craig v. Boren involves
more than this formulaic inquiry. As the Court explained in Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women v. Hogan, "[a]lthough the test for determining the validity
of a gender-based classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of
fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."375
For this reason, the Court examines legislation in two ways. First, it scruti-
nizes legislative purpose to determine "whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions" about women.376 Second, as the
Court explained in Hogan,
if the state's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine
whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and
means is present. The purpose of requiring that close relationship is to as-
sure that the validity ofa classification is determined through reasoned anal-
ysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.377
The Court has variously described the type of gender-based judgments
the Equal Protection Clause proscribes. As Hogan explains it, the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits legislation which embodies "archaic and stereo-
typic notions" about the sexes, or is premised on "traditional, often inaccu-
rate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women." Elsewhere
the Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids legislation rest-
ing on the view of women as the" 'weaker sex' or ... child-rearers,"378 and
other" 'old notions' of role typing,"379 including the assumption that" 'the
female [is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and
only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.' "380 Thus, the
Court's gender discrimination cases condemn state regulation premised on
empirical generalizations and normative assumptions about the "roles of
374. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
375. 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
376. ld. at 725. Even if the statutory purpose appears legitimate, the Court may inquire
whether it is the actual purpose. ld. at 728 ("the mere recitation ofa benign, compensatory purpose
is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying the
statutory scheme") (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975»; see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion).
377. 458 U.S. at 725-26.
378. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
379. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14
(1975».
380. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726 n.ll (quoting Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14-15); see also Craig, 429 U.S.
at 198-99 (repudiating "increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the
home rather than in the 'marketplace and world of of ideas' ") (quoting Stanton, 421 U.S. at 15).
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men and women,"381 especially the assumption that women are merely, pri-
marily, or essentially mothers, persons "destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family." Though the Court has never analyzed reproductive
regulation in light of these concerns, one need only look to the history of
abortion-restrictive regulation to see that such regulation can be, and has
been, premised on constitutionally proscribed judgments about women.
During the nineteenth century, legislation criminalizing birth control
was enacted to enforce "traditional ... assumptions about the proper roles
of men and women,"382 and served as an important public mechanism for
maintaining the sexual division of social life. Although laws prohibiting
abortion and contraception were omitted from the account of "our Na-
tion['s] ... long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" Justice Bren-
nan offered in Frontiero v. Richardson,383 they emanated from the same
separate spheres ideology he condemned.384 Laws criminalizing contracep-
tion and abortion were explicitly premised on the view that women are
"child-rearers," and that" 'the female [is] destined solely for the home and
the rearing of the family, and ... the male for the marketplace and the world
of ideas.' "385 Indeed, the records of the nineteenth century campaign pro-
vide a textbook illustration of attitudes toward women the Equal Protection
Clause now prohibits. The history of abortion-restrictive regulation suggests
that there may be substantial equal protection impediments to renewed en-
forcement of pre-Roe abortion law.386 And it supplies a compelling reason
381. The case law tends to conflate two types of improper bases for statutes: erroneous empiri-
cal generalizations about women, and offensive normative judgments about women. See, e.g., Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. at 726 (rejecting legislation premised on "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions
about the proper roles of men and women") (emphasis added).
382. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26; cf. Karst, Woman's Constitution, supra note 5, at 457:
Prominent among the means historically used to control women's sexuality and maternity
has been the law. The range ofcontrols can be called to mind just by reciting a list of legal
topics: marriage, marital property, divorce, control over and responsibility for children,
illegitimacy, abortion, contraception, prostitution, and rape.
Id. (footnote omitted).
383. 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion).
384. In describing the attitudes toward women that gave rise to the nation's "long and unfortu-
nate history of sex discrimination," Justice Brennan quoted Justice Bradley's opinion in Bradwell v.
Illinois: "'The paramount destiny and mission ofwoman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother.''' Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (plurality opinion) (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring».
385. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726 n.11 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975».
386. Many states still have pre-Roe abortion statutes on the books. See Frances Frank
Marcus, Louisiana Lawyers Move to Revive Invalidated Law Banning Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
1989, at A9. Some statutes were enacted before women were even allowed to vote. See, e.g., TE..'X.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (West 1976) (enacted 1911); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN.
§§ 9.02.010-.02.030 (West 1988) (enacted by Laws 1909, ch. 249, §§ 196-198). All pre-Roe statutes
were enacted before the Court began applying modem equal protection analysis to sex-based regula-
tion; consequently, the legislatures that adopted them were free to regulate women's conduct in ways
that enforced traditional conceptions of women's roles. Such regulation was not condemned by a
majority of the Court on equal protection grounds until the mid-1970s. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (adopting standard of heightened scrutiny for sex-based state action).
Chief Justice Rehnquist has repeatedly observed that older legislation is more likely to rest on
archaic gender-based assumptions than is legislation recently enacted. Cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 74 (1981) (claiming recent congressional debate "clearly establishes that the decision to
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for scrutinizing currently enacted abortion legislation with extraordinary
care to ensure that it is free from the attitudes and assumptions about
women that attended its adoption in the past.
It may be claimed that the gender code informing the nineteenth century
campaign was a product of its era, and that today a legislature might restrict
access to abortion to protect the unborn without entertaining any similar
assumptions about women. History alone cannot refute this objection. Yet,
the historical record supplies strong evidence that this argument should not
be readily credited. The nineteenth century campaign to restrict abortion
was multi-purposed, simultaneously benign and pernicious in its objects:
Opponents of abortion urged its regulation to protect unborn life and to en-
force a certain gender code and to prevent depopulation of certain racial and
ethnic groups. In reasoning about saving unborn life, advocates of antiabor-
tion laws were simultaneously reasoning about women's lives. The gender-
based framework in which legislatures reasoned about restricting abortion in
the past provides a lesson for those charged with reviewing such regulation
in the present. The existence of bona fide legislative concern to protect the
unborn does not preclude the possibility that abortion-restrictive regulation
is animated by constitutionally suspect purposes. Nor does it preclude the
possibility that a legislature's decision to save fetal life by compelling preg-
nancy may ultimately depend on the attitudes toward women that legislators
hold. I explore each of these equal protection objections in tum.
1. Legislative purpose.
Is the purpose of abortion-restrictive regulation a legitimate one? Roe
describes a legislature's purpose in restricting women's access to abortion as
protecting unborn life. Yet, from a social standpoint, that purpose can be
differently described. A legislature's purpose in enacting restrictions on
exempt women from [draft] registration was not the 'accidental byproduct of a traditional way of
thinking about females' ") (citations omitted); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 n.6
(1981) (plurality opinion) (similar inference drawn from fact that state legislature recently consid-
ered and rejected proposals to make statutory rape statute gender neutral); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISfRUSf: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 167-69 (1980) (suggesting that
older sex-based legislation warrants heightened scrutiny, and may be especially vulnerable to invali-
dation under the Equal Protection Clause).
Even legislation that does not employ suspect classifications can be invalidated on equal protec-
tion grounds if it was originally adopted with discriminatory purposes. See Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985):
Without deciding whether [the regulation] would be valid if enacted today without any
impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was motivated by
a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section continues to this
day to have that effect. As such, it violates equal protection under Arlington Heights.
There are, of course, concerns apan from equal protection that may militate against revival of
pre-Roe abortion statutes. See. e.g.. Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (B.D. La. 1990)
(because Louisiana's old "criminal abortion statutes and [post-Roe] abortion regulations clearly con-
flict, earlier statutes were repealed by implication"); Erica Frohman Plave, Note, The Phenomenon
ofAntique Laws: Can a State Revive Old Abortion Laws in a New Era? 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111,
111 (1989) (discussing "whether a state statute, once declared unconstitutional ... may be validly
enforced without legislative reenactment after a later decision overrules the prior holding of
unconstitutionality").
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abortion is to pressure or compel women to carry a pregnancy to term which
they would otherwise terminate-as the Court has acknowledged in the
funding Cases.387
It is by no means clear that this legislative purpose is legitimate under
equal protection doctrine.388 A legislature's effort to force women to bear
children could easily be characterized as a "statutory objective [that] reflects
archaic and stereotypic notions"389 about women. Motherhood is the role
upon which this society has traditionally predicated "gross, stereotyped dis-
tinctions between the sexes."390 Thus, the objective of abortion-restrictive
regulation is to force women to assume the role and perform the work that
has traditionally defined their secondary social status. More particularly,
the purpose of abortion-restrictive regulation appears constitutionally sus-
pect if one considers (1) the role that stereotypes of women as "childrearers"
played in the history of coerced childbearing (including laws criminalizing
both abortion and contraception), (2) the role these same stereotypes played
in justifying restrictions on women's participation in the workforce and the
political arena391 during the era that federal and state law denied women
access to abortion and contraception,392 and (3) the exclusions and indigni-
ties this society still inflicts upon women who gestate and nurture human
life.393 Of course, state actors may well believe their interest in protecting
unborn life justifies their interest in forcing pregnant women to bear chil-
dren. But, as history attests, the fact that state actors believe they are justi-
fied in forcing women to bear children by no means precludes the possibility
that they are acting from invidious attitudes about women-for example, an
387. The Court has described the legislature's purpose in enacting abortion-restrictive regula-
tion as an interest in controlling women's conduct in the abortion funding cases, but not in cases
involving direct prohibitions or constraints on abortion. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325
(1980) ("By subsidizing the medical expenses of indigent women who carry their pregnancies to term
while not subsidizing the comparable expenses of women who undergo abortions •.• Congress has
established incentives that make childbirth a more attractive alternative than abortion for persons
eligible for Medicaid."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1977) (state has a "strong and legiti-
mate interest" in promoting childbirth over abortion) (quoting Beat v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446
(1977».
388. In the abortion funding cases, the Court acknowledged that legislatures sought to pres-
sure women to bear children, see note 387 supra, but it never subjected this legislative purpose to
heightened scrutiny or otherwise attempted to reconcile it with the concerns of sex discrimination
doctrines because it did not view the legislative classifications as sex-based. See note 23 supra. In
fact, the Court's discussion oflegislative purpose in the abortion funding cases is remarkably cursory
given that they involved no "compelling" state interest. According to Roe, the state's interest in
potential life does not become compelling until viability. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
389. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
390. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (plurality opinion).
391. See. e.g., AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT,
1890-1920, at 15 (2d ed. 1981) (congressional opponents of women's suffrage rested their argument
on the grounds that "each woman's vocation [was] determined not by her individual capacities or
wishes but by her sex. Men were expected to have a variety of ambitions and capabilities, but all
women were destined from birth to be full-time wives and mothers. To dispute this eternal truth was
to challenge theology, biology, or sociology."); text accompanying notes 248-257 supra (discussing
justifications for protective labor legislation restricting women's employment).
392. See text accompanying notes 212-219 supra.
393. See text accompanying notes 439-456 infra.
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 359 1991-1992
January 1992] REASONING FROM THE BODY 359
inability to comprehend that women are individuals whose lives are richer
than society's reductive view of them and who will suffer in having this so-
cial status forced on them. Considered from an antidiscrimination perspec-
tive, the state's purpose in adopting restrictions on abortion is deeply
suspect-if not illegitimate on its face.
It is crucial to consider this threshold objection to abortion-restrictive
regulation before scrutinizing the regulation in more detail. Whatever
weight one accords this constitutional concern at the outset, it acquires force
as one examines the judgments that abortion-restrictive regulation can re-
flect about women and the particular forms of status harm it can inflict.
Thus, because the purpose of abortion-restrictive regulation ultimately de-
mands evaluation from an antisubordination perspective, I intend to return
to it and explore it at greater length below.
2. Legislative means.
Roe describes the purpose of abortion-restrictive regulation as protecting
unborn life. If one follows this descriptive convention, compelled mother-
hood is not the purpose of abortion-restrictive regulation, but instead a par-
ticular means to a nominally benign legislative end. And on the face of it,
this means-ends relationship satisfies doctrine's requirement of instrumental
rationality: A state that seeks to protect unborn life by compelling women
to continue pregnancies they wish to terminate employs means that are sub-
stantially and functionally related to important governmental ends.
Yet applying the Craig standard in this mechanical fashion will defeat
the purpose of the inquiry, which is "to assure that the validity of a classifi-
cation is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through mechan-
ical application of traditional, often inaccurate assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women."394 Examining the relationship between a legisla-
ture's ends and means will identify stereotypical reasoning where the legisla-
ture misattributes characteristics of some group members to the group as a
whole, and thus employs "gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more
germane bases of classification."395 But because a state's decision to save
fetal life by compelling pregnancy entails a purely functional use of the preg-
nant woman, any traditional sex-role assumptions that may inform or
prompt this regulatory decision cannot be detected by examining how
394. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982); cf. City of Rich-
mond v. I.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion):
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that
the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use ofa highly suspect
tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejUdice or stereotype. .
395. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); see also id. at 199 ("In light of the weak con-
gruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, it was
necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their substantive laws in a gender-neutral
fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered generalization
actually comported with fact.").
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closely the state's means are related to its ends.396 Rather, one has to ask, in
what ways might assumptions about the proper roles of men and women
have moved the state to engage in fetal life-saving by compelling pregnancy?
What view of women prompted the state's decision to use them as a means
to an end? Given the constitutionally suspect means that laws restricting
abortion employ to promote the state's interest in potential life, and espe-
cially given their history of overt gender-based justifications, it is patently
unreasonable to assume a priori that they are adopted by a process of legisla-
tive deliberation free from constitutionally illicit judgments about women.
As Part III of this article suggests, there is strong evidence that the atti-
tudes which first prompted enactment of abortion-:restrictive regulation still
persist.397 Although the separate spheres tradition no longer receives official
public sanction, the sex-role concepts it fostered continue to play a crucial
part in the abortion controversy, supplying norms of sexual and maternal
comportment for women that inform public judgments about the propriety
of abortion. For example, in Louisiana, where the legislature recently at-
tempted to enforce the state's nineteenth century criminal abortion statute
and then enacted severe restrictions on abortion,398 a poll of the state's resi-
dents indicated they favored providing women access to abortion when preg-
nancy occurred because of incest or rape (89 percent); when the child is
likely to have serious birth defects (67 percent); when childbirth might en-
396. Robin West has discussed this critical blind spot in the so-called "rationality" model of
equal protection review. In analyzing the constitutionality of marital rape exemptions, she notes
that equal protection doctrines focus on questions of legislative rationality in a manner that can
completely obscure the gender-based judgments informing state action:
The damage occasioned by [marital rape exemptions] is the subordination .•. of the
psychic, physical, emotional, and erotic female self. Under a rationality model this clear
fact entirely escapes constitutional notice. . . . If the state wants to pursue the goal of
marital privacy, harmony, and spousal reconciliation at the cost of female self-sovereignty,
and if the Court decides that the goal of marital privacy is important (which it surely
could), then the marital rape exemption is an imminently rational, hence constitutional,
way to achieve this goal •... The rationality model of equal protection quite dramatically
fails to target the state's complicity in [SUbordinating women).
Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape. and the Promise ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA.
L. REv. 45, 69-70 (1990).
Equal protection doctrine treats a legislature's choice of race- or sex-based means as suspect,
and then proceeds to determine how closely the state's means are related to its ends in order to
"smoke out" constitutionally illicit judgments. In this framework, all sex-based means are suspect,
but none need be examined with any particularity. From a socia-historical standpoint, however,
some sex-based means are more suspect than others. Given their history, restrictions on abortion
and marital rape exemptions are deeply suspect means no matter how benign a legislature's objec-
tives may be.
In short, to determine whether constitutionally illicit judgments about women informed a
state's decision to legislate by sex-based means, it is important to examine the particular sex-based
means employed: It should matter whether the state is restricting men's access to 3.2% beer, see
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976), or subjecting women to forced childbearing or forced sex.
If equal protection review is inattentive to these distinctions, then justice will indeed be blind.
397. See text accompanying notes 260-279 supra.
398. See Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp. 1036 (B.D. La. 1990) (prohibiting state efforts to
revive pre-Roe criminal abortion statutes); 1991 La. Sess. Law Servo 74 (West) (prohibiting abortion
unless undertaken for the express purpose of saving the life of the mother; allowing abortion where
pregnancy has resulted from certain acts of rape or incest, but only under narrowly enumerated
conditions).
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danger a woman's health (64 percent), or when childbirth might endanger a
woman's mental health (64 percent); but 79 percent of respondents were op-
posed to abortion "when childbirth might interrupt the woman's career."399
The most widespread support for abortion depended upon a judgment about
the sexual relations in which unborn life was conceived, and the most wide-
spread opposition to abortion reflected a judgment about women's pursuit of
career opportunities in conflict with the maternal role. National polls and
sociological research confirm that such attitudes are widespread.400 InAbor-
tion and the Politics ofMotherhood, Kristin Luker demonstrates how con-
flicts over abortion reflect divergent views about the proper role of sexuality,
work, and family commitments in women's lives, contending that "[t]he
abortion debate is so passionate and hard-fought because it is a referendum
on the place and meaning of motherhood."401
Thus, today, as in the nineteenth century, legislators enacting restrictions
on abortion may act from judgments about the sexual and maternal conduct
of the women they are regulating, and not merely from a concern about the
welfare of the unborn. Legislators may condemn abortion because they as-
sume that any pregnant woman who does not wish to be pregnant has com-
mitted some sexual indiscretion properly punishable by compelling
pregnancy itself.402 Popular support for excusing women who are victims of
rape or incest from the proscriptions of criminal abortion laws demonstrates
that attitudes about abortion do indeed rest on normative judgments about
women's sexual conduct. Opinion polls like Louisiana's suggest that the
public assumes a woman can be coerced into continuing a pregnancy be-
cause the pregnancy is her sexual "fault."403
Along distinct, but related lines, legislators may view abortion as repel-
lant because it betrays a lack of maternal solicitude in women, or otherwise
violates expectations of appropriately nurturing female conduct. If legisla-
tors assume that women are "child-rearers," they will take for granted the
399. John Hill, New Poll: Abortion Veto OK, Gannett News Service, Sept. 7, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
400. See notes 273-275 supra and accompanying text.
401. K. LUKER, supra note 65, at 193 (emphasis omitted).
402. See, e.g., Mary Kay Blakely, RememberingJane, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, (Magazine),
at 26 (quoting an Indiana legislator who characterized women who seek abortions as "irresponsible
women who get themselves pregnant," and observing that "[n]o one in the audience challenged his
apparent belief in parthenogenesis, preferring to keep men's role in the abortion drama invisible");
cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (plurality opinion) (discussing pregnancy
as a form of punishment for young women who have sex, which imposes "natural sanctions" on
them).
403. This view sometimes finds expression in the argument that in consenting to sex, a woman
has either consented to the pregnancy that may result from it, or has at least voluntarily "assumed
the risk" of conception; thus the community may justifiably force her to continue the pregnancy.
This argument is riddled with so many difficulties that its persuasive force would seem in fact to
depend on a priori assumptions about women's obligations as mothers.
First, the argument seems to assume that all sexual intercourse not legally cognizable as rape is
consensual. The law of rape serves policy concerns not applicable in the abortion context (e.g.,
protecting the accused; "protecting" the marriage relation), and the concepts ofconsent it has devel-
oped are generally inadequate to detect sexual coercion between intimates. In an intimate relation, a
woman may engage in sex under conditions of physical, emotional, or even economic duress which
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work women give to motherhood and ignore what it takes from them, and so
will view women's efforts to avoid some two decades of life-consuming work
as an act of casual expedience or unseemly egoism. Thus, they will condemn
women for seeking abortion "on demand," or as a .mere "convenience,"
judging women to be unnaturally egocentric because they do not give their
lives over to the work of bearing and nurturing children-that is, because
they fail to act like mothers, like normal women should.404
While enforcing moral judgments resting on traditional sex-role assump-
tions about women may be the actual purpose of a legislature's decision to
restrict abortion,40S it is crucial to recognize that a legislature need not at-
tempt to enforce its views of appropriate sexual or maternal conduct in order
for such attitudes to play an important role in the enactment of abortion-
restrictive regulation. Even if state actors have adopted restrictions on abor-
tion out of a genuine and single-minded concern for the welfare of the un-
born, archaic or stereotypical assumptions about women may nonetheless
deeply bias their deliberations, making fetal life-saving by compelled preg-
nancy seem reasonable where otherwise it would not. A legislature's atti-
tudes about women may cause it to underestimate or disregard the burdens
it would impose on them by compelling pregnancy. A latent assumption
that motherhood is women's "normal" condition can easily render state ac-
tors oblivious to the life-consuming consequences of forcing women to per-
form its work-just as a latent assumption that motherhood is women's
will still appear consensual from the standpoint of the law. In short, consent and voluntariness in
sexual intercourse demand distinctions of degree to which this argument is utterly inattentive.
Second, the consent-ta-sex argument does not excuse those who conscientiously use contracep-
tive methods that nevertheless fail.
Third, the argument ignores the ways this society discourages women from taking the initiative
in matters of contraception lest they look like they have taken the initiative in matters of sex.
Fourth, like the just-punishment argument, the consent-ta-sex argument visits the consequences
of sexual activity on the woman alone, ignoring the male partner who may have initiated or forced
sex, and who may have failed to use contraception or actively discouraged its use. Thus, like the
just-punishment argument, the consent-based argument rests on a sexual double standard, assuming
that women must engage in sex for procreative purposes, but not men.
Fifth, the argument would impose some two decades of obligation on a woman for "choosing"
to engage in a common social act that is not only condoned, but actively encouraged. by the society
that would judge her. (Reasoning in analogous terms, one might argue that a woman raped outside
her home assumed the risk of rape by voluntarily choosing to leave her home, or, as the Angla-
American legal tradition has long argued, a woman who is raped in marriage "consented" to sex
because she voluntarily chose to marry, see note 362 supra).
At root, the argument assumes the very duty it purports to justify. Consent-based justifications
for compelling a pregnant woman to bear a child acquire their persuasive force from a latent as·
sumption that the pregnant woman ought to bear the child, which appears as an obligation individu-
ally assumed by her so long as some voluntary act can be found to support it. Consent-based
arguments of this sort have long been employed to enforce relations of gender status. See note 362
supra.
404. Objections to abortion "on demand" or "for convenience" can be traced directly to the
nineteenth century campaign, where they played a role in arguments that explicitly invoked women's
maternal duties. For a comparison of contemporary and nineteenth century rhetoric, see note 276
supra. For an account of the reasons women actually give for having abortions, and the frequency
with which they actually have abortions, see note 457 infra.
405. Cf. note 376 supra (noting that court may inquire whether nominally benign purpose of
legislation is its actual purpose in fact).
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"deserved" condition will cause indifference to the burdens the legislation
will inflict. In short, a legislature may not decide that it is reasonable to save
unborn life by compelling pregnancy, "but for" the archaic or stereotypic
assumptions about women it holds. If restrictions on abortion are adopted
in these circumstances, they offend constitutional guarantees of equal
protection.406
3. Evidence ofgender bias in abortion-restrictive regulation.
Evidence that a state's decision to enact abortion-restrictive regulation
was rooted in judgments about women's appropriate sexual or maternal con-
duct may be found in the record of legislative debate. But as Part III of this
article suggests, there are other ways of determining whether abortion-re-
strictive regulation rests on constitutionally offensive assumptions about
women. Analyzing the terms of the statute, or situating it in larger policy
context, can yield structural evidence of such assumptions-if one asks, how
consistently does the state act to protect the unborn? In what circumstances
does the state act or refrain from acting, and why? In doctrinal parlance, are
the means a state has chosen to promote the welfare of unborn life underin-
elusive with respect to its ends?407
As we have seen, the selective focus of fetal-protection policies can sup-
ply evidence that such regulation rests on social assumptions about women's
roles. Regulatory selectivity prompted the Supreme Court's observation
that the "[t]he bias in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but
406. See text accompanying notes 375-381 supra. Under prevailing equal protection doctrine,
sex-based state action is subject to heightened scrutiny, an inquiry that examines the legislature's
means and ends to determine whether the legislative process has been infected by stereotypical sex-
role assumptions or other constitutionally impermissible forms of gender bias-but need not ascer-
tain the existence of discriminatory purpose, the ultimate fact to be proved where the action chal-
lenged is facially neutral. Compare Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27
(1982) and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (sex-based legislation) with Personnel Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48
(1976) (facially neutral legislation). In many, if not most, of the cases where the Court has invali-
dated sex-based legislation under the Equal Protection Clause, the legislation was enacted for benign
purposes. See, e.g., Craig. 429 U.S. at 199-200 (invalidating liquor sales statute adopted to promote
traffic safety).
Even when the Court has reviewed challenges to regulation that does not explicitly discriminate
on the basis of some characteristic or trait of a protected class, it has still allowed plaintiffs to prove
discrimination by demonstrating that the challenged regulation was the product of "mixed motives."
See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) ("Once racial discrimination is shown to
have been a 'substantial' or a 'motivating' factor behind the enactment of the law, the burden shifts
to the law's defenders to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor.")
(citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977»; cf. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (analyzing the role of stereotypical attitudes about women in causing
employment discrimination against them; applying Mt. Healthy "mixed motive" analysis).
407. While "[i]t is no requirement ofequal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradi-
cated or none at all," Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949), when the
Court reviews legislation embodying constitutionally suspect classifications, it will examine whether
a legislature's means are underinclusive with respect to its ends as a method of "smoking out" con-
stitutionally impermissible bias. See note 394 supra and accompanying text; see also Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. I, II (1967) ("The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications [are] measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy.").
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not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their
reproductive health for a particular job."408 For similar reasons, analyzing
the pattern of exceptions or excusing conditions stipulated in abortion-re-
strictive regulation can supply evidence that the state's willingness to save
unborn life rests on unarticulated assumptions about the women whose con-
duct it would regulate.
For example, the criminal abortion statute that Utah recently enacted
provides exceptions when "abortion is necessary to save the pregnant
woman's life" or "to prevent grave damage to the pregnant woman's medical
health"; in certain cases "when pregnancy is the result of rape" or "the re-
sult of incest"; and "to prevent the birth of a child that would be born ",lith
grave defects."409 The state does not consistently act to protect unborn life.
Rather, as the statute's preamble explains, the state has determined that "a
woman's liberty interest, in limited circumstances, may outweigh the unborn
child's right to protection."410 Thus, the state is indeed making judgments
about women as well as the unborn.
The statutory exception allowing women to have abortions if they con-
ceive by an act of rape or incest indicates that the state's decision to compel
women to bear children depends upon certain normative judgments about
women's sexual conduct.411 The apparently widespread beliefthat it is rea-
sonable to force women who have consented to sex to bear children likely
rests on unarticulated social assumptions about women's maternal obliga-
tions.412 But, more importantly, rape exceptions of this sort offend core val-
ues of equal protection because they rest on a sexual "double-standard."
Utah has decided to punish pregnant women who have "voluntarily" en-
gaged in sex by making them bear children, yet it has enacted a statute that
imposes no similar duties, burdens, or sanctions on the men who were co-
participants in the act of conception.413
Traditional sex-role assumptions also shape the exception that allows
408. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1202 (1991). For other examples of
selectivity in fetal-protection policies, see text accompanying notes 332-341 supra.
409. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-301, -302 (1991).
410. Id. § 76-7-301.1.
411. In fact, a sentence struck from the preamble to the Utah statute read: "It is recognized
that, in cases of rape or incest, the fact that the woman has been an unwilling participant in the
reproductive process may justify the preference for her rights over those of the unborn child." Id.
(Amendment Notes).
412. See note 403 supra and accompanying text.
413. It does not cure this objection to observe that men are subject to general child support
obligations-the enforcement of which is notoriously lax. Both parents are under such a duty.
Meanwhile, the state subjects men to no burden even remotely approaching that of coerced
childbearing. If the state decides to make a pregnant woman bear a child because she has chosen to
have sex, no fact of nature prevents the state from imposing duties or sanctions on the man who was
co-participant in the act of conception. Cf. Jeff Rosen, Naturally Right, NEW REpUBLIC, Sept. 24,
1990, at 20, 23 (quoting Professor Akhil Amar, who discusses the sexual inequality of abortion
restrictions, noting "[t]he law does not require men ... to support the women they have impregnated
during the course of an unwanted pregnancy").
By imposing unilateral duties on women for engaging in consensual sex, the state has defined
the proper ends ofJemale sexuality as procreative, and punished women who violate this norm by
forcing them to bear children. The rape exemption thus holds women to standards ofsexual conduct
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abortions to save the pregnant woman's life or to prevent grave damage to
her health. The therapeutic exception indicates that the state is willing to
subordinate the welfare of the unborn to that of the pregnant woman, but
only when women will sustain physical injuries in bearing children. Indeed,
more than any sex-based legislation the Court has reviewed in the modem
era, the therapeutic exception graphically defines women as childbearers.
Utah has weighed "woman's liberty interest" against that of the unborn, and
decided that women can be forced to be mothers except when they are physi-
cally incapable of the act. By allowing women abortions, but only when
pregnancy threatens to kill them or to inflict "grave damage" on their "med-
ical health," Utah has defined the pregnant woman's "liberty interest" as an
interest in brute physical survival-reasoning about women as if they had no
social, intellectual, or emotional identity that transcended their physiological
capacity to bear children.414 Thus, analyzing the excusing conditions in
Utah's statute, it appears that the state has promulgated a code of conduct
for pregnant women that distinguishes "good" abortions from "bad" abor-
tions-whose very reasonableness depends on unarticulated sex-role as-
sumptions about women.415
Analyzing abortion-restrictive regulation in larger policy context may
also reveal that the state manifests its concern for the unborn in underinclu-
sive or selective ways that suggest latent sex-role assumptions about women.
A legislature may express interest in the welfare of the unborn forcefully in
circumstances that involve compelling women resisting motherhood to per-
form its work, but intermittently, ambivalently, or not at all, in policy con-
texts that involve supporting women seeking to become mothers in their
and maternal duty whose roots lie deep in the nineteenth century. Cf. text accompanying notes 116-
134 supra.
414. In the years before Roe was decided, a critic of expansive therapeutic exceptions openly
articulated the view of women that is implicit in Utah's "balancing" of maternal and fetal interests:
A mother who would sacrifice the life of her unborn child for her own health is lacking in
something. If there could be any authority to destroy an innocent life for social considera-
tions, it would still be in the interests of society to sacrifice such a mother rather than the
child who might otherwise prove to be normal and decent and an asset.
Quay, supra note 85, at 234.
The therapeutic exception does not merely define women as childbearers. Because this excep-
tion to criminal abortion statutes removes decisions about a pregnant woman's welfare and needs
from the pregnant woman to her medical guardian, it is as paternalist today as it was in the nine-
teenth century. Cf. H.R. STORER, supra note 123, at 115-16:
Every married woman, save in very exceptional circumstances, which should only be al-
lowed to be such by the decision of a competent physician, every married woman, until
near the so-caIled tum of life, should occasionally bear a child; not as a duty to the commu-
nity merely ... but as the best means of insuring her own permanent good health.
See also H. STORER & F.F. HEARD, supra note 95, at 4 ("medical men are the physical guardi-
ans of women and their offspring; from their position and peculiar knowledge necessitated in all
obstetric matters to regulate public sentiment, and to govern the tribunals ofjustice"); text accompa-
nying notes 130-133 supra.
415. Cf. Frank Zimring, Constitutional Doctrine in Societal Context: Revisiting Roe v. Wade.
at 15-16 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript on file with the StanfOrd Law Review) ("[T]he aim and
method of the American Law Institute-Model Penal Code statute is not determining the value of
fetal life but the separation of deserving from undeserving women.").
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desire to bear and rear healthy children.416 Here the state's choice of sex-
based, coercive means suggests that it is interested in controlling and/or
punishing women who resist motherhood: It will promote the welfare of the
unborn only when it can use women's bodies and lives to realize the poten-
tial of unborn life-and not when the community as a whole would have to
bear the costs of its moral preferences.
Finally, as analysis of the fetal-protection policy in Johnson Controls
clearly illustrates, regulators may adopt particular means for protecting un-
born life because stereotypical assumptions about the maternal role lead
them to underestimate the impact of fetal-protective regulation on women.
If one examines the conventional structure of abortion-restrictive regulation,
it does indeed appear that such regulation must rest on traditional assump-
tions about women's natural obligations or instrumental uses as mothers.
Absent such attitudes about women, it is reasonable to assume that legisla-
tures would adopt at least some measures to offset the consequences of com-
pelled motherhood for women, whether by compensating them, or by
protecting their employment and education opportunities, or by affording
them needed medical services and child care. Normally, some remunera-
tion, reward, support, and/or recognition is offered to those asked to per-
form services for the community, whether they are asked to provide foster
care for children, volunteer or are drafted for military service, or are com-
pelled to alienate property to the state. If no offsetting or compensating
measures are adopted or even contemplated when the state engages in fetal
life-saving by compelled pregnancy, it is clear that abortion-restrictive regu-
lation is indeed premised on certain views about women as well as the un-
born: that women's physical and intellectual and emotional energies as
mothers can be publicly appropriated without recompense, that their lives
can be subordinated to the work of gestation and nurturance without
consequence.
Because the state has chosen to promote the welfare of the unborn by
sex-based, coercive means, it carries the burden of demonstrating that the
statute does not rest on constitutionally offensive assumptions about
women.417 A state seeking to demonstrate that its decision to compel preg-
nancy was moved by concern for the unborn, and not traditional sex-role
assumptions about women, could carry this burden by supplying evidence of
the following sort: by showing that the state does all in its power to promote
the welfare of unborn life by noncoercive means, supporting those women
who do wish to become mothers so that they are able to bear and raise
healthy children; by demonstrating that the sacrifices the state exacts of
women on behalf of the unborn are in fact commensurate with those it ex-
acts of men-and the community in general-to promote the welfare of fu-
416. Cf. text accompanying notes 342-346 supra.
417. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) ("party seeking to up-
hold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of show-
ing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification") (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
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ture generations;418 and, even, by showing that the state is ready to
compensate women for the impositions and opportunity costs of bearing a
child they do not wish to raise. A state that could demonstrate such a con-
sistent course of conduct could indeed claim that it was an accident of na-
ture that the state had to make the pregnant woman a samaritan for the
unborn, and that its decision to do so had no roots in assumptions about her
natural obligations or instrumental uses as a mother. I know of no jurisdic-
tion in this nation that can pass the test.419
To this point, I have analyzed abortion-restrictive regulation from the
standpoint of antidiscrimination values to demonstrate that a legislature's
decision to adopt such regulation may indeed reflect attitudes toward women
that are offensive to principles of equal protection. This analysis provides a
basis for questioning the legitimacy of a state's purposes in compelling preg-
nant women to bear children. And, even if one follows Roe in defining fetal
life-saving as the purpose of legislative restrictions on abortion, the analysis
still supplies a framework for scrutinizing the state's decision to promote the
welfare of unborn life by coercive, sex-based means. But for certain stere-
otypical assumptions about women, a legislature may not view coercing
women to perform the work of motherhood as a reasonable way of promot-
ing the welfare of the unborn. But for certain stereotypical assumptions
about women, a legislature might act to mitigate or offset the burdens it
imposes on women by compelling them to bear children. If a legislature
would not in fact employ the means it has chosen to promote the welfare of
the unborn but for "the traditional ... assumptions about the proper roles of
men and women" it holds, its benign objectives cannot save abortion-restric-
418. This showing is especially required if the state has conditioned the pregnant woman's
obligation to bear children on her sexual conduct (e.g., by incorporating a rape exemption in the
statute). See note 413 supra and accompanying text.
419. For some evidence of this nation's failure to support women who desire to become
mothers and its failure to promote the welfare of future generations by means that support, rather
than coerce, women, consider:
(I) President Bush's decision to veto the Family and Medical Leave Act, which would provide
job security for pregnant women and parents who need leave from work for purposes of family
caregiving, see Sharon A. Holmes, Bush Vetoes a Bill to Give Workers Family Leave, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1990 at A9; see also Tamar Lewin, Battle/or Family Leave Will Be Fought in States, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 1990, at A8 ("Mr. Bush said he thought the measure would have been an unwar-
ranted intrusion of government into business affairs.");
(2) our failure to provide prenatal care to pregnant women who lack health insurance, see note
344 supra, as well recent attempts to reduce funding to programs providing nutritional supplements
to pregnant women, infants, and children, despite this nation's startlingly high infant mortality rates,
see Pear, supra note 342, at AID (each year in U.S., nearly 40,000 babies die before reaching their
first birthday, a fact described by the Secretary of Health and Human Services as "almost obscene
for a country with the resources we have"); Robert Pear, Bush Plan to Fight In/ant Deaths Would
Use Money Going to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at Al (administration proposes plan to combat
" 'exceptionally high rates of infant mortality' " in ten cities "by taking money from other health
programs that serve pregnant women, poor children and the homeless"). But see Robert Pear, Food
Assistance to Poor Women Gets a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, June 3D, 1990, at Al (Congress authorizes
bill allowing states to borrow against next year's allocation, in order to minimize cutbacks in pro-
gram);
(3) the fact that more than half of the children living in female-headed households are impover-
ished, see notes 455-456 infra.
HeinOnline -- 44 Stan. L. Rev. 368 1991-1992
368 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:261
tive regulation from constitutional indictment.42o
Yet for many, this approach to analyzing abortion-restrictive regulation
may be plagued by two kinds ofuncertainty: uncertainty about the nature of
the legislative judgments on which the regulation actually rests, and, perhaps
even more importantly, uncertainty about the moral gravity of the gendered
judgments that can in fact be seen to animate it. These uncertainties seem
inherent in the analytical orientation of equal protection doctrine, which is
organized to detect breaches of the antidiscrimination principle, and there-
fore demands judgments about the reasoning of state actors rather than the
character of their conduct. If the only objective in analyzing a legislature's
conduct is to elicit evidence of its collective "state of mind," then the doc-
trines of heightened scrutiny will obscure the most important sense in which
restrictions on abortion offend equal protection commitments: one defined
in terms of the harm abortion-restrictive regulation inflicts on women rather
than the judgments about them it reflects. To rectify this problem, it is nec-
essary to examine abortion-restrictive regulation from an antisubordination
perspective. As I see it, this approach can either supplement analysis from
an antidiscrimination perspective,421 or provide an alternative framework
for review.
C. The Antisubordination Inquiry
When the Court declared in Brown v. Board ofEducation 422 that de jure
segregation violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection, it did not
confine its analysis to the attitudes and judgments of the state actors respon-
sible for the policy. The Court emphasized the injury segregation inflicted
on the schoolchildren subjected to it.423 It judged the constitutionality ofde
jure segregation by the specific forms of status harm it imposed, not simply
the regulatory distinctions it embodied.424 Today, equal protection doctrine
is largely elaborated from an antidiscrimination perspective, whose domi-
nant focus is the judgment and justifications of the state actors deploying
public power, rather than the impact of a particular exercise of power on the
420. See note 406 supra and accompanying text.
421. Obviously, one is more concerned about the nature of the state's justifications for adopt-
ing restrictions on abortion when one considers the character and magnitude of the injury such
regulation inflicts on women. In addition, considering the harm abortion-restrictive regulation in-
flicts on women imbues the task of determining whether sex-dependent judgments might have
prompted the state to enact it with greater urgency. Finally and more generally, the moral gravity of
entertaining "traditional assumptions about the proper roles of men and women" is easier to grasp
once one considers the harm that laws premised on such assumptions can inflict on women.
422. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
423. See id. at 494 ("To separate [black children in public schools] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
424. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1336 (1986) ("Brown and its progeny do not stand for the abstract
principle that governmental distinctions based on race are unconstitutional. Rather, [they] •.• stand
for the proposition that the Constitution prohibits any arrangements imposing racial subjugation
...."); see also Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-
Blind?," 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 204-05 (1986).
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citizens subject to it.425 A growing number of constitutional commentators
would reorient the focus of equal protection analysis so that it directly con-
sidered the impact of state action on the citizens affected by it, a paradigm
shift of consequence to numerous areas of constitutional debate.426 Sylvia
Law has employed antisubordination values to develop a framework for
evaluating state regulation of reproduction, which she applies to analyze the
constitutional equities of abortion-restrictive regulation itself.427
While there are many principles one could employ to craft an equal pro-
tection standard for evaluating the subordinating effects of state action-
which might embrace overtly discriminatory and facially neutral policies, as
well as the harms they foreseeably and inadvertently cause-undertaking
this far-reaching enterprise is not necessary to evaluate abortion-restrictive
regulation. Abortion-restrictive regulation has several characteristics that
make it particularly suitable for analysis under even the most constrained
application of antisubordination principles.428 First, abortion-restrictive
425. The clearest illustration of this orientation is the requirement that plaintiffs challenging
the discriminatory impact of facially neutral state action must show that state actors adopted the
challenged policy with discriminatory purpose. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 274, 279 (1979). Doctrines governing the review of explicitly race- and sex-based state action
are informed by this antidiscrimination perspective in less apparent ways. The fact that such action
triggers heightened scrutiny reflects concern that the state will inflict or perpetuate forms of status
injury by legislating in race- and sex-based terms. See note 369 supra. Yet, doctrinal standards for
determining the constitutionality of such action scrutinize the character ofa legislature's judgments,
without directly putting in issue the actual impact of its actions on members of protected classes.
The results in many of the Court's gender discrimination cases might well be different if the Court
inquired, not whether the state's decision to regulate on the basis of sex was substantially related to
important governmental ends, but instead: Has the challenged action harmed women in ways that
enforce, perpetuate, or aggravate their subordinate social status?
426. Commentators have employed antisubordination values to distinguish between benign
and invidious race- and sex-based state action, as well as to criticize doctrines requiring a showing of
discriminatory purpose to challenge facially neutral state action. See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, supra
note 5, at 32-45; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 117
(1979) (arguing that courts examining state action for sex discrimination should inquire "whether
the policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a
deprived position because of gender status"); L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 16-21, at 1514-21; Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976) (proposing to
substitute for the equal treatment principle a group-disadvantaging principle premised on a theory of
"status harm" that would inquire whether a challenged practice would "impair or threaten or aggra-
vate the status or position ofthe group"); Kennedy, supra note 424, at 1334-37; Charles R. Lawrence
III, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv.
317,319 (1987) ("the injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of the decisionmakers' motives");
West, supra note 396, at 59-62 (discussing work of Catharine MacKinnon, Ruth Calker, and Mary
Becker).
427. See Law, supra note 5, at 1008-09 ("[L]aws governing reproductive biology should be
scrutinized by courts to ensure that (1) the law has no significant impact in perpetuating either the
oppression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints on individual freedom or (2) if the
law has this impact, it is justified as the best means of serving a compelling state purpose."); see id. at
1016-28 (analyzing abortion regulation under this test).
428. Antisubordination analysis need not assume the form of a simple disparate impact test of
the sort the Court has adopted in the employment discrimination context, but refused to extend to a
constitutional setting. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (applying a disparate
impact analysis to facially neutral state action "would ••• perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax,
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor
and average black than the more afIluent white"); cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 16-21, at 1520:
[S]trict judicial scrutiny would be reserved for those governmental acts that, given their
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regulation is sex-based state action:429 It is regulation directed at women as
a class, and not dispersed across the citizenry at large. Second, the most
dramatic and visible of its effects-the continuation of an unwanted preg-
nancy-is an intended consequence of social policy. Indeed, as I have al-
ready argued, it is fair to characterize forced childbearing as the principal
purpose of abortion-restrictive regulation.430 Third, abortion-restrictive reg-
ulation has historically functioned as caste legislation. Finally, today, as in
the past, the injury inflicted on women by compelling them to bear children
is a specific form of status harm, one that plays a central role in women's
subordination.
These factors together provide for a highly focused application of an-
tisubordination principles. Because a state adopting restrictions on abortion
intentionally inflicts a traditional form of status harm on a constitutionally
suspect class, courts evaluating the constitutionality of the state's action
should examine what the state is doing to women, and not simply why it
does it. Examining how restrictions on abortion harm women supplies an
independent and sufficient basis for evaluating the constitutionality of abor-
tion-restrictive regulation. It also supplies evidence relevant to more con-
ventional forms of equal protection analysis: If one wants to determine
whether a state's decision to adopt abortion-restrictive regulation rests on
constitutionally offensive sex-role assumptions about women, it is crucial to
examine what a state adopting restrictions on abortion does to women.
This section considers how state action restricting abortion injures
women, addressing several points which bear on this question. First, restric-
tions on abortion do not merely force women to bear children; powerful
gender norms in this society ensure that almost all women who are forced to
bear children will raise them as well, a result that legislatures adopting re-
strictions on abortion both desire and expect. Second, the work legislatures
would force women to perform defines women's social status along predict-
able, gender-delineated lines. Women who perform the socially essential la-
bor of bearing and rearing children face diverse forms of stigmatization and
injury, none of which is ordained by the physiology of gestation, and all of
which is the doing of the society that would force women to bear children.
Third, when states adopt restrictions on abortion, they compel women to
become mothers, while in no respect altering the conditions that make the
institution of motherhood a principal cause of women's subordinate social
status. When the gender-based impositions of abortion-restrictive regulation
are considered in light of the forms of gender bias that may animate it, it is
clear abortion-restrictive regulation is and remains caste legislation which
subordinates women in ways that offend constitutional guarantees of equal
protection.
history, context, source, and effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate subordination
but also to reflect a tradition of hostility toward an historically subjugated group, or a
pattern of blindness or indifference to the interests of that group.
429. See note 373 supra and accompanying text.
430. See text accompanying note 387 supra.
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1. Abortion restrictions coerce childbearing and childrearing.
Laws that forbid or impair women's access to abortion431 in fact have
many effects on women's lives. Restrictions on abortion affect not only preg-
nant women, but all women who believe they are capable of conceiving,
whether or not they are presently sexually active, whether or not they en-
gage in some form of contraceptive practice. Because such laws deprive
women of means to determine whether or not they will become mothers
should they become pregnant, they impair the possibility of sexual pleasure
for women, and aggravate the force of sexual fear.432 Abortion-restrictive
regulation does not of course prevent all pregnant women who seek abor-
tions from obtaining them; rather, it subjects all pregnant women seeking
abortions to social indignity, some to illicit procedures fraught with fear and
physical hazard, and the rest to the burden of state-coerced pregnancy.
Laws restricting women's access to abortion are only intermittently dis-
cussed in their compulsive aspect. Even then, discussion often seems to as-
sume that such regulation coerces women into performing only the work of
childbearing.433 But if abortion-restrictive regulation is evaluated in light of
actual social practice, it is clear that such regulation coerces women to per-
form, not only the work of childbearing, but the work of childrearing as
well.
Hypothetically, a woman compelled to bear a child she does not want
could give it up for adoption, abandon it, or pay someone to care for the
child until maturity. In this society, however, these are not options that
women avail themselves of with great frequency for the simple reason that
few women are able to abandon a child born of their body.434 That society
as a whole, or some women in particular, may judge it morally preferable to
give a child up to adoption rather than abort a pregnancy is beside the point.
Once compelled to bear a child against their wishes, most women will feel
431. Here I address laws that prohibit or restrict the performance of abortion in ways that
signify social condemnation of the practice, including laws that attempt to deter women from ob-
taining abortions by interposing procedural obstacles, financial barriers, or other practical impedi-
ments to access to the procedure. Depending on a woman's age, financial means, family situation,
and sophistication, she mayor may not be deterred by them. Some women will be able to evade laws
prohibiting abortions; others will be prevented from obtaining abortions by laws that merely inter-
pose practical impediments to abortion.
432. Cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 5; C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 93-102; Law, supra
note 5, at 1019-20.
433. See Regan, supra note 5, at 1589-91; but cf. Koppelman, supra note 5, at 490 n.45 (citing
Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 790 n.204).
434. Of all babies placed for adoption in 1982, 88% were born to mothers who had never
married, 6% were born to mothers who had been married but were unmarried at the time of the
birth, and 6% were born within a marriage. It is important to note, however, that while premarital
births account for the preponderance of adoption placements, only 6% of all babies born
premaritally to women 15 to 44 years of age in 1982 were placed for adoption. White unmarried
mothers were much more likely to place their children for adoption than black unmarried mothers;
unmarried mothers whose fathers had some college education were much more likely to place their
children for adoption than unmarried mothers whose fathers had not completed high school. Chris-
tine A. Bachrach, Adoption Plans, Adopted Children. and Adoptive Mothers. 48 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 243, 249-50 (1986).
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obligated to raise it.435 A woman is likely to form emotional bonds with a
child during pregnancy; she is likely to believe that she has moral obligations
to a born child that are far greater than any she might have to an embryo/
fetus; and she is likely to experience intense familial and social pressure to
raise a child she has borne. The pressure on women to raise children they
have borne will intensify dramatically if they are married and/or have other
children, as current adoption placements illustrate.436 Women will also ex-
perience particularly intense pressure to raise a child if the child lacks the
privileged characteristics that ensure it will be readily adopted.437
Thus, while discussions of abortion-restrictive regulation often assume
that women who are forced to bear children can simply abandon them at
will, the premise is wholly at odds with the norms of the society that would
compel women to bear children. Many women will simply assume they
must raise children which the state forces them to bear; others may well
choose to raise the child, but they will exercise this choice under social con-
ditions that virtually dictate the outcome of their decision. Legislatures that
enact restrictions on abortion understand this. They both desire and expect
that most women will raise the child they are forced to bear, and in the vast
majority of cases, women will.
Of course, a state can deny responsibility for imposing motherhood on
women simply by emphasizing that the pregnant woman has chosen to raise
the child that the state forced her to bear. Arguments about women's
choices offer a familiar way to rationalize state action enforcing gender sta-
tus roles.438 But, if one considers the powerful norms governing women's
choices about whether to raise their children, it is clear that such formalistic
arguments do not relieve the state of responsibility for dictating the pregnant
woman's social fate. In twentieth century America, when a legislature re-
stricts women's access to abortion, it is forcing women to bear and rear
children.
2. The work ofbearing and rearing children.
What then does the state do to women by forcing them to bear children?
To answer this question, it is necessary to consider what is entailed for
435. The Los Angeles Times reported that when women, who had undergone abortions were
asked "whether it would be harder for an unmarried woman to rear a child out of wedlock, or give
up the baby for adoption, or have an abortion, a majority (52%) said the hardest thing would be to
hand over the infant to adoption. The easiest was abortion (18%)." George Skelton, Guilt Plagues
Many Who Had Abortion, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1989, at 15 (emphasis added). It is important to
note that the question posed concerns the case of an unmarried woman. If a woman had other
children and/or was married, it seems quite likely that giving the child up for adoption would appear
even more difficult.
436. See note 434 supra (88% of babies placed for adoption in 1982 were born to never-mar-
ried mothers, while only 6% were born to women in an intact marriage); cf note 457 infra (unmar-
ried cohabiting women nine times as likely to have an abortion as married women living with their
husband).
437. Cf note 434 supra (white unmarried mothers much more likely to place their children for
adoption than black unmarried mothers).
438. Cf note 362 supra.
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women in performing the work of motherhood. While the burdens of moth-
erhood are to a significant extent a matter of common knowledge, it is none-
theless important to consider certain aspects of the work that are regularly
omitted from discussions ofabortion. Too often, analysis of abortion-restric-
tive regulation is dominated by physiological paradigms, with the result that
the injuries such regulation inflicts tend to be attributed to and described in
terms of the female body.439 If the decision whether to terminate a preg-
nancy has special significance in women's lives, it is in part, but only in part,
because of the physiology of reproduction. From the point of gestation on-
wards, a woman performing the work of parenting assumes the social role of
motherhood, a role and status that defines her identity, relations, and life
prospects in diverse social arenas.
For women, the work of parenting begins in a lengthy period of bodily
labor. Because the work of making life does proceed within a woman's
body, it can subject her to physical discomfort, pain, disability, and risk
throughout the term of pregnancy, and after. These physical burdens alone
are sufficient grounds for many to hesitate before assuming the work.440
Yet, because gestation is not simply a reflex process, its impositions are not
solely physiological. Childbearing, like childrearing, involves work to be
performed in accordance with detailed prescriptive norms.441 A woman
who attempts to conduct her pregnancy in conformity with such norms will
find herself making daily judgments as she attempts to accommodate her life
to the process of making life: choices about what to eat and drink, about
how to exercise, about securing appropriate medical care, and about negoti-
ating quotidian forms of risk associated with travel, leisure activities, and the
work she performs on the job and at home.442 The work of gestation thus
439. Cf. Law, supra note 5, at 1016 ("When the state denies women access to abortion, both
nature and the state impose upon women burdens of unwanted pregnancy that men do not bear.");
id. at 1017 ("When the state prohibits abortion, all women ofchildbearing age know that pregnancy
may violently alter their lives at any time. This pervasively affects the ability of women to plan their
lives, to sustain relationships with other people, and to contribute through wage work and public
life."); Regan, supra note 5, at 1579-82 (consulting obstetrical authorities to determine the impact of
pregnancy on women's lives); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (pregnancy has diverse
health effects on women's lives; "maternity ... may force on the woman a distressful life and fu-
ture"). But cf. MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 1308-09 ("women, because of their sex, are subjected to
social inequality at each step in the process of procreation").
440. Donald Regan has collected a detailed list of "what two obstetricians, writing for preg-
nant women and attempting not to alarm but to reassure them, call the 'minor complaints' of preg-
nancy." Regan, supra note 5, 1579 (footnote omitted); see id. at 1582 ("It may seem that I must
have got it wrong-that if having a child were as bad as I suggest, no woman would ever do it
voluntarily."); see also Law, supra note 5, at 1017 n.220 (comparing health risks of childbirth and
first trimester abortion).
441. In the nineteenth century, physicians advanced a theory of "prenatal impressions," which
required a pregnant woman to avoid all shocking sights, intellectual stimulation, or powerful emo-
tions, such as anger or lust, lest the baby be deformed in the womb. As they understood it, during
pregnancy the brain and uterus competed for phosphates, such that every mental effort of the mother
could deprive her unborn of substances required for proper development. See B. EHRENREICH & D.
ENGLISH, supra note 78, at III, 127; see also C. DEGLER, supra note 74, at 79-82 (gestation and
breast-feeding); C. ROSENBERG, supra note 67, at 26-29, 58, 68.
442. Today, as in the nineteenth century, the pregnant woman is advised to conduct the work
of gestation with attention to a complex set of factors that may affect the development of the unborn
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involves on-going calculations and compromises that can have a pervasive
impact on women's lives; its impositions are simultaneously physical and
social.
Because gestation is a social as well as a physiological act, it implicates
women in relationships and defines their identity in many ways. A woman
may experience pregnancy as a bond tying her to a man with whom she may
or may not wish to be involved, or, alternately, it may signify the brute fact
of his absence or abandonment.443 During the course of gestation, a preg-
nant woman often bonds to the unborn life she bears, so that over time a
maternal relation is formed that she may feel herself incapable of severing.
Nor is this relational aspect of pregnancy a matter of intimate experience
alone. A woman may find that pregnancy comes to embody her social iden-
tity to others, who may treat her with love and respect or, alternatively,
abuse her as a burden,444 scorn her as unwed,445 or judge her as unfit for
employment.446 Or, precisely because the work of pregnancy is believed to
in utero. Common conditions and activities of the pregnant woman that are currently believed to
have some bearing on fetal development include: "being overweight or underweight, working or
even living in certain environments, rejecting or undergoing specific medical treatments, e:"ercising,
failing to eat 'well,' failing to 'stay oll' of her feet,' smoking, drinking alcohol, ingesting caffeine,
taking nonprescription, prescription, or illegal drugs, and suffering physical harm through accident
or illness." Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs. supra note 6, at 192. Conducting a pregnancy with
attention to such concerns produces a daily regimen of calculations and compromises, not unlike
that urged upon pregnant women a century ago. See C. ROSENBERG, supra note 67, at 58 (discuss-
ing nineteenth century medical advice) ("A woman who lived 'unphysiologica11y'-and she could do
so by reading or studying in excess, by wearing improper clothing, by long hours of factory work, or
by a sedentary, luxurious life-could produce only weak and degenerate oll'spring.").
443. On the relational aspects of pregnancy, see, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, supra note 276, at 71-74
(discussing abortion decision); NATIONAL ABORTION RiGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, THE VOICES OF
WOMEN (n.d.) (same); Brief for the Amici Curiae Women Who Have had Abortions and Friends of
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(No. 88-605) (same); see also BriefFor the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence As Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 5, at 293 ("A battered woman who becomes pregnant is less
able, economically and otherwise, to leave the batterer, and her economic dependence on the batterer
will only increase if she is forced to bear the child.").
444. Evidence concerning the battering of pregnant women was introduced in the Court's most
recent teen pregnancy cases. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2991
(1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Pregnancy does not deter, and may even precipitate, physical
attacks on women.") (citing briefof the American Psychological Assoc); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110
S. Ct. 2926, 2938-39, 2939 n.25 (1990). For recent cases in which women charged with fetal neglect
appear to have been subject to physical battering by their husbands, see note 334 supra.
445. By this I intend conventional forms of stigma as well as contempt currently directed at
"welfare" or "teen" mothers. See Fox Butterfield, Stunning Primary in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES.
Sept. 20, 1990, at Al4 (Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate John Silber explains his opposition to
providing welfare for unwed, poor women who "continu[e] having children"). Silber told a radio
audience:
When young teenagers walk down the street proud of being pregnant despite the fact that
they are not married, you know there has to be some incentive. And it's not merely to be
loved by their oll'spring. It's also because they have the knowledge that they have now
married Uncle Sam and Uncle Sam will provide.
/d.
446. On pregnancy discrimination in employment before enactment of the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act, see Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out ofthe Maternity and
the Workplace Debate. 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1123-25 (1986). As currently construed, the Act
only requires employers to treat a pregnant employee the same as other employees "lith similar work
disabling conditions, and for this and other reasons, pregnancy exclusions continue. See Maureen E.
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involve intellectual and moral judgments, they may brand her, socially or
legally, as an irresponsible mother.447 Pregnancy, and the period of lacta-
tion that follows it,448 are not merely burdensome, disruptive, or even con-
suming forms of work. They amplify the gendered judgments and
constraints to which women are already subject, exposing them to material
and dignitary injuries having nothing to do with the physiology of reproduc-
tion, and entangling them in relationships that profoundly define their iden-
tity and life prospects.
Finally, notwithstanding changing norms of family life, it remains the
case that it is women who perform the vast majority of the labor necessary to
make infants into adults.449 Mothers are expected to subordinate their per-
sonal interests to children in a way that men are not; most women give
themselves over to the nurturance of life in a way that men do not-and face
Lally-Green, The Implications of Inadequate Maternity Leave Policies Under Title VIL 16 VT. L.
REv. 223 (1991); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (federal law
permits states to require employers to give pregnant employees needing unpaid disability leave up to
four months of such leave, to the extent consistent with business necessity); Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (sustaining, under Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
dismissal of employee of girls club because she was single and pregnant in violation of club's "role
model" rule); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing airline to ground
flight attendants for duration of pregnancy); Alison Leigh Cowan, Trend in Pregnancies Challenges
Employers, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1989, at Al (reporting that 3,600 pregnancy-related complaints
have been filed annually with EEOC since 1981); Douglas Martin, About New York: Women Given
Cruelest Choice Now Fight Back, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1989, at 27 ("mid-level managers told preg-
nant correction officers that they must obtain abortions or resign, according to [New York] [C]ity's
Department of Investigation"); see also text accompanying notes 302-303 supra (discussing fetal-
protective exclusions of women from employment).
447. Public outrage directed at pregnant, drug-dependent women is but one manifestation of
this response. Advocates for providing state protection to the fetus in utero believe the pregnant
woman has a duty of care to the unborn implicating choices in all aspects of her life, cf. note 331
supra, breach of which warrants state intervention, whether in the form of civil liability, criminal
prosecution, forcible surgical treatment, "protective" incarceration, or deprivation of child custody.
Cf. text accompanying notes 280-285 supra.
448. The same compound of physiological and social forces that shape the work of gestation
governs the work of breast-feeding an infant once it is born. Women are alone physiologically capa-
ble of engaging in the work, but the choice to engage in it and the conditions under which it is
performed are fundamentally social. Like gestation, breast-feeding an infant is a practice subject to a
diverse array of prescriptive norms; women are pressured to perform the work and stigmatized for
performing it in highly context-bound ways. Suffice it to observe that a woman nursing a baby will
likely meet with approval if she is sitting in her bedroom, and scorn if sitting in a corporate board
room.
449. Presently, 45% of women with pre-school age children withdraw from the labor force to
care for them personally, while 55% continue to engage in some form of paid employment. Felicity
Barringer, Census Report Shows a Rise in Child Care and its Casts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at
A12; see also RUTH SIDEL, ON HER OWN 204 (1990) (in 1987, 63% of women with college degrees
remained in the work force after bearing a child, as compared with 38% of high school graduates).
Even when mothers are employed, they continue to perform a larger share ofthe work offamily
maintenance than do men. For example, a 1986 study of a Boston-based firm found that employed
women work twice as many hours on childcare and homemaking as men, even when the woman's
income is greater than the man's, and that married female parents spend a total of 85 hours a week
on work, in and out of the home, while married male parents spend 65 hours. Other studies suggest
that even where parents share child care, fathers are more likely to 'play' with children, and mothers
to carry out most of the caretaking activities. Id. at 202-04; see also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE
SECOND SHIFf: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 271-79 (1989) (research on
who does the housework and childcare in two-income households).
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stigmatization, unlike men, if they will not. Consequently, a woman's iden-
tity, relations, and prospects are defined by becoming a parent in a way that
a man's are not.450
While this society celebrates the work of childcare, it continues to view
the work of raising children as "women's work." Childcare remains status
work, organized and valued in ways that limit the life prospects of those who
perform it. Most prominently, childcare is uncompensated labor, tradition-
ally performed under conditions of economic dependency;451 consequently,
it remains a form of undercompensated labor for those who are paid to assist
in the work.452 It is not merely the uncompensated character of childcare
that betrays its peculiar social valuation. Those who devote their personal
energies to raising children are likely to find their freedom to participate in
so-called public sphere activities impaired for years on end, for the evident
reason that most activities in the realms of education, employment, and poli-
tics are defined and structured as incommensurate with that work.453 Thus,
a woman who becomes a parent will likely find that the energy she invests in
childrearing will compromise her already constrained opportunities and im-
pair her already unequal compensation in the work force454-all the more so
450. For th.ese reasons, women as a group more frequently compromise employment opportu-
nities to accommodate family needs than do men. Cf Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Profes-
sional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163, 1183-87 (1988) (examining accommodations of familial and
occupational commitments among professionals).
451. On the uncompensated character of the work of family maintenance, see CATHARINE A.
MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 60-80 (1989); THE POLmcs OF
HOUSEWORK (Ellen Malos ed., 1980); Joan Acker, Class, Gender, and the Relations ofDistribution,
13 SIGNS 473 (1988); Heidi I. Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political
Struggle: The Example ofHousework, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 109 (Sandra Harding ed,
1987).
452. An analysis of the median weekly wages of female private household workers (averaged
for 1976-1984) shows African-American women earning $143, Hispanic women earning $148, and
white women earning $124. The same statistical source shows median weekly wages for all occupa-
tions, with African-American women averaging $242, Hispanic women at $224, and white women at
$264. See Suzanne Goldberg, In Pursuit of Workplace Rights: Household Workers and a Conflict of
Laws, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 63, 70 & n.25 (1990).
On the historical connections between women's domestic work in the family and the organiza-
tion and compensation of domestic "help," see FAYE E. DUDDEN, SERVING WOMEN: HOUSEHOLD
SERVICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1983). For a discussion of some of the contempo-
rary linkages between the maternal role and the work ofday-care providers, see Margaret K. Nelson,
Mothering Others' Children: The Experiences ofFamily Day-Care Providers, 15 SIGNS 586 (1990).
453. For example, an article in the American Bar Association Journal off'ered women entering
the practice of law the following tips for success:
Don't "shirk late hours or weekend projects." Don't cook and tell, i.e., avoid going home
to cook dinner-or if you do, don't let anyone know. Keep your "personal life in the
background. ..•• Never make excuses based on the needs of a spouse or children..••"
Rhode, supra note 450, at 1186, quoting Nell B. Strachan, A Map for Women on the Road to Success.
A.B.A. J., May 1984, at 94, 94-95; see also R. SIDEL, supra note 449, at 200-01 (in medical profes-
sion, it may be acceptable for doctors to take time off' for traditionally male responsibilities, but not
for traditionally female responsibilities associated with family care). Those women who do attempt
to accommodate work and family commitments are often penalized for it. See Leslie Bender, Sex
Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 941, 943 n.l0 (1989); Claudia Deutsch,
Saying No to the 'Mommy Track, 'N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1990, at 29 (describing "Mommy Track" as
a "devil's bargain"); Women in the Work Force: The Mommy Track v. the Fast Track, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1989, at 2 (positive and negative responses to "Mommy Track").
454. In analyzing the size of a gender-based "wage gap," it is conventional practice to exclude
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if she raises the child alone, whether by choice, divorce, or abandonment.455
Considered in cold dollar terms, it is the institution ofmotherhood that gives
a gendered structure to the economics of family life, and a gendered face to
poverty in the nation's life.456
3. Abortion restrictions as status-enforcing state action.
In assessing the social effects of restrictions on abortion, it is important
to observe not only that such regulation compels women to perform the
work of bearing and rearing children, but that it lacks any provision that
would mitigate or offset the social consequences of enforced motherhood for
women. No modem legislature interested in adopting restrictions on abor-
tion has, to my knowledge, offered to compensate women for this work; to
protect women's employment and education opportunities while they per-
form the work of motherhood; or to provide women adequate childcare so
that they are not pushed into dependency upon men or the state. Nor has a
legislature required that men fathering the children women are forced to
bear assume primary responsibility for the work of nurturance and mainte-
nance women typically provide. Thus, when the state enacts restrictions on
abortion, it coerces women to perform the work of motherhood without al-
tering the conditions that continue to make such work a principal cause of
their secondary social status.
For this reason, state action compelling motherhood injures women in
predictable ways. Both the workof childbearing and the work of childrear-
ing compromise women's opportunities in education and employment;
neither the work of childbearing nor the work of childrearing produces any
variables that may contribute to such a gap but that do not reflect the operations of sex discrimina-
tion in employment, at least as conventionally understood. It should be noted that such variables-
for example, whether individuals work full-time or part-time, their general experience in the labor
force, and their tenure with their employer-are all crude biographical proxies for time women
devote to care of home and children. Cf. Paul Weiler, The Wages ofSex: The Uses and Limits of
Comparable Worth. 99 HARV. L. REv. 1728, 1780-84 (1986) (noting the role of these factors in wage
disparities); see also id. at 1786 (citing econometric study suggesting that the "addition ofeach child
enhances the man's earnings by another three percent while depressing that of the woman's by fully
ten percent").
455. The National Commission on Children, appointed by the President and Congress in 1989,
found that more than half the children in households headed by women are impoverished. T. Berry
Brazelton, Why Is America Failing Its Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1990, (Magazine), at 40, 42;
see also note 456 infra.
456. Almost all single-parent households are headed by women, and these households are dis-
proportionately represented amongst the ranks of the nation's poor. In 1988, nearly a quarter of the
nation's children were living in single-parent households; 21.4% living with their mother only, and
2.9% with their father only. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CuRRENT POPULATION REpORTS:
SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 162, STUDIES IN MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, at 18. In 1989,
more than half of the children who lived in households headed by women lived in poverty, while
only 20.3% of children who lived in single-parent households headed by their father lived below the
poverty level. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CuRRENT POPULATION REpORTS, SERIES P-20, No.
445, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1989, at 37, tbl. 6. Ofall poor black
families, 73.4% were maintained by women with no husband present; for white families the compa-
rable figure was 42.1%, and for Hispanic-origin families, 46.8%. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REpORTS, SERIES P-60, No. 168, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1989, at 10.
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material compensation for women; most often the work of childbearing and
the work of childrearing entangle women in relations of emotional and eco-
nomic dependency-to men, extended family, or the state. None of these
consequences is inherent in the physiology of reproduction; all are socially
produced, reflecting communal designation of the work of mothering as
"women's work." There is no other form of socially essential labor in this
society similarly organized or valued: The more effort a woman personally
invests in it, the more time she devotes to it, the more inexorably economi-
cally dependent she becomes. From this perspective, it is apparent that com-
pelled pregnancy will injure women in context-dependent ways. It may be
endured by women who have ordered their lives in conformity with tradi-
tional norms ofmotherhood, but it will profoundly threaten the material and
psychic welfare of any woman whose life deviates from this traditional norm,
whether by choice or socio-economic circumstance.457 When the state de-
prives women of choice in matters of motherhood, it deprives women of the
ability to lead their lives with some rudimentary control over the sex-role
constraints this society imposes on those who bear and rear children. It
makes the social reality of women's lives more nearly conform with social
stereotypes of women's lives. Considered from this perspective, choice in
matters of motherhood implicates constitutional values of equality and lib-
erty both.458
Women are centuries-versed in negotiating the conditions of mother-
hood, and deriving meaning, value, pleasure, and purpose from work that
this society all too frequently disparages. Under such conditions, mothering
is work that for a woman, and amongst women, variously promises joy, rage,
identity, and entrapment.459 But the fact that most women will give them-
457. A 1987 survey of abortion patients found that
unmarried cohabiting women are nine times as likely as married women living with their
husbands to have an abortion, and separated women are also at high risk. Other character-
istics associated with an above-average likelihood of abortion are current school enroll-
ment, current employment, low income, Medicaid coverage, intention to have no more
children, and residence in a metropolitan county.
Stanley K. Henshaw & Jane Silverman, The Characteristics and Prior Contraceptive Use of u.s.
Abortion Patients, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 158, 158 (1988); see also id. at 159 (57% of patients never
had abortion before and 27% had one prior abortion); cf. Skelton, supra note 269, at 1 (Women who
admitted to poll takers that they had had an abortion "tended to be better educated, working full
time, earning good salaries and generally representative of every racial and ethnic group. They also
tended to be either childless or the parent of just one child, single, a baby boomer and living in
metropolitan areas.").
In 1987, when a group of abortion patients was asked about their reasons for seeking an abor-
tion, three-quarters said that having a baby would interfere with work, school, or other responsibili-
ties, two-thirds said they could not afford to have a child, and half said that they did not want to be a
single parent or had relationship problems. Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do
Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 169 (1988).
458. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 659
(1980) ("The freedom to choose one's place in society, rather than accept an inferior status as Na-
ture's legacy, is both a symbol of equality and an effective instrument for attaining it. There is
nothing incongruous about protecting the freedom of intimate association through application of the
equal protection clause."); see also note 367 supra (privacy and Thirteenth Amendment analyses of
abortion-restrictive regulation that emphasize its caste- or status-enforcing aspects).
459. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND IN-
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selves to children in ways that belie what is taken from them, does not alter
the fact that coercing motherhood is an act of violence against women,460
one that devalues what women give, and give up, in parenting and who they
might be apart from that work.
Restrictions on abortion thus offend constitutional guarantees of equal
protection, not simply because of the status-based injuries they inflict on
women, but also because of the status-based attitudes about women they
reflect. For centuries, this society has defined women as mothers and de-
fined the work of motherhood as women's work. These are the assumptions
which make it "reasonable" to force women to become mothers. Absent
these deep-rooted assumptions about women, it is impossible to explain why
this society insists that restrictions on abortion are intended to protect the
unborn, and yet has never even considered taking action that would alleviate
the burdens forced motherhood imposes on women.
Restrictions on abortion reflect the kind of bias that is at the root of the
most invidious forms of stereotyping: a failure to consider, in a society al-
ways at risk of forgetting, that women are persons, too. It is a bias that
manifests itself in this society's unreflective expectation that women should
assume the burdens of bearing and rearing future generations, its tendency
to denigrate the work of motherhood, and its readiness to castigate women
who seek to avoid maternity as lacking in humanity, proof of which consists
in a woman's failure perfectly to subordinate her energies, resources, and
prospects to the task of making life-to a degree that men, employers, and
the community as a whole most often will not.
This society has "unclean hands" in matters respecting motherhood.
While it may possess the power, it sorely lacks the moral grounds to "bal-
ance" the rights of women and the unborn as if it were a disinterested by-
stander to a conflict thrust upon women by nature. We may stand a century
away from the attitudes expressed in the nineteenth century campaign, but
we are still generations away from any prospect of transcending their ideo-
logical or institutional legacy. In a society that viewed women as full and
equal citizens-as something more than particularly valuable means to an
important social end-the test for determining the constitutionality of abor-
tion-restrictive regulation might be: Has the state asserted its interest in pro-
moting the welfare of the unborn in a fashion consistent with promoting the
welfare of women?
STITUTION (1986); ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS (1983); Regina Aus-
tin, Sapphire Bound/, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 539, 558-74; Eileen Boris, Looking at Women's Historians
Looking At "Difference," 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 218-22 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender. 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 28-36 (1988).
460. Cf. West, supra note 459, at 28-36 (considering wanted, and especially, unwanted, preg-
nancy and motherhood as invasive experiences for women, which can constitute an assault upon
body and identity in a fashion analogous to intercourse or rape); id. at 29 ("[i]nvasion and intrusion,
rather than intimacy, nurturance and care, is the 'unofficial' story of women's subjective experience
of connection" to others); Ellen Willis, Abortion: Is a Woman a Person?, in POWERS OF DESIRE:
THE POLmcs OF SEXUALITY 471, 473 (Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell & Sharon Thompson eels.,
1983) ("However gratifying pregnancy may be to a woman who desires it, for the unwilling it is
literally an invasion-the closest analogy is the difference between lovemaking and rape.").
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In an inchoate fashion, Roe embodied this understanding. The Court
understood that regulation of women's conduct premised on a theory offetal
personhood would deeply conflict with public recognition of women's per-
sonhood. Roe's trimester framework accommodated this conflict practi-
cally, but gave only a partial account of its sense. By allowing states to
prohibit abortions at the point of fetal viability, the Court hoped to craft a
constitutional compromise. But Roe's viability rule can function as a legiti-
mate constitutional compromise only if it provides women reasonable access
to abortion in the early months of pregnancy, the period they normally seek
abortions; and if it is understood, not simply as an ambiguous recognition of
fetal personhood, but as an explicit constitutional affirmation of women's
personhood. The Constitution requires government to respect women's free-
dom to refuse motherhood because decisions about abortion are both deeply
personal and profoundly social: When a pregnant woman decides whether
to become a mother, she faces dilemmas in which the community itself is
inextricably complicit.
State action on behalf of the fetus in utero must find its constitutional
bearings, and constraints, in the community's relation to the citizen in whom
unborn life resides. In this sense, the common law criterion of quickening
gave surer moral guidance to the regulation of abortion than the "scientific"
concept of viability with which Roe replaced it. At least the common law
criterion of quickening located the unborn internal to a born, sentient being,
rather than presenting the unborn as an autonomous life form-an illusion
sustained for more than a century now by medical rhetoric. IfRoe survives
in some form, it will be because those charged with expounding federal and
state constitutions do not, in their hearts, credit this dehumanizing myth of
human genesis. It will be because they recognize that women's lives are re-
quired to make potential life recognizable as a person, and recognize that
because women are equal citizens too, their labor in bearing life is a gift with
which they can endow the community, not a resource the community can
expropriate to its use.
v. CONCLUSION
For too long this nation has regulated women's status through the insti-
tution of motherhood. Its judgments about the ways in which it is reason-
able to impose on women as mothers are deeply distorted by a long history
of denigrating, controlling, and using women as mothers. For this reason,
the physiological paradigms that currently dominate review of reproductive
regulation are deeply pernicious. They invite public actors to use state
power against women without the minimal forms of self-scrutiny that re-
quirements of equal protection normally impose. They invite abusive exer-
cise of public power against women because they suspend rudimentary
safeguards on the exercise of such power in precisely those circumstances
where safeguards are most needed. Before this society rushes to judge
women's conduct toward the unborn, it ought to reflect upon its own con-
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duct toward women. Instead of devising new ways to control women as
mothers, it needs to promote the welfare offuture generations by means that
respect and support women in their work as mothers. Only then will the
story of the nineteenth century criminal abortion campaign be a closed chap-
ter in American history-and not a continuing part of American life.
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